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Abstract
This doctoral thesis deals with the question of how self-images change when
people are getting into the age of retirement. Two main issues are addressed
regarding the development of personal identities in that life stage: (1) The
content of identity: the question if and how retired people have a different
way of defining or characterizing themselves than employed people. (2) The
age identity (subjective age): the question of how old people feel, and what
predictors and implications can be found for a younger or older age identity.
Method: These issues have been addressed first with a preliminary in-
quiry where 13 persons aged 55-67 were interviewed face-to-face with open
questions. Based on a qualitative analysis of the interviews, a standardized
questionnaire was developed and sent to a random sample of 2000 citizens of
Thun (Switzerland) aged 58-70. 792 persons participated in the survey.
Results: (1) Identity content: The profession remained important for
the participants’ self-description after retirement and was not replaced by a
new identity as being retired. In general, the retired persons estimated more
domains of self-description as important than did the not yet retired persons,
which means that the identity diversity was higher for the retired than for
the not yet retired persons. In addition, high identity diversity correlated
with a high satisfaction across different life domains. This finding has im-
portant implications for psychological theories of older adults’ development,
disproving strongly the view that disengagement be inherent to successful or
even to normal aging.
(2) Age Identity: A measurement model of subjective age was assessed
and proved to have very good fit indices and a one-dimensional structure.
Furthermore, it was shown that the general tendency to feel younger than
one’s real age implies a motivational component and can therefore probably
be seen as a special case of self-enhancement. This finding provides a possi-
ble theoretical framework for further research. To explore the relationships
between various predictors and subjective age, a predictive structural model
of subjective age was developed, including aspects of personality, behavior
and body.
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Introduction
This work approaches the question of identity changes during older adult-hood. Retirement seems to be a crucial moment in the process of
growing older since it is generally viewed as a point in time where older age
begins. Retirees are often referred to as the “young old”, a term that shows
some of the uncertainty of those people’s age identity. They often do not
feel old, but nevertheless find themselves suddenly belonging to the category
of the “elderly”. Furthermore, the profession provides a very strong identity
throughout our working time. The question arises of what happens to that
vocational identity once the profession is not practiced anymore.
The thesis addresses two major issues regarding the development of per-
sonal identities in that life stage:
1. Identity contents: This issue enfolds the question if and how retired
persons have a different way of defining or characterizing themselves
than employed persons.
The present thesis made several contributions to this topic:
(a) The role of the professional identity after retirement was illumi-
nated, that is, the question if the profession remains important
for retired persons, and what factors are linked to a stronger or
weaker professional identity.
(b) The concept of identity diversity was introduced and contrasted to
theories of aging. Since the disengagement theory (Cummings &
Henry, 1961) and the self-complexity theory (Linville, 1985; 1987)
lead to competing predictions in this respect, this study verified
to what extent a high identity diversity has positive or negative
implications on older adults.
(c) As little is known yet about the effects of retirement or aging on
the personal identity, some issues were approached in an explo-
rative way: the question which identity-domains are getting more
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or less important after retirement, or to what extent the age makes
a difference on the importance of identity-domains.
(d) A further explorative question concerned the self-perception of
changes, that is, what kind of changes people experience about
themselves in the course of older adulthood. This question was
approached in a qualitative analysis.
2. Age identity (also: subjective age):
The construct of subjective age (which is determined by how old a per-
son feels) has been used especially in marketing psychology since the
1970’s, where it can be used to distinguish different consumer groups,
the subjectively younger persons being supposed to consume more ac-
tively than those who feel old. In most previous studies, subjective
age was measured by a scale comprising four aspects of subjective
age, which was developed by Kastenbaum, Derbin, Sabatini, and Artt
(1972), and further evolved by Barak (1987). The model is supposed
to be four-dimensional; however, this assumption was never empirically
verified.
Previous studies found consistently that most older adults feel consid-
erably younger that their real age, but there is still a lack of theoretical
explanations for this phenomenon.
The following contributions were made by this thesis to the research
field of age identity:
(a) Kastenbaum et al.’s (1972) model of subjective age was evaluated
with two regards: its applicability as a scale was assessed, and
the so far unquestioned assumption that the model consist of four
dimensions was challenged.
(b) Two theoretical approaches were introduced and contrasted
with regard to their appropriateness to explain the subjective
age bias: (1) a motivational approach assuming that the
age-underestimation is a special form of self-enhancement (since
feeling young is generally considered as positive), and (2) an
information-processing approach assuming that people compare
themselves to an inner age-image when they rate their own
subjective age. Since elderly people look younger nowadays than
in former times, this prototype does not correspond to reality
anymore, which leads to an underestimation of the own age.
Several competing predictions were deduced from the two ap-
proaches and tested empirically.
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(c) The previous findings about correlations of subjective age with
other variables were integrated into a predictive model, which was
compared with the empirical data by means of structural equation
modeling.
The following methods were applied to address these issues: A preliminary
inquiry was conducted where 13 persons aged 55-67 were interviewed face-to-
face with open questions. Based on a qualitative analysis of the interviews,
a standardized questionnaire was developed and sent to a random sample of
2000 citizens of Thun (Switzerland) aged 58-70. 792 persons participated in
the survey.
The thesis is organized in the following way:
The first three chapters will address the research question from a theo-
retical point of view, giving a literature overview to several relevant subject-
matters:
The first chapter will give an introduction into different approaches of
research on self and identity. A historical background will be provided, giving
a very brief overview over some of the philosophical questions concerning self
and identity. Based on the research of Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999),
neurological considerations about the self will then be presented. Further,
some cognitive aspects of the self will be addressed—the focus being laid on
the question of how self-knowledge is represented in our minds. The chapter
will conclude with a presentation and discussion of several approaches of
social identity theories.
The second chapter will address the development of self and identity in
later adulthood. Four theoretical approaches of older adults’ development
will be discussed, and an overview of previous research on age identity will
be given.
In the third chapter the topic of identity and roles will be faced under the
perspective of retirement. After pointing out some definition problems of re-
tirement, several kinds of predictors for a successful adaptation to retirement
will be discussed. Then two models of role exit will be elaborated: A model
developed by Ebaugh (1988) and an expansion of this model by Ashforth
(2001).
In the fourth and fifth chapter, an empirical analysis will be presented
regarding the two aspects of identity development during the transition to
retirement—identity contents and age identity:
The fourth chapter will address the issue of identity contents, that is the
development of self-definition domains during the transition to retirement.
A special focus will be placed on one hand on the development of the re-
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spondents’ professional identity after retirement and their self-definition as
retirees, on the other hand on the question how identity diversity is linked
to life satisfaction for retired persons; further some explorative issues will
be addressed. In a first step, the most important theoretical framework will
be presented and hypotheses will be derived. Afterwards, the method will
be described, followed by a presentation and discussion of the results. Since
different research questions are treated in this part, and in order to ensure
a stringent and easily readable structure, a large part of the discussion was
included seamlessly into the presentation of the results. A concluding dis-
cussion will be provided at the end of the chapter.
The fifth chapter will deal with age identity, where three major issues will
be addressed: a measurement model of subjective age will be evaluated, two
theoretical approaches to explain the subjective age bias will be introduced
and empirically assessed, and a predictive structural model of subjective age
will be developed. The structure of the chapter will be the same as above:
beginning with an introduction of the theoretical background and deduction
of research questions and hypotheses, followed by a description of the method
and a presentation and discussion of the results.
The book will be concluded with a final general discussion.
Chapter 1
Concepts of Self and Identity
The Go¨delian strange loop that
arises in formal systems in
mathematics (...) is a loop that
allows such a system to “perceive
itself”, to talk about itself, to
become “self-aware”, and in a sense
it would not be too far to say that
by virtue of having such a loop, a
formal system acquires a self.
Douglas R. Hofstadter (1999)
Go¨del, Escher, Bach: an Eternal
Golden Braid
1.1 Models of the Self in Philosophy and Psy-
chology: Historical Background
“Let us begin with the Self in its widest acceptation, and follow it
up to its most delicate and subtle form, advancing from the study
of the empirical, as the Germans call it, to that of the pure, Ego”
(James, 1980, p. 291).
The question of the nature of the “Self” has absorbed mankind for thou-sands of years. I will in this chapter describe one of the main problems
of personal identity and consider several approaches how the problem of per-
sonal identity was addressed by philosophy and early psychology. Parts of
15
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this analysis are based on a comparing discussion by Brown (1998) and a
philosophical debate by Cohen (2002).
1.1.1 The Problem of Personal Identity—Greek Ori-
gins of Dualism
The problem of personal identity refers to the question of what it is that
binds together our perceptions and thoughts (what we refer to as “I”), and
what the nature is of this “I” that appears to unite our sensations.
One of the earliest discussions on the nature of identity can be found
with Greek Philosophers. Plato reports the following puzzling doctrine from
Heraclitus (Cratylus 402A, as cited in Cohen, 2002):
Heraclitus, you know, says that everything moves on and that
nothing is at rest; and, comparing existing things to the flow of a
river, he says that you could not step into the same river twice.
The idea is this: since the composition of the river changes from one
moment to the next, it is not the same (numerically the same) river for any
length of time at all. Plato thinks that Heraclitus uses the river as an example
of what he takes to be a general condition: everything is like a river in this
respect. That is, nothing retains its identity for any time at all. That is:
there are no persisting objects.
Another puzzle that points out one of the main problems of self and
identity is the “ship of Theseus”. This is a puzzle that has been around since
antiquity, probably later than Heraclitus, but not much later. It first surfaces
in print in Plutarch (Vita Thesei, 22-23, as cited in Cohen, 2002).
The original puzzle is this: over the years, the Athenians replaced each
plank in the original ship of Theseus as it decayed, thereby keeping it in good
repair. Eventually, there was not a single plank left of the original ship. So,
did the Athenians still have one and the same ship that used to belong to
Theseus?
On this basic question, we can develop other thought experiments, like:
what if somebody collects all the planks of the original ship and rebuilds a
ship, maybe in a slightly different form, which one would we consider to be
the ship of Theseus?
The point of these stories is that the physical properties of an entity are
neither sufficient nor necessary to establish its identity. The Greek philoso-
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pher Aristotle recognized this point when he distinguished between the sub-
stance of an object and its form. The substance of an object is its matter—the
material of which it is made. Its form is abstract an immaterial. For exam-
ple, the substance of a bronze statue (its matter) is bronze; statue is its form.
If we melted the bronze and made some other object with it, we would no
longer have the same object, even though the substance is still the same.
The same is true, according to Aristotle, for a person. The essence of a
person is not the person’s physical substance, but the person’s form, which
Aristotle referred to as the person’s soul.
Aristotle’s view of the soul as an immaterial entity that unites the person’s
various perceptions and sensations persisted for over 2000 years. It was
adopted by the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages (e.g., Augustine,
Aquinas) and later for example by Descartes or Hobbes.
This view is also called dualism because it postulates the existence of two
entities: the body and the mind (or soul), or more generally: the material
and the immaterial.
1.1.2 Locke: Identity is Memory
The British Philosopher John Locke (1603–1704) made a distinction between
man and person, reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction between substance and
form: man is substance, person is form. Locke’s reference to thought “across
time and space” establishes that the criterion for personhood is an ability to
remember our various perceptions in the prior situations of our lives. For
Locke, then, the identity of a person is tied to memory; it extends as far
back in time as the person has memories.
By treating identity in terms of memory, Locke moved the study of self
from the spiritual to the empirical. At the same time, his departure from the
dualist tradition was incomplete. He assumed that our memories inhere in
an immaterial substance. Although he believed we could never know what
this immaterial substance was like, he was sure it existed.
1.1.3 Hume: Identity is a Fiction
Locke’s ideas were subsequently extended and modified by the Scottish
Philosopher David Hume (1711–1776). As had Locke, Hume assumed
that the subjective unity of the self derives from memory: We remember
having particular perceptions and thus perceive a unified entity as having
those perceptions. Hume disagreed with Locke, however, as to whether
these perceptions were joined in any fashion other than a psychological,
subjective one. He did not believe they were. He did not believe there was
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an immaterial substance that was bearer of this unity. Instead, he believed
that all that existed were isolated perceptions. We perceive them as joined,
but this perception is a fiction; the isolated perceptions themselves are not
joined in any real fashion. Hume’s basis for reaching this conclusion is that
he cannot find any such substance or unity in himself. He suggests that our
notions of personal identity derive from the fact that our thoughts follow
one another so rapidly that we confuse temporal contiguity with unity.
Thus, for Hume, the identity which we ascribe to the mind of humans is
only a fictitious one.
1.1.4 William James’ Framework and Definition of the
Self
The work of the prominent American pragmatist William James (1890) was
the beginning of systematic and empiric investigation of the self. He wrote
extensively on the topic and developed his definition of self in chapter 10 of
his publication The Principles of Psychology (1890).
James approached the problem of personal identity on the background of
the above presented theorists:
Ever since Hume’s time, it has been justly regarded as the most
puzzling puzzle with which psychology has to deal; and whatever
view one may espouse, one has to hold his position against heavy
odds. If, with the Spiritualists, one contend for a substantial
soul, or transcendental principle of unity, one can give no positive
account of what that may be. And if, with the Humians, one deny
such a principle and say that the stream of passing thoughts is all,
one runs against the entire common-sense of mankind, of which
the belief in a distinct principle of selfhood seems an integral part
(James, 1890, p. 330).
James attempts to solve this enigma by staking out a middle ground
between these various positions. He disagrees with those who postulate the
existence of an immaterial substance in which our perceptions inhere, but
he also disagrees with those who claim that there is no tie binding these
perceptions. Instead, his position is that there is a unity to the self, provided
by the thoughts and perceptions themselves and the feelings associated with
them. This unity of the self can be explained entirely in psychological terms.
Each successive thought is joined with previous thoughts by virtue of the
feeling they share. Personal identity is therefore, according to James, our
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uninterrupted memory for prior perceptions and our memory or the affect
associated with them.
James (1890) used the term “the empirical self” to refer to all of the
various ways people think about themselves. He used three subcategories
into which he grouped the various components of the empirical self: (1) the
material self, (2) the social self, and (3) the spiritual self.
1. The Material Self
The material self refers to tangible objects, people, of places that carry
the designation my or mine. Two subclasses of the material self can
be distinguished. These are the bodily self and the extra-corporeal self
(beyond the body).
The bodily component of the material self requires little explanation.
A person speaks of“my arm”or“my leg”, and our body and parts of our
body are clearly an intimate part of who we are. The extra-corporeal
self extends to include other people (my children), pets (my cat), pos-
sessions (my house), places (my hometown), and the products of our
work and our ambitions (my painting). It is not the physical entities,
however, that comprise the material self, but rather our psychological
ownership of them (Scheibe, 1985, as cited in Brown, 1998). For ex-
ample, a person my have a favorite chair she likes to sit in. The chair
itself is not part of the self. Instead, it is the sense of an appropriation
represented by the phrase “my favorite chair”. This is what we mean
when we talk about the extended self; it includes all of the people,
places, and things that are psychologically part of who we are.
Prior to the time James wrote his book, psychological research was
restricted to the physical self (cf. Brown, 1998). But James wanted to
expand the study of self to include nonphysical aspects of the person.
He believed that the self encompassed more than our physical bodies
and has a fluid character. Given this fluidity, how can we tell whether
an entity can be considered a part of the self?
James suggested that we could make this determination by examining
our emotional investment in the entity. If we respond in an emotional
way when the entity is praised or attacked, the entity is likely to be part
of the self. We feel not only emotionally attached to our own body, but
also our property, family, friends and so on, all of which are becoming
thus a part of our empirical selves.
Another way to determine whether something is part of the extended
self is according to James to see how we act toward it. If we pay a lot
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of attention to it and invest a lot to improve or maintain it, we can
infer that the entity is part of the self. We have an impulse to watch
over our body, to clothe it favorably, to cherish our parents, partners
and children, and to find ourselves a home of our own which we may
live in and enhance. An equally instinctive impulse drives us to collect
property. Those collections become, with different degrees of intimacy,
parts of our empirical selves. The parts of our possession that are most
intimately ours are often those in which we have invested most.
James (1890) suggests further that our depression at the loss of posses-
sions is only partly due to our feeling that we must now renounce at
certain advantages directly connected to the possessions. More impor-
tant than this is, according to James, a sense of the “shrinkage of our
personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness, which is a
psychological phenomenon by itself” (James, 1890, p. 293).
So we do not value our possessions simply for what they provide, but
also because they have become a part of us. (Note that we usually
tend to assume that the causal influence goes into the other direction:
we gather things – that is make them a part of our selves – because
those entities are valuable, we do not think that we value it because it
is ours.) For example, children often are avid collectors, they gather
and treasure shells, rocks, screws, and so forth. The material value of
those things is often negligible, but they represent important aspects
of self. The tendency to treat possessions as part of the self might also
explain why so many people have difficulties discarding of old clothes
or other possessions that have long outlived their usefulness.
There are at least two functions of the extension of the self on posses-
sions (cf. Belk, 1988; Brown, 1998):
(a) Possessions serve a symbolic function, they help people to define
themselves. The clothes we wear, the cars we drive, and the man-
ner in which we adorn our homes and offices signal to ourselves
and others who we think we are and how we wish to be regarded.
(b) Possessions also extend the self in time. Most people take steps to
ensure that their letters, photographs, possessions, and memen-
tos are distributed to others at the time of their death. Besides
the desire to hand down to others the utilitarian value of these
things, this dispersal might also have the function of giving peo-
ple the feeling of coming a bit closer to immortality by passing
their possessions on to the next generation.
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2. The Social Self
The second category in James’s scheme is the social self. The social
self refers to how we are regarded and recognized by others. A person
has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize the
person and carry an image of him or her in their mind. Or, since the
individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may,
according to James, practically say that a person has as many social
selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he
cares.
Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier (1995) elaborated James’ categoriza-
tion and suggested a further distinction between five types of social
identities:
(a) personal relationships (e. g., wife, father)
(b) ethnic group or religion (e. g., Asian-American, Muslim)
(c) political affiliations (e.g., Republican, pacifist)
(d) stigmatized group (e. g., criminal, drug-addict)
(e) vocation, avocations and employment status (e. g., teacher, artist,
retiree)
Some of these identities are ascribed : these are identities that we are
born with. They are imposed on us irreversibly and without our contri-
bution. Examples for ascribed identities are the ethnic group, or also
some personal relationships like “son” or “daughter”.
Other identities are attained : these are identities that we acquire in
life, for example our profession or political affiliations.
Each of these social identities is accompanied by a specific set of expec-
tations and behaviors. We act differently in the role of “wife” than in
the role of “teacher”. This results, according to James, in what practi-
cally is a division of a person into several selves. This may sometimes
be a discordant splitting, like where we are afraid to let one set of ac-
quaintances know us as we are elsewhere; but it may also be a perfectly
harmonious division of labor, like where someone is tender to his wife
(in his role of husband) and strict to his pupils (in his professional role
as teacher).
James made an additional point about these social selves: he suggested
an instinctive drive to be noticed and recognized by others. His assump-
tion was that we affiliate not simply because we like company, but also
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because we crave recognition and status. Thus, a persons social self
is the recognition he gets from his friends, family, and other relevant
persons.
James believed that our social roles are one important aspect, but that
they are by no means the sole aspect of self nor the most important.
Rather, he contended that there is a common sense of self that runs
through all the various social identities.
3. The Spiritual Self
James called the third category of the empirical self the spiritual self.
The spiritual self is our inner self or our psychological self, this means
our subjective being, our psychic faculties or dispositions. Our per-
ceived abilities, attitudes, emotions, interests, motives, opinions, traits,
and wishes are all part of the spiritual self. It is comprised of everything
we call my or mine that is not a tangible object, person, or place, or a
social role.
In short, the spiritual self refers to my perceived inner psychological
qualities. It represents my subjective experience of myself—how it feels
to be “me”.
These psychic dispositions are according to James the most enduring
and intimate part of the self, the part which we most truly seem to be.
James assumes that we take a purer self-satisfaction when we think for
example of our ability to argue and discriminate, of our moral sensibility
and conscience, or of our powerful will, than when we think about any
of our other possessions.
It is of interest to note the close connection between our possessions
(which are aspects of the material self) and our emotions, attitudes,
and beliefs (which are components of the spiritual self). As Abelson
(1986, as cited in Brown, 1998) observed, this similarity is captured in
our language. A person is said to have a belief, from the time the belief
is first acquired, to the time it is discarded or lost. We also use to say
things like “I inherited a view” or “I can’t buy that!”. Finally, we speak
of people who have abandoned their convictions or disowned an earlier
position. These terms imply that possessions and attitudes share an
underlying conceptual property: They are both owned by the self.
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1.2 Neurological Considerations about the
Self
Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999) have looked at the concept of“self” from
a neurological perspective, trying to identify brain regions or functions that
are responsible for different aspects of our experience of self and identity.
They do not claim to have found a definition for the self, but have worked
out a list of characteristics that define the self:
1. The Embodied Self
The self is anchored within a single body. If we close our eyes, we have
a vivid sense of different body parts occupying space - the so-called
body image. If you pinch a person’s toe, it is that person’s self, not
just his or her toe, that experiences the pain. Indeed, the “loyalty” of
our self to our body is so axiomatic that we do not even question it.
However, Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999) showed that our body
image is extremely malleable, despite all its appearance of stability.
They argue that our brain temporarily constructs our own body image
purely for convenience, and they propose a few experiments to the
reader to demonstrate how our body image can be altered profoundly
in just a few seconds. In one of the examples, you stroke and tap (in
an irregular rhythmic sequence) the nose of a person sitting in front of
you, facing the same direction, while a third person taps your own nose
in exactly the same rhythm and timing. After about half a minute, you
may develop the uncanny illusion that you are touching your own nose
that has been dislocated and stretched out about three feet in front of
your face. The more random and unpredictable the stroking sequence,
the more striking the illusion will be.
Another illusion requires a dummy rubber hand which you place be-
tween you and a cardboard that you set like a wall in front of you.
You place your own hand in the same position like the rubber hand,
but behind the cardboard so you cannot see it. Then another person
strokes and taps in the same irregular, but perfectly synchronous way
both your hand behind the cardboard and the rubber hand that you are
watching. Within seconds you will experience the stroking sensation as
arising from the dummy hand. In both experiments, the sheer statis-
tical improbability of the two sequences of strokes and taps leads the
brain to adopt a different body image although your conscious brain
knows perfectly that this is absurd.
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Circuits in the parietal lobes and the regions of the frontal lobes to
which they project are involved in constructing our body image. Partial
damage to these structures can cause gross distortions in body image.
There was for instance such a patient who claimed that her left arm
belonged to her mother, or another who said that the left half of her
body was still sitting in her chair when she got up and walked.
Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999) conclude from this evidence that
our body image is an entirely transitory construct, despite its appear-
ance of durability, and despite our assuming that our “self” is anchored
to a single body that remains stable and permanent at least until death.
2. The Passionate Self
The emotions—mediated by the limbic system and amygdala—enable
us to see the meaning and significance of things and to apprehend
their implications. Thus they are an essential aspect of self, not just
a “bonus”. The amygdala and the rest of the limbic system (in the
temporal lobes) ensure that the cortex serves the organism’s basic evo-
lutionary goals. The amygdala monitors the highest levels of perceptual
representations and “has it’s fingers on the keyboard of the autonomic
nervous system” (Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1999, p. 248), it deter-
mines whether or not to respond emotionally to something and what
kinds of emotions are appropriate. It also receives information from
the insular cortex, which in turn is driven partially by sensory input
not only from the skin but also from the viscera (heart, lung, liver,
stomach), so that one can also speak of a visceral, “vegetative self” or
of a “gut reaction” to something.
Pathologies of the emotional self include temporal lobe epilepsy, Cap-
gras’ syndrome and Cotard’s syndrome. In the temporal epilepsy, there
may be a heightened sense of self that may arise partly through a
process called “hyperconnectivity”—a strengthening of connections be-
tween the sensory areas of the temporal cortex and the amygdala. Such
hyperconnectivity may result from repeated seizures that cause a per-
manent enhancement (kindling) of these pathways, leading the patient
to ascribe deep significance to everything around him, including him-
self. Conversely, people with Capgras’ syndrome have reduced emo-
tional response to certain categories of objects, namely faces. People
with Cotard’s syndrome (nihilistic delusional disorder) have more per-
vasive problems with emotion, feeling so emotionally remote from the
world and from themselves that they believe for example that their
friends, family, possessions, the whole world, or even parts of their
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body do not exist. A Cotard’s patient can actually make the absurd
claim that he is dead or that he can smell his flesh rotting.
Interestingly, what we call“personality”—a vital aspect of your self that
endures for life and is notoriously impervious to “correction” by other
people of even by common sense—probably also involves the very same
limbic structures and their connections with the ventromedial frontal
lobes. Damage to the frontal lobes produces no obvious, immediate dis-
turbance in consciousness, but it can profoundly alter the personality.
Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999) report the example of a railway
worker whose frontal lobes were pierced by a crowbar in an accident,
and who was transformed from a stable, polite, hardworking young man
into a lying, cheating vagabond who could not hold down a job.
3. The Executive Self
Classical physics and modern neuroscience tell us that we inhabit a
deterministic billiard ball universe. However, people do not experience
themselves as puppets on a string, but have the feeling that they are
in charge and have a free will to decide over their own actions. Indeed,
a “self” that sees itself as completely passive, as a helpless spectator,
is no self at all, and a self that is hopelessly driven to action by its
impulses and urgings is equally effete. A self needs free will even to
exist. More technically, conscious awareness can be described as a
“conditional readiness to act” (Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1999, p.
249)
To achieve all this, we need to have in our brains not only a representa-
tion of the world and various objects in it but also a representation of
ourselves, including our own body within that representation (—and it
is this peculiar recursive aspect of the self that makes it so puzzling).
The representation of the external self has to interact in addition with
our self-representation (including the motor command system) in order
to allow us to make a choice. Derangements in this mechanism can
lead to syndromes like anosognosia or somatoparaphrenia, in which a
patient will with a perfectly straight face claim that parts of his or her
body belong to another person.
What neural structure is involved in representing these“embodied”and
“executive” aspects of the self? Damage to the anterior cingulate gyrus
results in a bizarre condition called“akinetic mutism”—the patient sim-
ply lies in bed unwilling to do or incapable of doing anything even
though he appears to be fully aware of his surroundings. This is prob-
ably as close as one can get to witness an absence of free will.
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Sometimes when there is partial damage to the anterior cingulate, the
very opposite happens: the patient’s had is uncoupled from his or her
conscious thoughts and intentions and attempts to grab things or even
perform relatively complex actions without his or her permission. Ra-
machandran and Blakeslee (1999) give the example of a patient whose
left hand seized the banister as she walked down the steps and she had
to use her other hand forcibly to unclench the fingers one by one, so
she could continue walking.
4. The Mnemonic Self
Our sense of personal identity—as a single person who endures through
space and time—depends on a long string of highly personal recollec-
tions: the autobiography. Organizing these memories into a coherent
story is obviously crucial to the construction of self.
The hippocampus is required for acquiring and consolidating new mem-
ory traces. If a man lost his hippocampi ten years ago, he will not have
any memories of events that occurred after that date. He is still fully
conscious, because he has all the memories prior to that loss, but he can
not store any new memories, so that in a very real sense his existence
was frozen at the time of the lesion.
Patients with temporal lobe epilepsy sometimes develop a tendency
to maintain elaborate diaries that record quotidian events in circum-
stantial detail—a trait called hypergraphia. This trait goes often to-
gether with a so-called “temporal-lobe-personality”: the patients have
heightened emotions, see cosmic significance in trivial events, and tend
to be humorless and self-important, and are obsessively preoccupied
with philosophical and theological issues. Ramachandran and Blakeslee
(1999) suggest that kindling in the amygdala causes every external
event and internal belief to acquire deep significance for the patient, so
that there is an enormous proliferation of spuriously self-relevant beliefs
and memories in his brain.
Profound derangement in the mnemonic self can lead to multiple per-
sonality disorder or MPD. In this syndrome, a person can assume two
or more distinct personalities, each of which is completely unaware, or
only dimly aware, of the others. There have been occasional reports in
the clinical literature that one person can be diabetic or allergic to a
substance while the other is not, or that various vital signs and hormone
profiles can be different in the two personalities. There are even cases
where one personality can be myopic or nearsighted whereas the other
has perfect vision (Birnbaum & Chiarello, 1996; Miller, 1989). MPD
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defies common sense. How can two selves dwell in one body? Accord-
ing to many psychiatrists, some cases of MPD are a consequence of
childhood sexual of physical abuse (cf. Ramachandran and Blakeslee,
1999). The child, growing up, finds the abuse so emotionally intoler-
able that she gradually walls it off into another world. A person who
has two sets of mutually incompatible beliefs and memories about him-
or herself may have to create two personalities within one body as the
only way to prevent anarchy and endless strife.
Given the obvious relevance of this syndrome not only to understanding
the nature of self, but also as a valuable testing ground for the claims
of mind-body medicine, it is astonishing how little attention it has so
far received from mainstream neurology.
5. The Unified Self—Imposing Coherence on Consciousness, Fill-
ing in and Confabulation
Another important attribute of self is its unity—the internal coher-
ence of its different attributes. I assume that the unifying self is very
nearly related to the mnemonic self, both implying a general tendency:
the need to create and sustain a coherent world view. But there are
also phenomena of imposing coherence that have nothing to do with
memory, namely the filling in of the blind spot in our visual field.
Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999) suggest that the executive brain
processes responsible for this phenomenon are associated with the lim-
bic system including parts of the anterior cingulate gyrus. This process
connects the perceptual experience with specific emotions and goals.
6. The Vigilant Self
A vital clue to the neural circuitry underlying consciousness comes
from two other neurological disorders—penduncular hallucinosis and
“vigilant coma” or akinetic mutism.
The anterior cingulate and other limbic structures also receive pro-
jections from the intralaminar thalamic nuclei (cells in the thalamus),
which in turn are driven by clusters of cells in the brain stem, including
the cholinergic lateral tegmental cells and the pendunculopontine cells.
Hyperactivity of these cells can lead to visual hallucinations called pen-
duncular hallucinosis, and it is also known that schizophrenics have a
doubling of cell number in these very same brain stem nuclei, which
may contribute to their hallucinations.
Conversely, damage to the intralaminar nucleus or to the anterior cin-
gulate results in coma vigilance or akinetic mutism. Patients with this
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curious disorder are immobile and mute and react sluggishly, if at all, to
painful stimuli. Yet they are apparently wide awake and alert, moving
their eyes around and tracking objects.
Clearly these brain stem and thalamic circuits play an important part in
consciousness, but it remains to be seen if they play a merely supportive
role or wether they are an integral part of the circuitry that embodies
consciousness (cf. Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1999).
7. The Conceptual Self and the Social Self
Information in autobiographical memory and information about one’s
body image need to be accessible to the self-concept, so that thought
and talk about self are possible. In the normal brain there are special-
ized pathways that allow such access to occur, but when one or more
of these pathways are damaged, the system tries to do it anyway, and
confabulation results. There is for instance a denial syndrome that
can sometimes be seen with patients whose left side of the body is
paralyzed because of a right hemisphere damage, (e.g., after a stroke).
Those patients seem to ignore or even deny the fact that their left arm
or leg is paralyzed—even though they are quite mentally lucid in all
other respects. This disorder was named anosognosia by the French
Neurologist Joseph Franc¸ois Babinsky who first observed it clinically
in 1908. For those patients, there is no access channel between infor-
mation about the left side of the body and the patient’s self-concept.
But the self-concept is set up to try automatically to include that in-
formation. The result is that the self “assumes” that the arm is okay
and “fills in” the movements of that arm. The main purposes of do-
ing this are to prevent constant indecisiveness and to confer stability
on behavior. But another important function may be to support the
sort of created or narrative self that we present ourselves as unified in
order to achieve social goals and to be understandable to others. We
also present ourselves as acknowledging our past and future identity,
enabling us to be seen as part of society.
To demonstrate the reality of the social self to skeptics, Ramachandran
and Blakeslee (1999) propose the following thought experiment:
“Imagine that there is some act you’ve committed about
which you are extremely embarrassed (love letters and Po-
laroid photographs from an illicit affair). Assume further
that you have a fatal illness and will be dead in two months.
If you know that people rummaging through your belongings
1.2. Neurological Considerations about the Self 29
will discover your secrets, will you do your utmost to cover
sour tracks? If the answer is yes, the question arises, Why
bother? After all, you know you won’t be around, so what
does it matter what people think after you’re gone? This
simple thought experiment suggests that the idea of the so-
cial self is not just an abstract yarn. On the contrary, it is
so deeply ingrained in us that we want to protect it even af-
ter death. Many a scientist has spent his entire life yearning
obsessively for posthumous fame—sacrificing everything else
just to leave a tiny scratch-mark on the edifice” (Ramachan-
dran and Blakeslee, 1999, p.254).
There is of course a certain irony to the fact that the self that almost by
definition is entirely private is to a significant extent a social construct,
a story that we make up for others.
Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999) suggest that confabulation and
self-deception evolved mainly because of the need to impose stability,
internal stability and coherence on behavior, but that an added im-
portant function might stem from the need to conceal the truth from
other people. Some interesting questions arise from this suggestion:
Does a patient with denial syndrome deny his paralysis to himself as
well? Would he do it when nobody was watching? Ramachandran’s
experiments suggest that he probably would1, but maybe the delusion
is amplified when others are present. Would his skin register a galvanic
response as he confidently asserts that he could arm wrestle? Even
though he denies the paralysis, would he be disturbed by the word and
register a strong galvanic skin response? Ramachandran tells an anec-
dote of one his patients who had tried—unsuccessfully, of course, but
1He wanted to find out what happened if the denial patients were rewarded for honesty,
so he gave them a choice between a task that could be done with one hand (thread a light
bulb into a bare socket) and another task that required the use of two hands (tie a pair
of shoelaces). Patients were told that they could earn five dollars for the light bulb, and
ten dollars for the shoelaces. Unhandicapped people would naturally go for the shoelaces,
but most paralyzed stroke patients—who do not suffer from denial—choose the light bulb,
knowing their limitations. Remarkably, stroke patients who had denial opted for the
shoelace-task every time and spent minutes fiddling unsuccessfully with the laces without
showing any signs of frustration. Even when patients were given the same choice ten
minutes later they went unhesitatingly for the bimanual task.
In another experiment, Ramachandran tried to “trick” the patients with a spontaneous
motor task, telling them to grab a loaded tray. Half-side paralyzed patients who did not
suffer from denial put their non-paralyzed hand in the middle under the tray – the center
of gravity – whereas patients who denied their left-sided paralysis just put their right hand
to the right side of the tray so that it toppled over. (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1999).
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oblivious of her handicap—to tie a shoelace with one hand. The next
day, she told a student that she had “tied it successfully with both my
hands”, which would be a very improbable thing to say for any person
who really did not have the least concern about her hands. This raises
the question if some part of her might know perfectly that she is para-
lyzed, and her strange remark was an attempt to mask this knowledge.
Another question is: Would a normal child show a strong galvanic skin
reaction when confabulating (children are notoriously prone to such
behavior)?
And, as Ramachandran and Blakeslee put it:
“What if a neurologist were to develop anosognosia (the de-
nial syndrome) as the result of a stroke? Would he continue
to lecture on this topic to his students—blissfully unaware
that he himself was suffering from denial? Indeed, how do I
know that I am not such a person? It’s only through raising
questions such as these that we can begin to approach the
greatest scientific and philosophical riddle of all—the nature
of the self” (Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1999, p. 255).
1.3 The Cognitive Representation of Self-
Knowledge
Cognitive psychologists assume that the mental representation of knowledge
about the self does not differ on principle from the representation of knowl-
edge about other persons and objects, although it is more differentiated and
affect-laden. The self-concept can thus be characterized as a dynamic mem-
ory system, the structure of which is represented in various models as they
have been developed for knowledge representation in general. For an overview
see Kihlstrom and Klein (1997), and Linville and Carlston (1994). It con-
tains semantic-abstract knowledge in the sense of generalized properties (like
“I am cooperative”) as well as episodic-concrete knowledge referring to spe-
cific behavior and events of the past (like “Last year I was on a holiday in
Canada”).
Besides propositional, language-related representations there are also as-
sumed to be non-propositional, perception-related forms of representation,
like for example the visual notion of one’s own appearance.
There are different models assuming that our knowledge of the world
is organized into cognitive structures. One suggestion is that knowledge is
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organized in a hierarchical fashion, so that a general concept is positioned at
the top of the hierarchy, and more specific knowledge resides at a subordinate
status (cf. Brown, 1998).
Figure 1.1 presents in the top half a greatly simplified example of this
type of model for the general concept of “animal”. Various kinds of animals
are associated with this general heading (e.g., birds, fish, and mammals).
Examples of each type of animal occupy a subordinate level, and linked to
each of these specific animals are characteristic behavior and attributes.
Honest
Birds
Chase Cheese
Mammals
Loyal
Chase cats
Dogs
Chase Mice
Aloof
Cats Mice
Timid
ANIMALS
Fish
Physical Attributes
SELF
Self−Esteem Social Identities
At School With Friends At Work
Intelligent Irreverent
Carefree
Honest
Responsible
Diligent
Honest
Serious
Figure 1.1: Hierarchical knowledge structures for animals and for the self
(Brown, 1998, p. 107)
People’s ideas about themselves may be represented in a similar man-
ner (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984). The bottom half of figure 1.1 shows such
a model (equally simplified). At the top of the hierarchy is the self. Un-
derlying this concept are three examples of more specific headings: physical
attributes, self-esteem, and social identities. Under each of the social iden-
tities are various characteristics and traits. Although there is disagreement
concerning the precise form these structures take, most authors agree that
people’s ideas about themselves form a complex and highly organized knowl-
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edge structure, and that this structure becomes increasingly differentiated
with age as people acquire additional knowledge about themselves. There
is also agreement on the general implications of the model (Greenwald &
Pratkanis, 1984; Linville & Carlston, 1994; Markus & Wurf, 1987). For
example, there is a contextual basis of self-knowledge. How we think of our-
selves depends on the social context (James, 1890; Rosenberg & Gara, 1985).
A person might think of him- or herself as intelligent at school, loyal with
friends, and responsible at work. Also, people have knowledge of themselves
that is somewhat contradictory. For example, we might think of ourselves as
serious at school, carefree with our friends, and diligent when we are working
(cf. Brown, 1998).
1.3.1 Self-Complexity
This structural model implies a number of important issues. First, we can ask
“How complex is the self-concept?” Does a person think of him- or herself
in many different ways or in only a few ways? Linville (1987) introduced
the term “self-complexity” to refer to such differences. People who think of
themselves in many different ways have a high self-complexity, those who
think of themselves in relatively few ways have a low self-complexity.
Linville used a card-sorting task to measure self-complexity. In that task,
people are given a number of index cards, each containing a trait term or
characteristic (e.g., lazy, outgoing, rebellious). They are then asked to group
the cards into piles that describe them in various settings or relationships.
The more groups a person forms, and the less overlap there is among groups,
the higher is the person’s self-complexity score. Linville (1987) argued that
differences in self-complexity affect people’s responses to positive and neg-
ative events. The less complex the person’s self-representation, the more
extreme the person’s response to positive and negative events. As an exam-
ple, suppose you are a single-minded lawyer, whose entire life revolves around
your law practice. If you win a case, you will feel ecstatic, but if you lose a
case, you may feel devastated. According to Linville, this is because you do
not have other identities to fall back on. Now consider the situation if you
think of yourself in many ways (e.g., as a hardworking lawyer, but also as an
understanding friend, a loving spouse, a caring parent, and so on). Under
these circumstances, losing a case may not be so devastating, because you
have many other identities to help cushion the blow.
Although multiple identities may generally be healthy, there is a point
at which highly complex self-concepts may get us into trouble. As William
James noted over a century ago, we can not be all the things we would like
to be (James, 1890). Often we are confronted by the necessity of holding to
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one aspect of our empirical selves and abandoning the rest.
“Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and
well-dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a a year, be
a wit, a bon-vivant, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher, a
philantropist, statesman, warrior and African explorer, as well as
a tone-poet and saint. But the thing is impossible. The million-
aire’s work would run counter to the saint’s; the bon-vivant and
the philantropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and
the lady-killer could not keep house in the same tenement of clay
(James, 1890, p. 310)”.
The problem is that each additional identity can be a burden as well as
a benefit. It depends ultimately on whether these identities fit well with
each other (Brown, 1998). Role conflict is a common lament in our society.
Men, for instance, are expected to be wage earners, but also good husbands,
fathers, educators, athletes, and so forth. These multiple social identities
may create conflict. But there may also be a conflict between various personal
identities. A woman may experience a conflict between a desire to be tough
and competitive versus a desire to be caring and tender.
Whether more is better, then, is likely to depend on whether the fit among
the various identities is good. Otherwise, too many identities can create as
many problems as too few identities (Brown, 1998).
Donahue, Robins, Roberts, and John (1993) investigated this question in
a study and showed that multiple identities are indeed not always beneficial.
They asked college students to describe themselves in each of five social roles
(e.g., “How responsible are you as a student, friend, romantic partner, son
or daughter, and worker?”). Then they calculated an index of self-concept
differentiation to capture the extent to which students described themselves
differently in each role. High self-concept differentiation was associated with
depression, neuroticism, and low self-esteem. These findings pose an interest-
ing challenge to Linville’s research of self-complexity. Brown (1998) suggests
therefore that multiple identities are beneficial only if they are well integrated
with one another.
1.3.2 Self-Concept Certainty and Importance
The certainty of people’s self-knowledge is another facet of the self-concept
(cf. Brown, 1998). The construct of self-concept clarity (Campbell, 1990)
describes the subjective certainty concerning self-knowledge and the extent
to which this self-knowledge is internally consistent and stable across time.
The certainty about different attributes of ourselves can vary considerably.
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A person can hold some views about herself with great certainty. She may
be absolutely sure that she is outgoing, and positive that she is mechanically
inclined. Other views of herself may be ill-defined and subject to equivo-
cation. She may for instance not be sure if she is intuitive or not. This
issue is important because self-views that are held with great certainty are
less likely to change than are self-views about which we are uncertain (cf.
Pelham, 1991). There is also evidence that the more certain people are in
their self-views, the better they feel about themselves (Baumgardner, 1990;
Campbell, 1990).
In addition to considering the certainty of people’s self-views, we can also
consider their importance. Some of our self-views are particularly central
and self-defining; others are peripheral of unimportant. In general, the im-
portance of an identity varies as a function of goal relevance. Identities of
high personal importance tend to be the ones that are instrumental to our
goals and ambitions; identities of low personal importance tend to be unre-
lated to our goal and ambitions (Pelham, 1991). For instance, a professional
athlete might primarily think of herself in terms of her athleticism and com-
petitive drive, but an artist might think of himself chiefly in terms of his
spontaneity and creativity.
People also vary in the importance they attach to their various social
identities. One person might think of himself principally in terms of his
work; another might think of himself primarily in terms of his family. These
differences influence people’s emotional lives, because they show stronger
emotional reactions to outcomes that touch important identities than to out-
comes that implicate unimportant ones.
Differences like these also highlight a more general point about the na-
ture of identity (cf. Brown, 1998). It is not only what people think about
themselves that is important; crucial is also the meaning people give to each
identity element. Even if two people’s self-concepts were comprised of exactly
the same identities, their self-concepts would still be different if the two per-
sons varied in how certain they were of these identities or in how important
these identities were to them.
In order to understand a person’s self-concept, we need to know more than
what the individual thinks about when he thinks of himself. We need also
to know how these conceptions are related and arranged, and what meaning
they hold for the individual (cf. Brown, 1998).
1.3.3 Self-Schemas
Markus (1977) defined the self-concept as a collection of self schemas that are
connected among each other. Schemas are hypothetical knowledge structures
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that guide the processing of information. People have schemas about many
different things, including other people, social groups, social events, and ob-
jects. Schemas represent the structure of an object. Underlying the under-
standing of schemata is a basic insight that concepts like objects or events
are defined by a configuration of attributes. The representation through
schemata is a way of comprehending this structure of an object (cf. Ander-
son, 1980).
For the concept of house, for example, we could have the following (in-
complete) schema representation, consisting of pairs of attributes and corre-
sponding values:
HOUSE
Superordinate concept: Building
Material: Stone
Contains: Rooms
Function: Human living space
Form: Rectangular
Size: 50 to 500 square meters
The superordinate concepts indicate one aspect of the hierarchical
schema-structure. Another aspect is the hierarchy of the parts, since the
parts of houses like windows and rooms have their own schema definitions,
including for example the knowledge that rooms contain windows and
ceilings. Schemata are built in a way as to facilitate us to draw conclusions
regarding a concept. If we know that something is a house, we can take the
schema definition and deduce that there are probably windows and a roof
etc. (although these deductions must not exclude variations and exceptions;
we have no problems to understand what a roofless house is, for example).
These schemas influence what information we notice, how we interpret
and explain the information we take in, and what we remember, as was
shown for example by Brewer and Treyens (1981).
Self-schemas have similar effects. Markus (1977) used the term self-
schema to refer to those attributes that people regard as particularly self-
defining and of which they are highly certain. In the first step of his investiga-
tion, Markus (1977) identified people who are schematic with respect to their
perceived independence, which means that these people think of themselves
as very independent or very dependent, and they regard this characteristic
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as very important. Other people were identified as being aschematic with re-
spect to this dimension. Aschematic people do not think of themselves as very
independent or very dependent, and they do not regard this trait as impor-
tant. In the second part of the study, Markus showed the participants a list of
words that related to independence, and they were asked to indicate whether
the word described them or not (e.g., “How assertive are you?”). Schematic
participants made these judgments faster than did aschematic participants,
indicating that being schematic influences the ease with which people process
information for that characteristic. Additional findings showed that, in com-
parison with aschematics, schematic participants remembered more examples
from their life when they had acted in an independent or dependent manner,
and made more confident predictions regarding their future behavior in this
realm.
Self-schemas also influence the way we process social information. People
who are schematic for a trait readily accept information that confirms their
self-view but actively refute of reject information that runs counter to how
they think of themselves. If a person is certain that he is graceful, he will
quickly accept feedback that suggests he is agile but he will carefully scru-
tinize or dismiss feedback that suggests he is ungainly (example by Brown,
1998).
Our perceptions of other people are also affected by self-schemas. For
instance, people who are schematic with respect to their own weight are
quick to notice other people’s weight and to categorize other people along
this dimension (i.e., they classify other people as fat or thin). This tendency
reflects a more general inclination to use the self as a reference point when
judging others. The more important an attribute is to the way we think about
ourselves, the more inclined we are to use that attribute when perceiving
others (cf. Dunning & Hayes, 1996).
Finally, self-schemas influence behavior. People who are schematic in
a given domain act more consistently than do those who are aschematic
(Markus, 1983). For example, compared to people who are aschematic for
independence, people who are schematic for this trait are more apt to act
consistently in an independent manner across various situations. This may be
true even though both aschematics and schematics both regard themselves
as independent. The key difference is that people who are schematic for
this trait are highly certain of their independence and regard the trait as
particularly self-defining. These features account for the greater behavioral
consistency schematic individuals display (cf. Brown, 1998; Markus, 1983).
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1.4 Self-Psychology and Personality
The focus on the way people think and feel about themselves distinguishes
self-psychology from other areas of psychology, like for example personality
psychology. Self-psychology is concerned with subjective experience—with
what people think they are like; whereas personality psychology is more con-
cerned with objective experience—with what people really are like.
Our picture of the self and our ideas what we are like may not be en-
tirely accurate; they may not capture the way we really are. Personality
psychology is concerned with what people are really like 2. It would not be
uncommon, for example, to say of a person that “he is an introvert” or that
“she is conscientious”. These phrases suggest that we are referring to what
the person truly is like, not simply what the person thinks he or she is like.
However, it should be noted that the distinction between self-psychology
and personality psychology is blurred. Brown (1998) specifies four reasons
for this:
1. What we really are influences the way we think about our-
selves. First, aspects of personality affect our thoughts about our-
selves. In theory, people are free to think whatever they want about
themselves. But in reality, people’s ideas about what they are like are
at least loosely tied to objective criteria. People with low intelligence
are unlikely to regard themselves as brilliant, and people who are tall
are unlikely to think about themselves as small (it can happen, but it is
unlikely). Although no one is born with a conception of self as unintel-
ligent or tall, people are born with certain physical and psychological
characteristics that influence how they think about themselves. (This
is of course not to say that our thoughts about ourselves are identical
with what we are actually like. Although our views of ourselves are
influenced by how we really are, they are not a faithful representation
of our true characteristics. Most people think of themselves in overly
positive terms—as somewhat better than they really are.)
2. What we really are influences the way we feel about ourselves.
Another way in which self-psychology and personality psychology are
2I will here not engage in a argument on whether there is such a thing as reality and
objectivity, and how we should deal with that problem in cognitive and social science (for
a further discussion of that point see e.g., Nu´n˜ez 1995; 1997). Even if it is never possible
to find out what a person really is like, because our view of the reality remains subjective
(at best intersubjective) it is still the goal of personality psychology to get as close as
possible to the—ultimately unreachable—objective view.
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related is that some personality variables influence self-esteem. Individ-
uals who score high in the broad personality dimension of Neuroticism
are prone to be unhappy and dissatisfied with all aspects of their lives
(Costa & McCrae, 1984; McCrae & Costa, 1988) and they are also likely
to have a low opinion of themselves. Similarly, individuals high in ex-
traversion bring an optimistic and positive attitude to their evaluation
of themselves.
3. Self is one aspect of personality. A third intersection between
self-psychology and personality is that people’s thoughts and feelings
about themselves are one aspect of their personality. For example, some
people think of themselves as attractive; others think of themselves as
unattractive. Although these thoughts do not tell us whether these
people really are attractive or not, it is still the case that they differ with
respect to what they think they are like. These individual differences
can be treated as personality variables.
We can also distinguish people according to how they feel about them-
selves, which is the subject of self-esteem research. Self-esteem research
divides people into two categories: Those who feel good about them-
selves are designated as having high self-esteem; those who do not feel
as good about themselves are designated as having low self-esteem. In
this manner, individual differences in how people feel about themselves
are treated as personality variables.
When we treat self-referent thoughts and feelings as individual differ-
ence variables, we are treating the self as one aspect of personality.
In this sense, personality can be viewed as a broader term that refers
to the entire psychological nature of the individual, including the self-
concept. Self-referent thoughts and feelings can thus be viewed as a
subset of personality.
There are, however, also authors who use the term personality in a much
more restricted sense to mean personality traits: the set of character-
istic dispositions that determine emotional, interpersonal, experiential,
attitudinal, and motivational styles (McCrae & Costa, 1988).
4. Personality traits form part of the content of the self-concept.
Individuals have beliefs about their personality, they see themselves as
being anxious or calm, sociable or detached, imaginative or practical. It
is this aspect of the self-concept that the individual presumably relies
on when answering the questions in a typical personality inventory.
Personality researchers often use self-report to measure personality, and
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whenever this is the case, a study of personality is therefore ipso facto
a study of the self-concept.
1.5 Social Identities
Social identities or social selves are viewed as socially constructed and so-
cially meaningful categories that are accepted by individuals as descriptive
of themselves or their group (Ashmore & Jussim, 1997). All of these social
categories can serve as the basis of both individual and collective identities.
I will in the following section examine three major social-identity theo-
ries: (1) McCall and Simmons’ Role-Identity Theory, (2) Stryker’s Identity
Theory, and (3)Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory.
The basis for theories on social identities has been laid by Meads symbolic
interactionism (1934), so this is where my overview begins.
1.5.1 Symbolic Interactionist Groundwork
Symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934) contends that one’s sense of self is
largely grounded in the perceptions of others. Through social interaction and
the internalization of collective values, meanings and standards, one comes
to see oneself through the eyes of others and constructs a more or less stable
sense of self.
Mead sees both self and society as created, sustained and changed through
the process of symbolic communication. In this approach, shared meaningful
symbols are the keys to the emergence of self and identity. The symbolic
meaning of a word of gesture lies in the response of the audience.
A crucial point of the theory is that shared symbols enable individuals to
“take the role of the other”, because shared symbols have the same meaning
in both alter and ego. That is, they evoke the same anticipated response.
This means that one can imagine the responses of others to one’s own use
of words and gestures, and thus one can shift perspectives. Using symbols,
as in the language, one is able not only to classify, think and act toward
meaningful social objects, but also to reflect oneself as a meaningful social
object from the perspective of others.
Mead (1934) speaks of an internal, silent “conversation of gestures” when
an individual privately considers, for example, performing a behavior, then
imaginatively anticipates other people’s reactions to that behavior, then re-
sponds to their expected reactions, and so on. In James’s (1890) terms, one
shifts from the self as subject to the self as object and back again.
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Mead, like James before him, called these two aspects of the self the “I”
and the“me”, where the I is the active, creative agent doing the experiencing,
thinking, and acting, and the me is the perspective or “attitude” toward one-
self that one assumes when taking the role of specific others or the generalized
community.
In the symbolic interactionist approach, these me’s, or perspectives on
the self, are one’s social selves or identities. They represent who I am in my
own and the other’s eyes.
Symbolic interactionism stresses the mutual interdependence of self and
society, claiming that selves cannot exist without society and society cannot
exist without selves. A society provides shared language and meanings, which
enable individuals to take the role of the other. This in turn results in
the acquisition of a variety of social self-conceptions. But individuals also
tend to recreate the social order as they enact their social identities. This
is because people can imaginatively anticipate others’ evaluations of their
identities and identity performances. Since the positive regard of others is
rewarding, individuals are motivated to modify their thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors to conform. Thus, social control and the social order is to a large
extent a product of self-control.
However, symbolic interactionism also emphasizes that human behavior
is not determined by society because of the implied basic duality of the self:
the I is often source of spontaneous, novel thought and action that cannot be
predicted. When new ideas or behaviors generated by the I are adopted by
others and become widespread in a community or society, then social change
in a larger scale is occurring.
This understanding of the mutual interdependence of self and society
underlies the theories that will be presented next.
1.5.2 McCall and Simmons’s Role-Identity Theory
McCall and Simmons (1978) presented a theory with the role identity as the
central concept, which incorporates both the I and the me aspects of the self.
They define a role identity as the character that an individual devises for
him- or herself as an occupant of a particular social position.
The authors stress that individuals carry out the broad dictates of so-
cial positions (the role part of role identity, reflecting the me) but do so
with improvisations and flourishes that make role performances expressive of
personal character and idiosyncracies (the identity part of role identity, re-
flecting the I). Individuals are able to embellish their me’s because most social
positions only loosely prescribe appropriate behavior, allowing considerable
latitude for creative, individualized performance.
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For McCall and Simmons, social positions that can form the basis for
identities include
• sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., gender, ethnicity),
• social roles (conventional of deviant, such as father and alcoholic),
• and positions defined by characteristic activities (e.g., hostess, thinker,
golfer, opera lover).
Since people usually have many different role identities, the central prob-
lem of the role-identity theory is to explain which role identities individuals
will value most and attempt to perform.
McCall and Simmons argue that people organize their multiple role iden-
tities in a “prominence hierarchy” that reflects the ideal self. The prominence
of any role identity depends on its reward value, which is a complex weighted
sum of various sources of reward, for example, the degree to which others
positively support the identity, and the intrinsic and extrinsic gratifications
gained through competent performance.
When situations permit a choice among alternative lines of action, indi-
viduals will attempt to enact the more prominent or valued role identity.
However, the choices among role identity performances is also constrained
by situational contigencies. Some situations are more likely to yield rewards
for one identity enactment than another (e.g., enacting one’s secretary iden-
tity in the office is likely to get more approval and support from the colleagues
and superiors than enacting one’s mother identity). The demands of the sit-
uation, other people’s role-identity needs or intentions, and their probability
of supporting one’s own needs or intentions, must always be taken into ac-
count. Thus, identities of lower prominence may become situationally salient
and are therefore enacted. McCall and Simmons point out that one often
experiences discrepancies between one’s ideal self and one’s situational self,
producing pressures to validate, eventually, those prominent, highly valued
role identities that have been neglected in social interaction. Alternatively,
one may reorganize one’s prominence hierarchy so that frequently performed
situational identities become more important and more prominent.
MCall and Simmons argue that legitimating and maintaining identities
is a need and a never-ending process. They compare it to the dusting of a
huge old house: by the time one is done with the ground floor and gets to
the upstairs, the downstairs is badly in need of dusting again.
An efficient means of meeting this need for identity legitimation is through
establishing durable interpersonal relationships: finding partners who can be
relied upon for dependable mutual exchanges of supporting and rewarding
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each other’s prominent role-identities. The closer such a relationship is and
the longer it lasts, the more of one’s self-structure can be incorporated into
the relationship. For example, over time, a married couple does an increasing
number of activities together: going to movies, playing cards with friends,
going to church, visiting family, having children of their own. Thus both
partners incorporate several role identities into the bounds of their relation-
ship and sustain them efficiently within. Durable, multiplex interpersonal
relationships tend to stabilize the prominence hierarchy, since the costs of
giving it up increase as more aspects of the self become assimilated. Nev-
ertheless, the individual’s prominence hierarchy is of course still likely to
undergo changes over time. Some role identities are devalued and dropped
(due to lack of rewards, identity support, or situational opportunities to en-
act them), and other identities are made prominent or added to the hierarchy
as the life course unfolds.
McCall and Simmons devote considerable theoretical attention to the in-
tricacies of obtaining role-identity support from others who are also attempt-
ing to sustain their own valued role identities. Since one’s own and the other’s
identities may not match, working compromises must often be negotiated.
One implication of the theory’s overall argument is that most individuals
and their role partners will behave in ways that largely (although never ex-
actly) recreate the existing social structure. Despite the potential for novelty
built into the very nature of the self and its I-aspect, the realities of differen-
tial power, status, and opportunity cannot be ignored. Although recognizing
the possibilities of change is always inherent in individuals and negotiable in
social interactions, symbolic interactionists generally tend to explain more
adequately how regularities in social behavior occur than how large-scale
social change is brought about (cf. Ashmore & Jussim, 1997).
1.5.3 Stryker’s Identity Theory
The central problem of Stryker’s identity theory is the same as the one of
McCall and Simmons’ role-identity theory: they both try to explain why
certain individuals choose to enact certain roles among the many available
in their identity repertoires.
In a similar way like McCall and Simmons, Stryker argues that one’s role
identities are arrayed in a hierarchy of salience, defined as a readiness to act
out an identity or the probability that an identity is being activated in a
given situation.
To incorporate social structure theoretically, Stryker develops the notion
of identity commitment. In contrast to most conceptions that refer to sub-
jective commitment, Stryker defines commitment in terms of the number
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of social ties or the affective importance of the social ties upon which each
identity is predicated. For example, a man is committed to the role of “hus-
band” to the degree that the number of persons and the importance to him of
those persons requires his being in the position of husband and playing that
role. Identities that are based on more relationships or intense, emotionally
positive relationships will be placed higher in the commitment hierarchy.
Commitment hierarchies reflect the social structure, because gender, age,
race or ethnicity, and social class largely determine the social networks into
which people are born of may enter. For example, white middle-class adoles-
cents are more likely than black working-class adolescents to be tracked into
a college-preparatory course and are thus more likely to form many friend-
ships and positive teacher-student relationships based upon a good “student”
identity.
Moreover, the cost of giving up any one of identity depends upon the
number or the affective intensity of the social ties on which it is based. Thus,
the higher in the commitment hierarchy, the more stable an identity is likely
to be.
According to Stryker, identity commitment in turn strongly influences
identity salience. He defines salience again not in subjective term but as the
probability of invoking an identity across a variety of situations. That is,
salience refers to the likelihood that a person will enact a particular identity
when given an opportunity to do so or when lines of possible action are open.
Identity salience in turn influences the actual enactment of social roles: the
higher the salience of a particular identity, the more time and effort will one
invest in its enactment, the more will one attempt to perform well, the more
one’s self-esteem will depend on that identity, and the more one’s identity
performance will reflect generally shared values and norms.
Although the primary goal of Stryker’s theoretical work is to explain the
differential investment of people’s time and effort in various social roles at
the individual level, it is clear, given the origins of this theory in symbolic-
interactionist thought, that the theory helps to link identity performance to
the maintenance of the social order. Because role identities are embedded
in networks of relationships, people are presumably motivated to carry out
the behavioral expectations attached to their role identities. Meeting others’
expectations simultaneously maintains these interpersonal relationships and
fulfills behavioral norms, thus sustaining the broader social order from which
these identities were initially derived.
Like all symbolic interactionists, Stryker also emphasizes that people may
deviate from the norms governing identity behavior, or re-negotiate them, due
to the creativity and initiative of the I aspect of the self. Ordinarily, however,
structural constraints are sufficiently strong that deviations are empirically
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less frequent that behavior that conforms to broad social norms (cf. Thoits
& Virshup, 1997; Stryker, 1994).
1.5.4 Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory begins with categorization, the cognitive process that
allows humans to streamline perception by separately grouping like and un-
like stimuli. Tajfel (1981) demonstrated that people categorize social as well
as nonsocial stimuli and that people use social categories to identify them-
selves and others. He defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s
self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social
group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached
to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255).
The main assertions of social identity theory can be summarized in a
nutshell as follows:
1. Social relationships are an important component of the self-concept.
2. People are motivated to feel good about themselves.
3. People feel better about themselves when they believe the groups they
belong to are somehow better than the groups to which they do not
belong.
Research in this tradition has focused on such categories as race, ethnicity,
class, and nationality. Tajfel illustrated his work with examples such as blacks
and whites, Jews, Pakistanis, and French- and English-speaking Canadians.
It is important to note that Tajfel did explicitly not distinguish between
these larger sociodemographic classifications and more structured, face-to-
face groups such as clubs or teams. For Tajfel, what defined a group was not
its structure, function, or size, but its social reality. That is, a group exists
insofar as its members categorize themselves with a high degree of consensus
in the appropriate manner, and are consensually categorized in the same
manner by others.
According to the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), indi-
viduals categorize themselves and others as a means of ordering the social
environment and locating themselves and others within it. Thus, categories
are selected to provide meaningful distinctions between people or subgroups
of people. Individuals define a category according to the most widely shared
attributes of category members (prototypes) or specific persons that exem-
plify the category (exemplars), or both.
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These social identities are relational and comparative: they define mem-
bers of a category relative to the members of other categories. For example,
the category of doctor becomes meaningful in relation to the category of pa-
tient. As the comparison category changes, so might the salience of certain
aspects of the focal social identity.
Since individuals are motivated to hold positive identities, they tend to
accentuate differences between their category and other categories that favor
their own.
Tests of the theory have taken many forms. Special interest was raised
by the minimal group paradigm, which was first designed by Tajfel, Billig,
Bundy, and Flament (1971) to determine the minimal sufficient conditions
that will lead to in-group favoritism and to out-group discrimination. The
experimental design was planned with the objective of testing the effect of
pure categorization on the behavior between groups. Therefore it had to
fulfill the following criteria:
1. There was to be no face-to-face interaction between the subjects, nei-
ther inside not between the groups.
2. Anonymity of group membership: the subjects had to interact with
persons of whom they did not know to which group they belonged.
3. There was a lack of any form of instrumental or rational link between
the proceeding of group arrangement—the classification was realized
following trivial criteria—and the kind of inter-group behavior expected
from the subjects.
4. The subjects did not personally profit or receive any benefit as a con-
sequence of their inter-group behavior.
5. The inter-group behavior expected of the subjects was in form of real
and meaningful decisions, that is concrete monetary rewards or pun-
ishments for other persons.
In these studies, participants are divided into groups on the basis of rel-
atively meaningless criteria. For example, participants might be shown two
paintings and then be divided into groups based on which painting they liked
best. Participants are then asked to apportion monetary rewards between
the two groups. Reliably, results showed that people discriminated in favor
of their own group, and doing so made them feel better about themselves
(Maass, Ceccarelli, & Rudin, 1996; Oakes & Turner, 1980, as cited in Brown,
1998).
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The experimental design had actually been intended to be an extremely
socially reduced basic situation that could be used as starting point for a
successive analysis of the critical factors of group-discriminating behavior.
The authors themselves were therefore surprised that even in these minimal
conditions there were such clear effects of in-group favoritism and out-group
discrimination (Tajfel, personal communication, as cited in Mummendey,
1998).
These studies support the claim that even trivial associations with others
can have powerful effects on the way people behave and feel about themselves.
By identifying with a certain category they belong to, individuals perceive
themselves as psychologically intertwined with the fate of the social category
or role. They share its common destiny, and experience its successes and
failures. As individuals begin to identify, they usually assume the perceived
prototypical or exemplary characteristics of the category or role as their own.
As Ashforth (2001) points out, the individual may of course have these
characteristics (or at least an affinity for them) prior to entering the category
or role. Indeed, the literature on vocational identity, job search, and the fit
between a person and his job or the organization he belongs to, assumes
that individuals have a more or less clear and stable sense of who they are
and simply search for positions and organizations that match or reflect these
attributes. However, the sense of who we are is somewhat malleable and
gets shaped and better known through concrete action and reflection. When
the self is grounded and enacted in specific settings, it is most knowable.
Ashforth (1981) assumes that individuals search for roles and organizations
that appear to resonate with who they are and what they want, but it is in
the course of learning and enacting the new role that a person crystallizes
and enacts these actual self-conceptions.
Role-entry is therefore a complex process of learning, personal change,
and role innovation. Thus the process of identification is often less about
discovering fit than about creating it.
Tajfel argues that because social categories are differentially valued within
a culture, social identities also carry varying degrees of positive and negative
values for the self. Individuals obtain an assessment of their in-group’s value
relative to an out-group through social comparison processes. Tajfel assumed
that humans need positive and distinctive group identities, from which indi-
vidual self-esteem and a sense of personal value can be derived. It is this need
that motivates intergroup behavior, like intergroup competition. If the group
to which an individual belongs is less highly valued than relevant out-groups,
the individual becomes motivated to either leave the group or improve the
group’s standing.
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If there is a social mobility, individuals may leave the group and im-
prove their social identity in a groups that has a higher status. Such “social
climbing” or assimilation strategies are individual solutions and leave the
relationship between groups as they were before.
If, however, there is no possibility for individuals to switch groups, an
improvement of the social identity can be reached with behavior directed to
change the relationship between groups, that is, the between-groups hierar-
chy. All strategies of social change have the goal of a better position of the
in-group in comparison to the out-group on a shared value dimension.
Tajfel and Turner (1986) describe a variety of strategies available to attain
this goal, that is to improve the image or status of one’s own group. In
collective strategies, the group members jointly seek to achieve this through
the following strategies:
1. Direct social competition on existing value dimensions: group members
augment in that case behavior that emphasizes, or also exaggerates the
positive distinction of the own group, or depreciate and devalue the
other group. This kind of unrealistic perception and communication is
called in-group bias. The strategy is especially being used by groups
with high status whose superiority is being questioned or threatened.
2. Change of the evaluation or new definition of the comparison criterion
(“social creativity”). Three possibilities can be named here (cf. Tajfel
& Turner, 1986; Mummendey, 1998):
(a) A different positive and distinctive criterion is made salient. That
is, a new dimension of comparison is created, where the in-group
does now have an advantage over the out-group.
(b) The original dimension of comparison is reinterpreted in a way
that leads to an inversion of the evaluation. Disadvantageous com-
parisons now appear to be particularly positive.
(c) A third possibility is to shift the comparisons to a different out-
group: in this case, not the dimension, but the group of com-
parison is altered. Comparisons to groups with higher status are
avoided; instead, group members seek to compare their own group
to poorer out-groups.
A new definition of the situation of comparison has only an impact on
the social identity of a group if these new evaluations become the con-
sensus of the in-group, and are also accepted by the out-group (Mum-
mendey, 1998).
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Those who perceive differential group evaluations as legitimate and group
boundaries as permeable may also try to move into the higher-status group.
Where group boundaries are perceived as illegitimate, the above described
collective strategies will be used. Regardless of the strategy selected, the
dominant group is likely to resist, and this situation may result in intergroup
conflicts and competition.
1.5.5 Turner’s Self-Categorization Theory
As a further development of the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel
and Turner, 1986) Turner’s self-categorization theory seeks to improve the
understanding of our psychological capacity for collective behavior.
Whereas Tajfel’s (1981) primary concern was intergroup relations, in par-
ticular group conflict and competition, Turner and his colleagues (Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Blackwell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & Mc-
Garty, 1994) focus on the cognitive processes that create a collective sense
of self and make different group-level phenomena possible. Turner et al.
(1987; 1994) seek to explain with their theory such diverse phenomena as
social stereotyping, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, co-operation and al-
truism, emotional contagion and empathy, collective norms and social influ-
ence processes. The theory is complementary to Tajfel’s (1981) and Tajfel
and Turner’s (1986) earlier work: while the latter emphasizes intergroup re-
lations as a product of social identity, Turner et al. (1987; 1994) emphasize
intragroup behavior.
Turner and his colleagues define social identity as “self-categories that
define the individual in terms of his or her shared similarities with members
of certain social categories in contrast to other categories” (Turner at al.,
1994, p. 454). Turner uses examples such as sociodemographic groupings by
gender, race, social class, religion, and nationality. Like Tajfel, he does not
distinguish theoretically between these larger classifications and organized
groups as bases of social identity because he assumes that members of each
group develop a shared social categorization of themselves in contrast to oth-
ers. This shared categorization influences in a given situation the members’
attitudes and behaviors.
According to Turner, all identities are self-categorizations, differing only
in their content and their level of abstraction or inclusiveness. For example,
the sense of oneself as human, what Turner et al. (1987) call the superor-
dinate level, is a more inclusive self-categorization than a collective identity,
which is in turn more inclusive than a personal-level identity based on one’s
sense of uniqueness. According to Turner et al., regardless of the level of
abstraction, how self and other are categorized is always determined by their
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relative similarity of difference compared with other stimuli in the situation.
Self-categorization theory is therefore both comparative and contextual in
emphasis.
A key question for Turner et al. is how one shifts from a personal to a
collective identity. He argues that the cognitive process of depersonalization
enables the shift. Where the individual’s unique characteristics fade and are
replaced by a self-definition in terms of stereotypical group characteristics,
this self-stereotyping amounts to the depersonalization of the self.
When the category or role is salient, unique attributes are downplayed
as individuals come to see themselves as more or less exemplifying the cate-
gory. Once internalized, these attributes may outline the individual’s active
involvement in the category or role. Thus, individuals develop a sense of who
and what they are—their goals, values, beliefs, and normative ways of think-
ing, acting, and even feeling—at least partly from their social memberships.
Depersonalization in turn influences intra-group behavior. When the so-
cial identity is salient, the individual thinks and acts as an exemplar of the
category or role. Cohesiveness occurs because individuals perceive similar-
ity between themselves and others in the in-group: positive self-estimation
is extended to others in the group as interpersonal attraction and liking.
Group cooperation occurs because identifying oneself with others leads to a
perceived similarity of interests and goals. Concurrently, conformity takes
place because one adopts the stereotypical traits, attitudes, and behavioral
norms of the group. In short, intra-group behaviors are consequences of de-
personalization, where the self is perceived as a part of a collective identity
(cf. Thoits & Virshup, 1997; Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al., 1994).
If collective identification and group behavior are the outcomes of deper-
sonalization, what are its causes? According to Turner and his colleagues,
the emergence of any self-categorization is a result of the interaction of three
factors: the relative accessibility of a category, its normative fit, and its com-
parative fit.
1. Relative accessibility is the individual’s readiness to use the category.
This readiness is based on past experience, present expectations, and
current motives, values, needs, and goals.
2. Comparative fit is the degree to which the individual perceives fewer dif-
ferences on relevant categorical characteristics among the group mem-
bers than between group members and others. This is also called the
“principle of meta-contrast”.
3. Comparative fit reflects the degree to which the stimuli in the context
match normative stereotypes or beliefs about the comparison criterion
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or category that is being applied
These three factors together determine whether a self-categorization will
become a psychologically active or salient influence in a particular situation.
Turner et al. (1994) emphasize that self-categorizations are inherently
fluid, variable, flexible, and context dependent. When the context changes,
self-categorizations are also likely to change. Turner asserts that there is no
stable self-categorization or self-concept except to the degree that the social
structure itself generates stable contexts or social norms, values, and motives,
making some social identities more accessible and therefore more likely to be
applied in a given situation.
1.5.6 Discussion of the Different Approaches in Social
Identity Theories
Tajfel and Turner’s social identity theory and Turner et al.’s self-
categorization theory share a highly similar conception of identity. However,
there are some notable differences. While Tajfel (1981) and Tajfel and
Turner (1986) focus more on intergroup relations—such as conflict and
competition between groups—as a product of social identity, Turner et
al. (1987; 1994) emphasize rather the intragroup relations as a product
of self-categorization. In contrast to Tajfel, whose primary purpose is to
explain the dynamics of inter-group relationships, Turner et al.’s main goal
is to explain how collective identification occurs.
Both theories leave certain problems unresolved (cf. Thoits & Virshup,
1997). In both, interpersonal attraction and group cohesion are treated only
at the cognitive level. Turner and colleagues see cohesion as a product of
depersonalization: positive self-evaluations are simply generalized to other
members of the in-group. Tajfel as well, although he includes the emotional
significance of the group in his definition of social identity, does not em-
phasize the emotional, as opposed to cognitive, causes or consequences of
collective identity. In fact, Tajfel rejects claims that in-groups form due to
emotional attachments among members, arguing instead that identification
with a group as a whole accounts for in-group formation and cohesion.
However, whether emotional antecedents and consequences of collective
identities are less important than cognitive ones needs further consideration—
on a theoretical as well as an empirical level.
Role-based theories differ from these approaches in several ways. They
focus less on the group as a whole, but rather on the individual within a social
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context. Beyond this, the two approaches differ regarding the presumed sta-
bility of social self-conceptions. McCall and Simmons as well as Stryker have
suggested fairly stable and organized self-conceptions, embedded as these are
in social relationships, themselves broadly patterned by the social structure.
In contrast, Turner et al. (1994) express doubts whether the idea of self as a
relatively fixed mental structure is meaningful or necessary. In fact, Turner
argues against conceptualizing the self as a set of stored constructs, calling it
instead a flexible, constructive process of judgment and meaningful inference
in which varying self-categories are created to fit the perceiver’s relationship
to social reality. With that, Turner implies that identities are essentially
fleeting phenomena, assembled anew each time relevant stimuli are present
in a situation. According to Turner et al. (1987), collective identities are
stable when social structures are stable, which means that roughly the same
collective identity will be constructed every time when structurally recurrent
contextual cues stimulate the self-categorization.
Thoits and Virshup (1997) point out that it is inconsistent to argue, as
Turner et al. (1994) do, that all the components of self-relevant informa-
tion, such as values, motives, and goals, are stored in memory as cognitive
resources, while representations of personal and collective selves are not.
Moreover, it would be cognitively inefficient for individuals to construct
and reconstruct whole identities each time relevant categorical stimuli appear.
Thoits and Virshup (1997) criticize further that Turner and his colleagues
ignore research in the self-schema tradition (initiated by Markus, 1977)
that indicates that stable self-conceptions exist and that schemas not only
heighten the speed and accuracy of information processing but increase
selective attention to self-relevant cues (cf. Guring & Markus, 1989; Markus,
Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982; Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985, as
cited in Thoits & Virshup, 1997).
Tajfel (1981) viewed role identities and collective identities as different
phenomena and suggested that roles might fall somewhere in the middle on
a continuum from interpersonal to intergroup behavior. In contrast, Turner
and his colleagues (1994) explicitly subsumed role-behaviors under collective
phenomena, viewing social roles as simple enactments or fulfillments of in-
group norms and responsibilities. They argued that roles are properties of
groups, emerging from the behavioral similarities and functional interchange-
ability of the in-group members.
Thoits and Virshup (1997) view it as a mistake to treat roles as byproducts
of collective identification, as Turner and colleagues do. They reason that
although, for example, family members may occasionally think of themselves
as a collective unit and behave similarly and interchangeably on its behalf,
52 1.5. Social Identities
roles within the family are not performed by similar and interchangeable
members. Rather, family roles are enacted by reciprocal, complementary,
and socially dissimilar members such as parent and child.
Further, role and collective identities involve different psychological states:
in one, the individual is psychologically merged the role (“this is who I am
with respect to specific role partners”), in the other, the person is psycholog-
ically merged with the group (“this is who we are, including me”).
Finally, these identities serve different social functions—individual-level
versus group-level functions.
In short, role identities can according to Thoits and Virshup (1997) not
be treated merely as derivative aspects because they are qualitatively distinct
psychological phenomena with different origins and consequences.
Chapter 2
The Aging Self—Development
of Self and Identity in Later
Adulthood
The tragedy of old age is not that
one is old, but that one is young.
Oscar Wilde (1890)
The Picture of Dorian Gray
2.1 Theories of Older Adults’ Development
Since the 1960s, gerontologists have been developing conceptual frame-works or schema to describe ideal outcomes of the aging process. One
of the most commonly used terms to describe a good old age is successful
aging, introduced by Havighurst (1961). The concept of successful aging is
central to gerontology, and the article by Havighurst appeared as the first
conceptual piece in the first issue of The Gerontologist, one of the profession’s
prime journals.
Interest in successful aging has remained high through the successive
decades. However, there is no single well-accepted definition of successful
aging that has stood the test of time (which is not surprising, given the
ambiguity of the term success itself).
• Havighurst (1961) defined it as adding life to the years and getting
satisfaction from life.
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• Rowe and Kahn (1987) defined it in terms of multiple physiological and
psychosocial variables.
• Ryff (1982), a psychologist, defined successful aging as positive or ideal
functioning related to developmental work over the life course.
• Fisher (1992) interviewed 19 senior center participants age 62–85 and
found that they tended to define successful aging in term of strategies
for coping.
• Gibson (1995) stated that successful aging referred to reaching one’s
potential and arriving at a level of physical, social, and psychological
well-being in old age that is pleasing to both oneself and others.
• In the Encyclopedia of Aging, Palmore (1995) says that a comprehen-
sive definition of successful aging would combine survival (longevity),
health (lack of disability), and life satisfaction (happiness).
• Additionally, some gerontologists have discussed similar issues using
different terms such as adjustment or adaptation to aging.
The shifting meanings of successful aging have paralleled changes in pre-
vailing theories of social and psychological aspects of aging, because ideas of
what constitutes successful aging are implicitly contained in each theory.
2.1.1 Disengagement Theory
One of the first theories of aging was the disengagement theory of Cummings
and Henry (1961). They proposed that in the normal course of aging, people
gradually withdrew of disengaged from social roles as a natural response to
lessened capabilities and diminished interest, and to societal disincentives for
participation.
The authors define disengagement as“an inevitable process in which many
of the relationships between a person and other members of society are sev-
ered, and those remaining are altered in quality” (Cummings and Henry,
1961, p. 210). In other words, it involves the process of both a psychologi-
cal and a social withdrawal of an individual from society. Disengagement is
supposed to result in a reduction of life activities and ego energy in old age.
Disengagement theory has been used in support of the concept of the
life review in old age. Butler (1963) hypothesizes that later life brings on
isolation and unoccupied time, that is disengagement. This isolation provides
the individual with time to reminisce and review his or her life. In a sense,
it prepares the individual for the ultimate disengagement—death.
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Not surprisingly, the disengagement model was criticized severely for eth-
ical reasons, since it assumes that the isolation of old people from society is
not a problem, but on the contrary a premise for successful aging. A per-
son should, according to this model, willingly withdraw from work or family
life and contentedly take to a rocking chair, or pursue other solitary, passive
occupations while preparing for death.
Maddox (1964), for example, has argued against the concept of disen-
gagement, claiming that there are many kinds of disengagement and that in-
dividuals may disengage at different rates. Carp (1968) found disengagement
from family negatively correlated with disengagement from friends. Thus, in-
dividuals who where disengaged from their family maintained strong contact
with friends, and vice versa. In addition, Tallmer and Kutner (1969) found
that disengagement was not related to age but rather to physiological and
social stress, both of which have been found to increase with age.
We can therefore conclude that disengagement theory has a poor concep-
tual and empirical basis. It is not an appropriate basis for further theoretical
development.
2.1.2 Activity Theory
A second major theory of aging, referred to as activity theory, proposed that
people age most successfully when they participate in a full round of daily
activities, that is, keep busy (Lemon, Bengtson, & Peterson, 1972). Activity
theorists view older people as unchanged and hold social and physical ob-
stacles responsible for declining rates of social interaction (Havighurst, 1961;
Maddox, 1964). This theory seemed to explain the surge of volunteerism and
senior activism in the 1960’s and 1970’s in the United States and may have
been partly responsible for public policies which underwrote the development
of senior centers and other recreational facilities in that period.
Today, the theory has been discarded by gerontologists who view it as
too narrow in its implied advocacy of one lifestyle. Empirical research has
demonstrated the heterogeneity of older people, including many people who
prefer less structured lives or do not have the health or means to pursue a full
schedule of activities. Lee and Markides (1990) could show that, contrary to
activity theory, when health status is controlled, social activity levels do not
predict physical of psychological well-being. Nevertheless, activity is widely
campaigned by older adults themselves as the key to successful aging, so that
Ekerdt (1986) has named this “the busy ethic”.
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2.1.3 Continuity Theory
A third theory of aging which has been viewed with much more favor in recent
years is called continuity theory (Atchley, 1989). This theory proposes that
the people who age most successfully are those who carry forward the habits,
preferences, lifestyles and relationships from midlife into late life. This theory
has gained support from the results of major longitudinal research studies
which have shown that variables measured in midlife are strong predictors of
outcomes in later life.
Since the continuity theory has had much influence in the research field
of life span development and gerontology, and has in the meantime received
considerable empirical support, I will here describe it in more detail.
A central premise of the continuity theory is that, in making adaptive
choices, middle-aged and older adults attempt to preserve and maintain ex-
isting internal and external structures. They prefer to accomplish this ob-
jective by using continuity, that is by applying familiar strategies in familiar
arenas of life. In middle and later life, adults are drawn by the weight of past
experience to use continuity as a primary adaptive strategy to cope with
changes associated with normal aging.
Continuity theory assumes evolution, not homeostasis (which has been
the background of activity theory), and this assumption allows change to be
integrated into one’s prior history without necessarily causing upheaval or
disequilibrium. An evolutionary theory allows the individual to have goals
for the developmental direction.
Atchley named his work “a continuity theory of normal aging”. The term
normal aging refers to usual, commonly encountered patterns of human ag-
ing. Because there is a sociocultural overlay that interacts with physical and
mental aging, normal aging can be expected to vary from culture to culture.
Further, normal aging can be distinguished from pathological aging by a lack
of physical and mental disease. In addition, there are individuals whose aging
is anomalous in the sense that it departs from the statistical norm but is not
pathological. For example, moving to a retirement community in later life is
not typical, but is is not pathological, either.
Thus, continuity theory claims to portray a general picture of aging for a
large majority of people, at least within the Northern American culture.
Types of Continuity
Continuity can be either internal or external.
Internal continuity is defined by the individual in relation to a remem-
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bered inner structure, such as the persistence of a psychic structure of ideas,
temperament, affect, experiences, preferences, dispositions, and skills. Inter-
nal continuity requires memory. What is disconcerting to us about people
with Alzheimer’s Disease or amnesia is precisely their inability to use memory
to present a continuity of identity and self. Using a dramaturgical analogy,
they do not know who their character was or is, how it fits with other char-
acters in the everyday drama, or even what the drama is about. Obviously,
then, lack of internal continuity can be not only a distress to the affected
individual, but also to those who are accustomed to interacting with him or
her and expect a degree of predictability. Internal continuity is a healthy
capacity to see inner change as connected to one’s past and to see one’s past
as sustaining and supporting and justifying the new self.
External Continuity is defined in terms of a remembered structure of
physical and social environment, role relationships, and activities. Percep-
tions of external continuity result from being in familiar environments, prac-
ticing familiar skills, and interacting with familiar people. Individuals have
everyday locations in ways that are uniquely typical of them as individuals.
External continuity is thus the persistence of a structure of relationships and
overt behaviors. To use the dramaturgical analogy again, everyday life for
most older people is like long-running improvisational theater in which the
settings, characters, and actions are familiar and in which the changes are
mostly in the form of new episodes rather than entirely new plays.
For both internal and external continuity in older age, it can be an impor-
tant pre-requisition to maintain a continuity of physical and mental health.
If a person’s health state declines dramatically, it often becomes necessary
to change the external situation, for example move to a nursing home where
medical care can be provided. The internal continuity, on the other hand, is
threatened rather by a mental decline, since memory processes are so crucial
for a persistence of inner structures.
It appears that even in older age a continuity of physical health is the
normal pattern of aging, and not just an ideal exception. This could be
shown for example in a still ongoing longitudinal study in Switzerland (Swiss
Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on the Oldest Old, SWILSO-O) that
surveyed a sample of—at the beginning of the study— 340 persons aged 80
to 84 years over a period of five years. It could be shown that stability in the
health state—in good as well as bad health—was the most frequent pattern
that could be observed (Lalive-d’Epinay, Pin, & Spini, 2001; Spini, 2001).
Whether internal or external, the extent of continuity is, according to
Atchley (1989), determined by a here-and-now assessment of the individual
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based on his or her remembered past. Therefore, the existence and the effects
of continuity can only be studied by retrospection.
The degree of continuity attributed by an individual to his or her life
can be classified into three general categories: too little continuity, optimum
continuity, and too much continuity.
1. Too little continuity means that life seems too unpredictable to be
individual. If lack of continuity comes to be defined by the individual
as severe, then it can also be called discontinuity.
2. Optimum continuity means that the individual sees the pace and degree
of change to be in line with personal preferences and social demands as
well as within her or his coping capacity.
3. Too much continuity means that the individual feels uncomfortably in
a rut; there is not enough change to enrich life.
It is important to note that there can not be objective definitions in order
to classify people with regard to the degree of continuity. Instead, individuals
must classify themselves based on their own standards. Although we can
devise regularities or normative standards within categories of people with
regard to perceptions of continuity, the assessment must still be made by the
individual.
Pressures and Attractions Toward Continuity
Atchley (1989) argues that aging individuals are predisposed and motivated
toward both internal and external continuity by identifiable pressures and
attractions.
Internal Continuity: Individuals have strong motives for wanting to pre-
serve internal continuity.
1. To begin with, individuals perceive that as a foundation for effec-
tive day-to-day decision making because internal continuity is an
important part of individual mastery and competence. For exam-
ple, continuity of cognitive knowledge is a major element if the
individual’s capacity to interpret and anticipate events. Without
persisting cognitive knowledge, there is no predictability in the
world, and without predictability, no mastery (or even compe-
tence) is possible.
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2. Internal continuity is essential to a sense of ego integrity, which
goes along with a sense of personal history and an acceptance of
that history to form a part of one’s identity.
3. Internal continuity also helps to meet the need of self-esteem. The
continuity principle within the self contains the ideas used as the
basis of self-esteem. Atchley’s argument for this is based on a
definition by James (1890), who suggested that self-esteem can be
seen as a function of one’s perceived level of success in relation to
one’s ideal expectations of self. From this follows that self-esteem
can be raised either by increasing success or reducing expectations.
For this formulation to apply over time, there must be a concept
of continuity operating in the definition of both success and ex-
pectation. It then follows that it is impossible to have durable
self-esteem without references to some notion of continuity.
4. People can also be motivated toward internal continuity as an ef-
fective means meeting important needs. For example, most of
us have ideas that quite effectively lead us to the food, housing,
income, and clothing that we need. Internal continuity also pro-
motes easy maintenance of social interaction and social support.
The predictability of an individual’s identity, self, and tempera-
ment is seen as an important part of that individual’s personal
attractiveness because it makes him or her foreseeable and com-
fortable to be around.
External Continuity: Various pressures and attractions move people to-
ward external continuity as well.
1. As noted earlier, people are expected by others to present them-
selves in a way that is obviously tied to and connected with their
past role performances. Older adults who have major social re-
sponsibilities such as jobs and child-rearing are generally exposed
to more pressures from others to show continuity compared to
those who have retired or are in the “empty nest” period of the
family life cycle.
2. External continuity of relationships is motivated by a desire for
predictable social support. Kahn and Antonucci (1981) referred
to the inner cycle of close family and friends as the “convoy” of
social support, because they “travel” with us across our lifetime.
The convoy of social support affirms individual identity, provides
insurance against a potential need for instrumental dependency,
and allows a sense of belonging.
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3. External continuity increases the possibility that feedback received
from others about the self-concept can be accurately interpreted.
This anticipation allows the individual to concentrate his or her
interactions among those who affirm his or her own view of self.
4. External continuity is seen as an important means of coping with
physical and mental changes that may come along with aging, or
even as a means of delaying these changes. For instance, regular
practice has been proved to offset negative effects of aging on
various cognitive capacities.
5. External continuity reduces the ambiguity of personal goals that
can come with changes such as widowhood, retirement or the
empty nest. The notion of continuity is an efficient way to narrow
the field from which new goals are sought. For example, the most
common pattern of adjustment to retirement is to maintain the
same set of personal goals (cf. Atchley, 1982).
Thus, continuity is, according to Atchley (1989), a preferred strategy for
dealing with aging for a wide variety of reasons. Both internal and exter-
nal continuity help individuals focus on and maintain their strengths and
minimize the effects of deficits as normal aging occurs.
2.1.4 Socioemotional Selectivity Theory
Socioemotional selectivity theory asserts that time perspective is integrally
involved in human goal-directed behavior and, more broadly, in human mo-
tivation (Carstensen, 1992; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; Lang
& Carstensen, 2002). The awareness of time, not just clock time or calen-
dar time, but lifetime, is a fundamental human characteristic (Carstensen
et al., 1999). Although cultures clearly differ in their treatment of time, a
basic awareness of time is ubiquitous in all known cultures and peoples. This
universal ability plays an essential role in motivation. Goals are often set
within temporal contexts, and goal selection depends fundamentally on the
perception of time. Although a reasonably stable set of goals—ranging from
physical safety and sustenance to more psychological goals such as feeling
comfortable and gaining information—motivates behavior throughout life,
the perception of time influences which is adopted. That is, the same essen-
tial set of goals operates through life, but the relative importance of specific
goals within this goal constellation changes as a function of time (Carstensen,
Fung, & Charles, in press; Fung & Carstensen, in press).
Socioemotional selectivity theory focuses on two main classes of psycho-
logical goals: one comprises expansive goals, such as acquiring knowledge or
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making new social contacts; the second comprises goals related to feelings,
such as balancing emotional states or sensing that one is needed by others.
When the future is perceived as open-ended, future-oriented goals are
most important and individuals pursue goals that optimize long-range out-
comes. In the interpersonal realm, such goals often pertain to acquisition of
knowledge or to seeking new social contacts—even relatively superficial con-
tacts or ones tinged with negative affect—because the information gleaned
from such contacts may be useful in the future. In contrast, when time is per-
ceived as limited, emotionally meaningful goals—e.g., a desire to feel needed
by others—are pursued because such goals have more immediate payoffs.
Thus, according to the theory, temporal perspective is an inherent as-
pect of goal selection. Since age is inextricably and negatively associated
with future time, age-related patterns emerge. The theory posits clear de-
velopmental trajectories for emotional and knowledge-related goals. Early
in life, time is typically perceived as expansive and people are motivated to
prepare for a long and unknown future. With this future-orientation, de-
veloping organisms allocate considerable resources to obtaining knowledge
and developing new skills, and are motivated to do so particularly when
knowledge is limited. Because knowledge striving is so important from late
adolescence to middle adulthood, it is pursued relentlessly even at the cost
of emotional satisfaction. As people move through life they become increas-
ingly aware that time in some sense is“running out”. More social contacts feel
superficial—trivial—in contrast to the ever-deepening ties of existing close
relationships. It becomes increasingly important to make the “right” choice,
not to waste time on gradually diminishing future payoffs. Increasingly, emo-
tionally meaningful goals are pursued.
Developmentally, the knowledge trajectory starts high during the early
years of life and declines gradually over the life course as knowledge accumu-
late and the future for which it is banked grows ever shorter.
Unlike knowledge-related goals, emotional goals follow a curvilinear tra-
jectory. Socioemotional selectivity theory acknowledges that emotional needs
are important throughout life, but posits that their relative salience among
the constellation of social motives changes with age. The emotion trajectory
is highest during infancy and early childhood when emotional trust and relat-
edness are initially established and rises again in old age when future-oriented
strivings are less relevant.
The theory predicts thus that people who are older or are otherwise in
situations that place constraints on time attach greater importance to emo-
tionally meaningful goals relative to those who are younger and/or perceive
time as relatively open-ended.
Socioemotional selectivity theory provides an explanation for the appar-
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ently paradox finding that life satisfaction and subjective well-being are main-
tained or even improve in old age, in spite of dwindling social networks. The
theory accounts for this phenomenon in motivational terms: limiting con-
tact with peripheral social partners allows individuals to optimize emotional
experience with people closest related to them.
Like disengagement theory (Cummings & Henry, 1961), socioemotional
selectivity theory views age-related reductions in social contacts as motivated.
However, disengagement theory predicts social withdrawal from intimate re-
lationships as well as peripheral relationships and posits emotional tranquility
to play a central role in the mutual withdrawal of individuals and society.
Socioemotional selectivity theory, in contrast, suggests that close relation-
ships are maintained in later life and emotional investment in them increases
(Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999).
The claims of the theory have been supported by extensive experimental
evidence, suggesting that not age itself, but rather the limited time
perspective is the reason for an increase of importance for emotionally
meaningful—in contrast to knowledge-oriented—goals (Carstensen et al.,
in press; Carstensen & Frederikson, 1998; Carstensen et al., 1999; Fung &
Carstensen, in press; Lang & Carstensen, 2002).
2.2 Development of Age Identity or Subjec-
tive Age
The concept of subjective age—the idea of asking people how old they feel—is
a relatively new domain of research. It has first raised some larger interest
among marketing psychologists in the early 1970’s, and since then, it is still
in marketing psychology were we can find most of the literature on the topic.
The reason for that interest is probably that subjectively young elderly peo-
ple (who are sometimes also referred to as “New-Age Elderly”, cf. Sherman,
Schiffmann, & Mathur, 2001) are considered to be a special consumer seg-
ment, and an attractive one since they are supposed to be more youthful in
their behavior, and thus more active consumers than the so-called traditional
elderly.
Studies dealing with subjective age show that real age and subjective age
can differ considerably, the subjective age being for adults almost always
younger than the real age. The older people get, the more do they feel
younger than their real age.
O¨berg and Tornstam (2001) for instance found an almost linear increase
of the discrepancy between subjective and real age with Swedish partici-
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pants. Already around fifty, people felt on average around 10 years younger
than their real age, and in the oldest age group (75–85 years), the average
discrepancy was around 20 years.
The same study shows that more than half of the 65-74 year old people
consider themselves as youthful, and still almost half of the 75-85 year old
do so as well.
Similar results were obtained by Barnes-Farrell and Piotrowsky (1989),
Filipp and Ferring (1989) and Smith and Baltes (1996).
Numerous variables have been found to correlate with subjective age. I
will here give a brief literature overview of variables that were considered in
previous studies.
Biological and Physiological Variables
1. Physical Health
Self-rated good health is in general inversely correlated to subjective
age. The better someone considers his or her physical health, the
younger does that person perceive him- or herself to be. This find-
ing is consistent throughout the literature. It was shown in longi-
tudinal (Markides & Boldt, 1983; Markides & Ray, 1988) as well as
cross-sectional studies (Baum & Boxley, 1983; George, Mutran, & Pen-
nybaker, 1980; Gwinner & Stephens, 2001; Mutran & George, 1982;
Sirgey, Mentzer, Rahtz, & Meadow, 1991).
Besides the self-rated health, the number of visits to a doctor and the
number of times hospitalized are also predictors for higher subjective
age (Mutran and George, 1982).
2. Physical Attractiveness
Guiot (2001) showed for women aged 50 years and older that there is a
relationship between self-perceived physical attractiveness and subjec-
tive age. The more the women’s self-perception of physical attractive-
ness was positive, the stronger their feeling of remaining young.
Demographic Variables
1. Chronological Age
The difference between chronological and subjective age is increasing
with chronological age (Kastenbaum et al., 1972; Staats, 1996; Staats,
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Heaphey, Miller, Partlo, & Romine, 1993). For young people chronolog-
ical and subjective age correspond more or less, whereas adults mostly
feel younger than they are. Filipp and Ferring (1989) report an aver-
age discrepancy of 10 years for her sample of 55 year old men. The 75
year old men feel on the average even 15 years younger than they are.
The Berlin Aging Study showed similar discrepancies (c.f. Smith &
Baltes, 1996): On average the subjects (aged 70 to 103 years) reported
to feel twelve years younger and look almost ten years younger than
their chronological age. The age that the respondents considered as
ideal for was 25 years below their real age.
2. Gender
There is no conclusive evidence about the connection between gender
and subjective age. Most studies find no association between gender
and subjective age (Baum & Boxley, 1983; George et al., 1980; Mutran
& George, 1982 O¨berg & Tornstam, 1999). However, there are earlier
studies (Bengtson, Kasschau and Ragan, 1977; Peters, 1971; Ross, 1981
as cited in Barak & Stern, 1986) that find women to perceive themselves
as younger than their male cohorts.
Social Correlates
1. Marital Status
The evidence about the relationship between marital status and sub-
jective age is not consistent. While Baum and Boxley (1983) found
no significant relationship between marital status and subjective age,
Barak and Stern (1986) found that unmarried women perceive them-
selves as younger. Markides and Boldt (1983)) reported that unmarried
men and women perceive themselves as older. The dissenting findings
might result from methodological or sample differences (cf. Barak and
Stern, 1986).
2. Family Demographics
This variable deals with both age and number of an individual’s off-
spring or progeny, that is, children and grandchildren.
(a) Age of offspring: A multivariate study by Barak and Gould (1985)
has found the age of the offspring to be one of the main determi-
nants of subjective age. The older an individual’s children and
grandchildren are, the older that person perceives him- or herself
to be.
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(b) The number of offspring is also positively correlated with subjec-
tive age: the more children and grandchildren a person has, the
older his or her own age perception (Barak & Gould, 1985; Barak
& Stern, 1986).
3. Social Support
A greater social support is correlated with a lower subjective age (Gwin-
ner & Stephens, 2001).
4. Culture
Cross-cultural studies showed that the phenomenon is not limited to
Western cultures: Indian, Korean and Chinese people, for instance,
indicate as well a subjective age that is younger than their chronological
age (Barak, Mathur, Lee, Zhang, & Erondo, 2001; Barak, Mathur, Lee,
& Zhang, 2001; Mathur, Barak, Zhang, & Lee, 2001).
Unfortunately, although the authors claim that their findings were“sur-
prisingly similar to those found in ‘ageless’ American society” (Barak
et al., 2001, p. 1023), they provide no explicit comparison to studies
in Western cultures regarding the extent of the discrepancy between
subjective and chronological age.
Job and Profession Variables
1. Educational Status
While there are studies indicating no relationship (Baum and Box-
ley, 1983; George, Mutran and Pennybaker, 1980, Mutran and George,
1982), most studies have found that higher educated people perceive
themselves as younger (Barak and Stern, 1986; Gwinner & Stephens,
2001; Markides and Boldt, 1983).
2. Employment and Retirement Status
Barak and Stern (1986) found that fully employed persons perceive
themselves as younger. George, Mutran and Penybaker (1980) as well
as Mutran and George (1982) found that retired people perceive them-
selves as older than their not yet retired cohorts, whereas Baum and
Boxley, using comparative age as measure, found no association be-
tween retirement and subjective age.
3. Income
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Income has been found to correlate with subjective age: the higher
the income level, the younger the person perceives him- or herself to
be (Baum and Boxley, 1983; George, Mutran and Pennybaker, 1980;
Gwinner and Stephens, 2001; Mutran and George, 1982). Sherman
et al. (2001) also showed that subjectively young persons are more
likely to perceive themselves to be financially well-off and at the same
time less likely to equate wealth with happiness and success. Moreover,
their findings suggest an interaction between gender and subjective age.
It seems that those who are male and subjectively old are likely to feel
that they are “financially just getting by”.
Psychographic Variables
1. Self-Esteem and Self-Confidence
A positive self-perception, that is, high self-esteem and self-confidence
correlate with low subjective age (Baum and Boxley, 1983; George,
Mutran and Pennybaker, 1980; Mutran and George, 1982).
2. Locus of control
An internal locus of control is related to low subjective age: individuals
who feel that they have more control over their lives perceive them-
selves as younger than individuals who feel that their lives are rather
controlled by external factors (Baum and Boxley, 1983).
3. Life Satisfaction
A greater degree of well-being in terms of life satisfaction is related to
a lower subjective age (Barak and Gould, 1985; George, Mutran and
Pennybaker, 1980; Mutran and George, 1982).
A comparison of studies focusing on life satisfaction rather than subjec-
tive age shows that many correlates are common to both constructs. It
is therefore conceivable that subjective age and life satisfaction function
as covariates.
4. Attitude Toward the Elderly
Gwinner and Stephens (2001) found that people who were subjectively
older were more likely to hold negative attitudes towards the elderly.
The authors point out that this is counterintuitive, since one would
imagine that those who view old age negatively would attempt to dis-
associate themselves from old age and report a younger subjective age.
Gwinner and Stephens’ finding is just the opposite. According to them,
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an explanation might be the higher-than-average education level of the
participants. Growing older may seem more attractive to those armed
with the knowledge and life experience that education brings.
Behavior Variables
1. Consumer Behavior Traits
(a) Venturesomeness: Sherman, Schiffmann and Mathur (2001) found
that subjectively young persons are more adventurous than sub-
jectively old persons. They continue to find new challenges and
interests and they are more likely to value different things each day
(i.e., novelty seeking). Moreover, their findings suggest an interac-
tion between gender and subjective age. It seems that those who
are female and subjectively young have a greater propensity to be
adventurous. Gwinner and Stephens (2001) also found cautious-
ness in purchases to be correlated with a higher subjective age.
Villanueva (2002) showed in a causal model that a high subjective
age is linked to the avoidance of physical risk and low confidence.
It is thus indirectly linked with an avoidance of the market.
(b) New Brand Trial: Gwinner and Stephens (2001) found that people
who feel young are more likely to try new brands. In a structural
equation model, however, they found that link to be an indirect
one, the subjective age influencing new brand trial through infor-
mation seeking and cautiousness.
(c) Traditionality: People who perceive themselves as younger tend to
be less traditional and old-fashioned in their appearance (Barak
& Gould, 1985).
(d) Homebodyness: In a multivariate study, Barak and Gould (1985)
found homebodyness to be a determinant of subjective age: Those
persons who agreed to statements like “I am a homebody” had an
older subjective age than those who did not.
(e) Price Sensitivity: This trait refers to a consumer’s tendency to
take his or her purchase decision mostly on the criterion of price.
Barak and Gould (1985) showed that female consumers (aged 30-
69) were the more likely to be concerned with the cost of goods
the older they felt.
(f) Information seeking: People who are subjectively younger are
more likely to consume product information, especially advertise-
ment, in general. For instance, they agree to statements like “I
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often read even my junk mail just to know what it is about”(Gwin-
ner & Stephens, 2001).
2. Use of Media
Barak and Gould (1985) found that television viewing was associated
with an older subjective age. Reading, on the other hand, was associ-
ated with a younger subjective age, and for radio listening he found no
association.
Unfortunately, the correlations were not controlled for education or
socioeconomic status.
3. Other Specific Behavior Traits
Barak and Gould (1985) found that exercising and dining out were
correlated with a younger perceived age.
Based on these findings of previous literature, a model of subjective age
can be developed as shown in Figure 2.1. The model shows interrelations that
have so far been shown empirically between different variables and subjective
age, without claiming any causal directions.
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Figure 2.1: Correlations with young subjective age, as found in previous
research
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Chapter 3
“...When the Work’s All Done
This Fall”—Transitions in Role
Identities Due to Retirement
L’homme n’est rien d’autre que son
projet, il n’existe que dans la
mesure ou` il se re´alise, il n’est donc
rien d’autre que l’ensemble de ses
actes.
Jean-Paul Sartre
L’existentialisme est un humanisme
Retirement is a relatively recent phenomenon, characteristic of aﬄuentindustrial and post-industrial societies. In many other cultures, and in
our own culture of 100 years ago, retirement was virtually nonexistent. Work
was part of life until illness or death prevented it. Now, however, we have
compulsory age-based retirement in most occupational sectors, supported by
social security schemes, and the tradition of retiring from work around the
age of 65 in other sectors. At the same time, life spans are lengthening.
The implication is that, to take the situation in Switzerland as an ex-
ample, men who retire at about 65 have a life expectancy of roughly 14 to
15 years in retirement (Kappeler, 2003), and women, who have a longer life
expectancy, can even expect to live for 19 years in retirement if they get
retired at 63 years (which is the retirement age for women in Switzerland).
Retirement can not only be viewed from the perspective of giving up work.
Beside the work-related variable, the retiree needs to adjust to a number of
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other life change events associated with the process. Shifts occur in at least
three important personal resources :
1. a decrease on personal income,
2. an increase in free time, and
3. a potential for declining health along with constrained activity
(Howard, Marshall, Rechnitzer, Cunningham, & Donner, 1982)
In addition, there are socio-psychological variables that involve changes:
1. the altered relationships an individual has with his or her interpersonal
environment, and
2. the altered societal perceptions about his or her role in society now
that retirement has taken place.
Retirement, therefore, is a complex process requiring adaptation in many
spheres of life besides the work role.
3.1 Definition Problems of Retirement
When retirement as a stage of life is conceptualized, there appears to be
general agreement that it is the period following a career of job-holding,
when income is usually secured by pension benefits, by virtue of having held
a job for a minimum length of time in the past (Atchley, 1980; Howard et al.,
1982). However, defining retirement in operational terms is more difficult,
and there is no widely recognized and accepted operational definition in the
literature today.
Operational definitions seek to define an abstract concept such as re-
tirement in terms of simple, observable procedures. Researchers studying
the field can choose from various approaches to operationalizing retirement,
including defining it in terms of reduction in employment, proportion of in-
come from pensions or self-initiated plans, and a subjective assessment as to
whether the subject considers him- or herself as retired.
This difficulty in defining retirement is a major problem, and Howard
et al. (1982) even suggest that the variety of definitions in use probably
accounts in large part for the problem of obtaining consistency in research
results.
Ekerdt and DeViney (1990) introduce five criteria for defining retirement:
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1. Separation From a Career: Under this criterion, persons retire upon
leaving a job, position, occupation, or employer with which they have
a long association. It is a criterion for which retirement is largely a
one-time event.
The idea is clear enough—people retire when they leave their life’s main
work. However, the idea is not easy to operationalize because not all
workers have continuous careers in one place or line of work. For ex-
ample, if a vocational education teacher concludes a career at the local
high school but remains occupationally an active plumber, is this a
career- ending retirement? When there is not enough common experi-
ence and homogeneity of experience regarding careers and endings, it
is difficult to frame survey questions about these transitions. One post
hoc strategy (i.e., devising a measure from data already collected) is
to characterize the position with longest tenure as the “career job” and
one’s having left it as retirement.
2. Exit from the Labor Force
Exit-retirements occur when an older worker has no current employ-
ment, as indicated by zero hours worked or zero earnings, and is not
seeking employment. Operationally, labor-force exit is the easiest, most
convenient definition of retirement, so long as the investigator does not
overlook occasional or seasonal employment that occurs on a regular
basis.
It has, however, the disadvantage of grouping together as “nonretired”
all persons with any work activity, full-time employment along with
nominal engagements in the labor force. This dichotomy masks the
nature of older persons’ work patterns, which are increasingly charac-
terized by part-time employment with advancing age
3. Reduced Effort
By this criterion, retirement is a substantial reduction in labor supply
or income, as indicated by a lower level of work activity or earnings.
The “reduced effort” criterion is a refinement of the previous “exit”
criterion, locating the cutoff for retirement/nonretirement higher up
the labor supply distribution.
Work effort is often called an “objective” measure of retirement, yet
determinations of full, partial, or nonretirement are fairly arbitrary.
Some clues about where to categorize along the work effort or earnings
continuum can be had by reference to other criteria. For example,
Murray (1979) has shown that people do not call themselves “partially
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retired” in great numbers until they have reduced work to 30– 34 or
even 25–29 hours a week.
4. Pension Receipt
Under this criterion, people retire upon receipt of retirement pensions.
These are in the United States mainly the retired-worker benefit of So-
cial Security or a pension from private or public employment. Pension
eligibility is an administrative definition of retirement and already an
amalgam of other criteria. Eligibility for the Social Security benefit is
defined by age, previous employment, and reduced earnings.
5. Self-Definition
Persons can be considered to be retired if they say they are. This is
typically called a “subjective” definition of retirement, which is, as Ek-
erdt and DeViney (1990) point out, an unfortunate label. In social
science generally, the quality of subjective data is usually compared
unfavorably to so-called objective data with their greater validity, re-
liability, and intelligibility. When self-reports of retirement status are
labeled as subjective, in contrast to the so-called objective indicators
of reduced effort or pension receipt, it may be meant that retirement
status is subjectively reported. However, unless data were generated
by the rare strategy of matching individual records with pension plan
or Social Security files, almost all information in retirement research
is subjectively reported and might properly be termed subjective la-
bor force participation, subjective earnings, subjective benefits, etc. In
another sense, the subjectivity of research participants (in their deter-
minations of retirement status) are contrasted with the objectivity of
scientific classifications. Yet subjectivity, too, inheres in the activity
of investigators, who also contrive characterizations of retirement using
unreported or unexamined judgments, assumptions, and reference to
common consensus. Ekerdt and DeViney (1990) emphasize that the
proper contrast is therefore not the subjectivity or objectivity of as-
signments to the retirement status, but the source of the assignment,
that is self-definition versus investigator definition.
Nevertheless, it is still important to understand what people mean by
their responses. When people say they are retired, are they confirm-
ing a role exit (Ebaugh, 1988)? Or assuming a social identity? Are
they acknowledging facts about their employment or income? For in-
stance, it can happen that older women, who have been housewives for
virtually all of adulthood but receive spouses’ pension benefits, define
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themselves as retired. Other women with full and concluded work ca-
reers may see themselves as housewives. Claims about being retired
may also be difficult to interpret among persons with histories of irreg-
ular work patterns or chronic unemployment. An other problem of the
self-definition criterion is that self-definitions may change over time in
ways that make it difficult to pinpoint the date or event of retirement.
Persons may not decide they are retired until sometime after they have
entered a set of circumstances. For example, after a certain duration of
disability or unemployment, a person may later decide that he or she
had retired when the new situation started.
Ekerdt and DeViney (1990) point out that defining persons as retired for
research purposes is hard because strategies for reducing the ambiguity of
retirement classifications largely succeed only in moving ambiguity around.
For example, introducing a category of partial retirement as an alternative
to nonretirement or full retirement will not resolve the number of arguable
assignments, but rather concentrate them among the partial retirees. There-
fore, no strategy for defining retirement suffices for all purposes; definitions
should be suited to the research task at hand.
However, in an analysis of a variety of studies, Ekerdt and DeViney (1990)
showed also that the operational definitions are not so difficult as they first
appear. By using a two- or three-criterion retirement definition, the number
of arguable classifications can be seen to be fairly small relative to the number
of persons for whom retirement status is a straightforward matter.
3.2 Predictors for a Successful Retirement
Adjustment
Role theory is a potentially useful framework for examining the retirement
transition. Roles consist of activities and behaviors that characterize a per-
son in a given social context and may be fundamental to change (George,
1990). Role theory suggests that certain socially prescribed and personally
relevant roles are critical for identity. These self-defined roles may emerge
through one’s personal relationship to close personal associates (e.g., mother,
friend), through valued activities experienced in the work roles (e.g., physi-
cian), through voluntary group affiliations (e.g., clubs), and through leisure
activities (e.g., gardener, photographer).
Individual differences in adjustment to change can be understood by ex-
amining the shifts in critical role activity that accompany life transitions.
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Research by George (1990) has shown that role theory can be used as a
foundation for understanding retirement adjustment. She used role theory
to predict how older people negotiate age-related changes and reported that
a person’s success in negotiating and managing the necessary shifts in ac-
tivities that result from role change and redefinition determines adjustment.
This role-based approach may be applied to the retirement process, because
leaving the workforce necessitates a shift in roles and activities.
Retirement can be viewed as a transition that involves role expansion,
redefinition, and change. Role activities that may diminish are those that
depend on contact with coworkers and activities involved in the execution of
work functions. Thus, Taylor and Cook (1995) assume that social roles whose
maintenance depends on coworker interactions and professional roles that
are based on work behavior are strongly influenced by workforce exit. The
influence of such post-retirement role loss on the individual depends on the
self-rated importance of these work-dependent roles and on the availability
of other satisfying substitutes for the old roles.
3.2.1 Personal Relationships and Social Roles
Social connections offer a means of support for individuals as well as a source
of identity. A number of studies have been conducted suggesting that there is
a positive relationship between the quality of retiree social connections and
post-retirement affect. For example, a common finding among researchers
is that social support may buffer against stress and stressful changes (An-
tonucci, 1990; Cutrona, Russel, & Rose, 1986; Krause, 1987). Dorfman, Ko-
hout, and Heckert (1985) surveyed retirees in a rural environment and found
a consistent relationship between retirement satisfaction and social connec-
tions such as friendship networks, family members, and group affiliations.
Examining the roles associated with family, friends, informal organizations,
and leisure activities allows us to understand their importance in retirement
adjustment.
Social roles are often operationalized as interactions with family, friends,
and informal affiliations.
Spouse
A question of interest is how the retirement process and adjustment is dif-
ferent for married than for unmarried persons, and what influence this social
role of being a husband or a wife has on the retirement satisfaction. Re-
sults of research on this question are mixed. Some researchers have reported
that being married is associated with more positive post-retirement satisfac-
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tions scores (Beck, 1982; Wan & Odell, 1983), others have found no effect
(Burkhauser & Quinn, 1983).
Atchley and Miller (1983) suggested that marriage has an influence on
the timing of retirement, especially for employed wives. Married women are
more likely to retire before age 65 while unmarried women are more likely
to retire after age 65. Older couples may attempt to coordinate the time
they retire so that they can spend retirement together. Since women tend to
marry older men, this would explain why older married women retire before
age 65.
From a role theory perspective, we can assume that the simple marital
status would not be as important a predictor for post-retirement adjustment
as would be the importance of the husband or the wife role, and also the
extent to which one gains satisfaction from role-related activities. Therefore,
it is necessary to go beyond a simple examination of whether participants
are married or not.
Bearth-Candinas (1997) analyzed data from a two-year longitudinal
study, questioning 119 couples
1. six months before retirement,
2. six months after retirement, and
3. one-and-a-half years after retirement (Buchmu¨ller et al., 1996; Buch-
mu¨ller, Dobler, Mayring, & Schneider, 1997).
Bearth’s analysis showed that retirement has no or only small effects on
different characteristics of marriage quality like communication, expression
of emotion, conflicts and confidence.
Lee and Shehan (1989), however, found negative effects of the husbands
retirement in the marital satisfaction of employed wives.
Meon, Jungmeen, and Hofmeister (2001) found in a two-wave longitudinal
survey including 534 married men and women that the actual retirement
transition is related to declines in stated marital quality for both husbands
and wives. Married men and women who move into retirement while their
spouses remain employed report the greatest marital conflict, regardless of
gender. People who had been retired for more than two years, however, report
higher marital quality, suggesting that role strain is reduced once couples are
settled into retirement.
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A similar u-formed development of satisfaction during the transition to re-
tirement has been found in the three-wave longitudinal study by Buchmu¨ller
et al. (1997).
Several studies have indicated that the perceived equity in the division of
household labor is an important predictor for retirees’ satisfaction. Partici-
pation of husbands in household work seems to contribute to satisfaction and
morale of husbands as well as wives (cf. Dorfman, 1992; Pin˜a & Bengtson,
1995; Ward, 1993).
Kulik (1996) questioned Israeli males, comparing pre-retired persons with
late-phase retirees. His results suggest an increase in the husband’s emotional
commitment towards the wife and an increase in the expected dependence on
her. Kulik attributes his findings to the fact that when the male partner loses
social contacts and other social rewards deriving from the work place, the
female partner becomes a primary source of emotional, physical, and moral
support.
Family and Friends
Simons and West (1985) suggest that it is useful to examine each of these
resources separately, because friends, family, and affiliations may fill different
needs for the individual and may be associated with quite distinct roles. For
example, satisfying family interactions are more strongly associated with feel-
ings of security than are interactions with friends. Being part of a friendship
group is more closely associated with feeling useful, whereas being married
is not closely associated with this feeling.
The nature of the activity that defines family and friendship is also dis-
tinctive, lending additional support to the idea that these social roles are
separate. A study by Larson, Mannel, and Zuzanek (1986) suggested that
time spent with the spouse is in more passive leisure, whereas time spent
with friends is spent in more active socializing. Families may impose needs
as well as offer resources, this is why Antonucci (1990) suggests that network
of friends are more closely related to well-being than is the family-network.
Friendship roles have probably a significant impact on retirement adjust-
ment, continuity of friendship being an important determinant of adjustment
(Taylor & Cook, 1995). Those individuals who derive many of their meaning-
ful social activities from colleagues in the work setting may have a relatively
difficult retirement transition. Maintaining these interactions after leaving
work can be difficult.
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MacLean (1982) found that involvement with one’s family can serve as a
predictor of adaptation to retirement: the more a person is involved with his
or her family, the more satisfied he or she is with the retirement situation.
Schneider and Dobler (1997) report that the satisfaction before and in
retirement is higher if a person has the feeling of having reached his or her
goals in the family, and if a person sees him- or herself as supported by a
social network providing information and emotional closeness.
3.2.2 The Work Role
Taylor and Cook (1995) point out that understanding the influence of work-
related variables on retirement requires a consideration of the meaning of the
work role, a given profession, and a particular job in an employee’s life. The
authors distinguish three levels of attachment to the work role:
1. Low work role attachment:
Individuals with low work role attachment do not derive a major source
of identity from the employing organization or their profession. For
these people, leaving the job does not entail problems due role loss
because the job is not a prominent source of identity.
Taylor and Cook (1995) assume that a significant proportion of indi-
viduals look forward to retirement and do not believe that they will
miss work. These individuals may concentrate on other social roles as
retirement approaches. This proposition is supported by research pro-
viding evidence that persons approaching retirement view the job as
less important and less central to happiness than do those in middle
age (Ryff, 1989). Similarly, having a career orientation may be less
important in an older person’s definition of an ideal person than it is in
that of a younger person. These individuals may see other roles as more
important in retirement and may not miss work. Non-work roles like
leisure activities or family interactions may be more important than
work roles for many retirees.
For those who do not view their affiliation with a given employer as
central in their identity, an interest in post-retirement employment may
stem from financial or social needs rather than from the need to fulfill
a work role. Even though they may feel a need to be productive, other
activities and roles outside work may readily fill this need.
Atchley (1989) observed that formal role relationships, such as jobs that
do not allow much personalization, are often easy to leave behind at
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retirement because they are rightly seen as having little reinforcement
to offer one’s identity.
2. Productive individual:
The second level of identification is found in the individual who has the
need to occupy a formal work role but has little attachment to a given
profession or company. These individuals may feel a need to be in a
formal work role, for example because of a strong work ethic, but they
may not regret leaving a particular job.
For those individuals who value work in general, other jobs can satisfy
this general need and maintain the role identity of a “productive indi-
vidual”. These persons would have an attachment to the general role
of “worker” rather than identifying themselves closely with a profession
or a company. To maintain this role, they may take on part-time roles
in related or even completely different organizations after retiring from
a particular firm.
If a person is attached to work in general, Taylor and Cook assume that
voluntary organizations may serve as satisfactory replacement for the
old work role. To the extent that some substitute for the satisfaction
from the professional activity is available, the individual may be able
to retire without discomfort. For example, a person who has been a
manager for a number of years and enjoys the activities central to the
profession may find satisfaction in taking a leadership role in a volunteer
association.
3. Work as self:
The third level of attachment to work is found in the individual whose
identity extends beyond a general attachment to work. For these re-
tirees, being an employee of a given firm or a member of a profession
have additional significance. They may view their professional activi-
ties and their affiliation with a company as an important part of their
identity. This source of identification cannot be easily be replaced by
other activities or other work. Thus, satisfactory substitutes for the
strong organizational or professional role may not be readily available.
Those workers who derive a major source of identification from their
particular job will probably find retirement from a given professional
role to be aversive, because retirement for this individual carries with
it a loss of identity.
Taylor and Cook (1995) emphasize that these three types of individuals
may be indistinguishable regarding their general work satisfaction and com-
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mitment scores. If professionals are to assist with the retirement transition,
they need therefore to understand the depth of individuals’ attachment to
work and also to examine the extent to which these individuals have invested
time and energy in developing alternative, satisfying roles.
However, there exists evidence that suggests that a high level of attach-
ment to the work role might not necessarily be linked to more difficulties
with the adaptation to retirement. On the contrary: a study of Buchmu¨ller
et al. (1997) found that the satisfaction with work before retirement corre-
lated with a high satisfaction with retirement afterwards. Other work-related
predictors for high retirement satisfaction are a person’s scope of action in
his or her job, the extent to which a person experiences work as a resource
and as important, the extent to which a person has reached his or her goals
during work, and the positive attitude of the employer towards older employ-
ees (Buchmu¨ller et al., 1996; Buchmu¨ller et al., 1997; Schneider & Dobler,
1997). Thus, high work commitment can even be a predictor for a good
retirement adaptation.
3.2.3 Voluntary Organizations
Participation in clubs, churches, and other voluntary organizations can create
roles that are central for a person’s identity (Taylor & Cook, 1995). The level
of activity in formal and informal associations before retirement predicts the
extent of participation after retirement (Long, 1987; Wan & Odell, 1983).
This shows that involvement in these groups continues beyond the transition
to retirement.
The question of the relationship between involvement in voluntary groups
and retirement adjustment has been addressed in various studies. The re-
sults of diverse studies reveal consistently a positive relationship between
memberships in voluntary associations and feelings of usefulness and satis-
faction (Simons & West, 1985; Usui & Keil, 1987). Voluntary activities such
as affiliations with clubs are related to actual and anticipated retirement sat-
isfaction and well-being (Dorfman et al., 1985; Dorfman & Moffett, 1987;
George, 1990; Kilty & Behling, 1985, as cited in Taylor & Cook, 1995).
These roles may be particularly important because they do not depend
on work-based interactions and allow people thus to maintain an important
role-identity tied to a useful and socially appreciated activity after leaving
the work-force.
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3.2.4 Leisure Time Activities
Recreational activities that bring a sense of satisfaction are open to expan-
sion after retirement. Research on the development of leisure time activities
during the transition to retirement shows a similar pattern to the above
mentioned evidence about commitment to voluntary organizations: a study
of Cutler and Hendricks (1995), e.g., suggests that involvement with leisure
activities before retirement predicts the involvement after retirement, sug-
gesting that people continue largely with the same activities after leaving the
workforce.
Similar results are reported by Schneider and Dobler (1997), who found
that the experience of leisure activities before retirement correlates with sat-
isfaction and well-being after retirement: People who are satisfied with their
leisure time before retirement, who view leisure as important and as a re-
source, who practiced many activities and had a high scope of action during
leisure time, reported high well-being six and eighteen months after retire-
ment.
Having satisfying leisure activities is associated with greater interest in
early retirement (Pherson & Guppy, 1979), suggesting that these may serve
as an attractive source of activity after retirement and may lead people to
anticipate more positive retirement experiences. These activities may serve
as a source of identity for retirees in the sense that a person can also define
him- or herself in terms of leisure accomplishments (e.g., golfer, painter).
Leisure may also contribute to a feeling of belonging when these activi-
ties are shared with others. The relationship between leisure-oriented club
participation and life satisfaction is probably to a large extent due to the
satisfaction derived from relating to others. Thus, shared leisure interests
may define valued social roles for the retiree.
3.2.5 Internal Resources
The ability of adapting to new roles may be seen as a psychological predispo-
sition that varies among individuals. The extent to which one effectively uses
available resources to cop with role changes that accompany retirement de-
pends, among other predictors, on psychological resources of the individual.
Thus, one’s success in redefining roles and role activity during the retirement
process is also influenced by these internal psychological resources.
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Internal Locus of Control
Locus of control involves a belief that one possesses the power to shape life’s
outcomes. Those with an internal locus of control believe that they can
control many events in life, whereas those with an external locus of control
believe that many of life’s outcomes are the result of luck and chance and are
not under their control. Understandably, those individuals with an internal
locus of control would be more likely to seek out information and resources
that may aid the retirement transition.
Internal locus of control has been associated with a number of psycho-
logical criteria related to effective coping skills. In older adults, an internal
locus of control has been associated with more positive coping strategies when
faced with challenging life events, greater life satisfaction, and more positive
psychological functioning in retirement (Abel & Hayslip, 1987; Buchmu¨ller
et al., 1997; Hickson, Housley, & Boyle, 1988, as cited in Taylor & Cook,
1995).
Taylor and Cook (1995) point out that locus of control may have an influ-
ence on adjustment to retirement because those persons with an internal lo-
cus of control may take charge of restructuring their activities and redefining
their roles after the transition to retirement. By accepting personal respon-
sibility for life changes, a retiree with an internal locus of control may take
advantage of available resources in order to successfully redefine or expand
existing roles.
Locus of control can influence retirement in at least two ways (Taylor &
Cook, 1995):
1. One important point is that individuals who possess an internal locus
of control may be more likely to engage in proactive strategies to meet
the retirement changes. They may seek out retirement planning in
anticipation of retirement change.
2. In addition, individuals who have a strong internal locus of control may
actively seek out new roles and activities after retirement, whereas per-
sons with an external locus of control will probably use more passive
strategies for coping and may not be as successful in pursuing substi-
tutes for the upcoming changes in work and social roles. After retire-
ment, they may be less likely to seek out replacements for lost activities
and roles.
Thus, locus of control may influence adjustment through its influence on
coping strategies.
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Self-efficacy Belief
Another related psychological factor, self-efficacy belief, is the belief that
one possesses the knowledge and skill needed to effectively negotiate events
(Bandura, 1982). Applied to retirement, it consists of the self-assessed ability
to deal with the changes that accompany retirement, that is the belief that
one has the resources needed to make the retirement transition successfully.
Given that positive feelings of self-efficacy are associated with more confi-
dence in the ability to handle challenging events, this variable may predict
retirement adjustment. Those with high self-efficacy belief or high retire-
ment self-confidence may be more likely to plan for and adapt to retirement
changes (Taylor & Cook, 1995).
Self-efficacy, or the belief that one can effectively cope with a given situ-
ation, has been used to
1. predict whether an individual will enter a new and unfamiliar situation,
2. predict the affective reactions of an individual to the new situation, and
3. predict an individual’s confidence in his or her own ability to deal with
the consequences of the change.
Given that retirement is a new experience, self-efficacy belief may serve
as a predictor of post-retirement adjustment. Those preparing to exit the
workforce would be expected to respond more favorably to retirement if they
believed that they had the skills and abilities necessary to make the retire-
ment transition.
This proposition has been supported by empirical evidence. Retiree’s
self-rated ability to make the adjustment to retirement is a predictor for the
planned retirement age: those persons who believed in their ability retire at
an earlier age (Taylor & Shore, 1995).
In addition, more favorable estimates to make the transition are positively
related to an affirmative attitude toward retirement, and higher self-efficacy
belief is related to lower preretirement anxiety (Fretz, Kluge, Ossana, Jones,
& Merikangas, 1989).
Buchmu¨ller et al. (1997) found in their longitudinal study that persons
with high self-efficacy belief were more satisfied and had a more positive
attitude towards retirement than persons with low self-efficacy belief (Buch-
mu¨ller et al., 1997; Schneider & Dobler, 1997).
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It can thus be assumed that self-efficacy is an important determinant of
anticipated and of experienced retirement satisfaction.
Retirement self-efficacy may be malleable if it operates similarly to other
forms of self-efficacy belief. That is, self-efficacy belief may be increased by
some types of retirement planning. MacLean (1982) showed that beliefs that
people had about retirement before they left the workforce could significantly
predict subsequent retirement adjustment.
Retirement planning is an important way to clarify expectations of re-
tirement and to transmit useful information to the retiree, thus raising self-
efficacy belief.
I will discuss the predictive value of different forms of retirement planning
and preparation below in some more detail (see subsection 3.2.6).
Sense of Coherence
Antonovsky (1987) developed the psychological construct of sense of coher-
ence (SOC), as he tried to understand how survivors or concentration camps
overcame their experiences. He was impressed with the fact that some per-
sons who had been interned in Nazi concentration camps, an experience of
great physical and emotional stress, followed by the uncertainty of being dis-
placed refugees after the war, nevertheless emerged from that experience with
reasonably good physical and emotional health. Why was this? To answer
this question, he developed his salutogenetic model of health, which posits
that to be stressed is the normal state for human beings, so the question to
be answered was not why do people become sick, but rather why is it that
most of us manage to stay reasonably well? His answer to the problem was
a concept he called the sense of coherence.
Antonovsky describes the sense of coherence as a factor that has a sta-
bilizing effect when people experience stressful events, enabling people to
maintain a positive level of well-being.
He defined the sense of coherence as a global orientation expressing the
extent to which an individual has a pervasive, enduring but nevertheless dy-
namic feeling of confidence. The feeling of confidence refers to three domains:
1. Comprehensibility:
The extent to which a person finds or structures their world to be
understandable, meaningful, orderly and consistent instead of chaotic,
random and unpredictable.
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This comprehensibility refers to stimuli emerging from the individual
as well as from the environment during the life course.
2. Manageability:
A person’s sense of being able to cope by relying on his or her own
resources or by getting help and not grieving endlessly.
3. Meaningfulness:
The deep feeling that life makes sense emotionally; that life’s demands
are worthy of commitment.
Schneider and Dobler (1997) investigated the influence of the sense of
coherence on the transition to retirement in their three-wave longitudinal
study (Buchmu¨ller et al., 1996; Buchmu¨ller et al., 1997).
They found that people with a high sense of coherence differ from people
with a low sense of coherence in the following aspects:
• They are more satisfied with their work and with their life in general
before retirement.
• They view retirement six month before the transition more favorably
and do not see the transition as a threat.
• They report more positive feelings regarding the prospect of their own
higher age.
• They are more satisfied with their life six and eighteen months after
retirement.
They are, however, not more active in their leisure time activities that
people with a low sense of coherence.
The results of this study showed in addition a clear correlation of a high
sense of coherence with a high self-efficacy belief.
3.2.6 Retirement Preparation
Regarding the fact that most employees pass 15 to 30 years of their lives in
retirement, the preparation of the transition gains importance. Therefore,
an increasing number of employers offer their employees preparation courses
for retirement and aging one to two years before retirement. The necessity of
these courses is hardly ever questioned by employers who are often disposed
to invest considerable amounts of money therein.
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Since the mid-1970’s, there are remarkably few studies reported that were
designed to evaluate retirement preparation courses.
A pair of studies by Glamser (Glamser, 1981; Glamser & DeJong, 1975)
are often cited because of their conclusions: that a comprehensive prere-
tirement program can bring about short-run changes in retirement-related
knowledge and behavior, but the long-term impact on the retirement experi-
ence is in doubt (as cited in Abel & Hayslip, 1987; Ekerdt, 1989). In the first
study (Glamser & DeJong, 1975), the old male work force of a glass manufac-
turer was assigned to a control group or to one of two experimental groups,
depending on the plant location. One group participated in a comprehen-
sive eight-session group discussion program with a planning emphasis. The
other group received a half-hour individual briefing about benefits. Rates of
participation in the two interventions were 62% and 71%, respectively. The
post-test four weeks afterwards compared knowledge, attitudes, and behavior
between 19 discussion-group participants, 40 men who received the briefing
only, and 20 controls. Compared to the others, the group discussion mem-
bers proved to be more knowledgeable at the post-test and had undertaken
more preparation activities. Effects of the individual briefing were minimal.
Neither intervention had a significant effect on attitudes. The acceptance of
both interventions were high, the participants being very pleased with the
assistance they had received.
Glamser (1981) later followed these same persons into retirement, resur-
veying them six years after the program had ended. This time, groups did
not differ on measures of life satisfaction, retirement attitudes, or reported
preparedness for retirement. Glamser concluded that the true value of retire-
ment preparation programs may lie in the help that can be provided during
the preretirement stage.
This conclusion sounds sobering, but in my opinion, it is an unrealistic
expectation if we hope to find an impact on such stable constructs as life
satisfaction or retirement attitudes as late as six years after those relatively
short interventions (cf. also Palmore, 1982; Klauer, 2001).
Another early study was a comparison of four behavior program models by
Tiberi, Boyack, and Kerschner (1978). The four interventions were labeled:
1. facilitated interaction
2. semi-structured stimulus and discussion
3. presentation/audience
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4. individual/resource
In this order, they represent a rough continuum of decreasing intensity
and opportunity for group discussion.
Several hundred persons volunteered to participate in the four programs;
a comparison group was included in the design, consisting of persons will-
ing but unable to participate. Complete pre-test and three-month follow-up
data were available for 256 (56%) of the original volunteers. Groups were
compared on nine factor scores measuring behavioral, informational, and at-
titudinal change. The general tendency was that participants in the more
intensive programs had more favorable pre- to post-program changes.
However, the authors acknowledge carefully issues of self-selection among
participants that may have had an influence on these results.
Haari (1992) realized a questionnaire survey in Switzerland to evaluate
retirement preparation courses offered by employers (Haari, 1992; Haari &
Holzwarth, 1993). 250 retirees and 200 employers participated in the study.
The usual form of a retirement preparation course is a two-day event
where about nine topics are covered, e.g., legal questions like marriage law
and right of inheritance, health and nutrition, or financial aspects.
Results of the questionnaire study showed that before retirement, about
one third of the employees reject the course. Employees with higher hier-
archical status do less often participate in the course. Haari concludes that
there is a certain social pressure imposed on the employees, which only high
positioned employees have the power to resist. However, since the course is
offered during working hours, I suggest as an alternative explanation for this
higher participation rate of blue-collar workers that two days off the usual
work might be more rewarding for them than for higher positioned persons
whose work-goals are often rather task- than time-oriented.
The employers as well as the retirees were asked about the contents of the
course that the retirees had taken part in, between two and five years before
the survey. The congruence between the answers of employers and retirees
were taken as a measure of the reception of the contents. Results showed
that the higher the socioeconomic status of the participants, the better did
they remember the contents of the preparation course.
A central objective of the study was to find out if participants of the course
were really better prepared for their retirement than non-participants. The
results of the study showed no significant differences between participants
and non-participants on any measures of life situation, time management
and prearrangements for older age.
Haari emphasizes that these humbling results hold only for the kind of
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preparation course that is currently offered by employers. He suggests that
the intention of imparting as many aspects as possible through presentations
by experts does not correspond to the needs of the participants. His proposal
is to offer courses that take place at different moments after retirement (over
several years) and are oriented more towards the momentary needs of the
participants and treat a more specific and limited number of topics.
Because of methodological constraints of the study, the results must in my
opinion be interpreted cautiously. As with the earlier, above presented stud-
ies, the design was not experimental, and the self-selection of the participants
may here as well have influenced the results.
Another question is also if the claims were possibly also too high in this
study. The fact that two days of retirement preparation did not, years after
the course, have a measurable effect on the participants’ life situation and
attitudes is in my opinion not really surprising, and it seems to me to be a
rather severe judgment to conclude that those two days were therefore of no
use to the participants.
The overall conclusion we can draw from these studies is that the available
evidence justifies only modest expectations for the usual retirement prepa-
ration programs to bring favorable outcomes for the individuals. The more
intensive models can, however, increase knowledge and planning behavior, at
least in the short run.
3.3 The Process of Role Exit
Retirement is a process of role-exit, if we look at it from the side of the
professional life, where the worker or employee role must necessarily be given
up.
What makes the concept of role exit interesting is the necessity for dis-
engagement, that is for physical and psychological withdrawal from the role
and the cultural context and web of relationships within which the role is
embedded. Taylor and Cook (1995) have suggested for retired persons that
the stronger the identification with the work role has been, the more difficult
the exit. The departing individual must cease to conceive him- or herself as
a role occupant, perhaps abandoning social identities and relationships that
are highly valued. Moreover, role disengagement is usually a mutual process
in which members of the parting individual’s role set must similarly withdraw
their role-based attachments to the individual. Thus, just as role entry may
involve a long and sometimes difficult process of adjustment, so too may role
exit.
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According to Ashforth (2001), the sources of role exit differ on two di-
mensions: the voluntariness of role exit (voluntary vs. involuntary) and the
locus of change (intra-role or push forces vs. exra-role or pull forces). Figure
3.1 illustrates those origins of role exit.
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Figure 3.1: Origins of role exit (Ashforth, 2001, p. 111).
1. Regarding the locus of change, a role exit is the product of factors
inherent in the role and its enactment (push forces, such as job dissat-
isfaction) or factors external to the role (pull forces, such as an inquiry
from a headhunter), or both.
For example, Grove (1992, as cited in Ashforth, 2001) interviewed nurse
practitioners about their occupational choice. Individuals who had
been dissatisfied with their previous occupation as a nurse were likely to
articulate their role transition as an active and rational attempt to up-
grade their professional credibility and status. That is, dissatisfaction
had mobilized them to seek change (= push). Conversely, individuals
who had been satisfied with being a nurse were more likely to describe
their transition in passive terms, as an unexpected opportunity to make
a job change (= pull).
2. Regarding voluntariness, a role exit may occur because a role occupant
chooses to leave voluntarily or because other influential individuals or
uncontrollable forces make it necessary than the individual leave (in-
voluntarily). The phenomenology of role exit is much different when
one perceives that the change was voluntary than when one is forced to
leave. The illustrative cell entries in Figure 3.1 show that resignation
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and retirement are examples of voluntary role exits that can originate
from push or pull forces or both. Individual terminations and mass
layoffs are examples of involuntary push forces. Finally, role progres-
sion (e.g., a medical intern becomes a resident, a university freshman
becomes a sophomore) and failing health are examples of involuntary
pull forces.
These are examples that represent tendencies in the sense that they are
often but not always true. For example, one might be coerced into accepting
early retirement, which would then be involuntary, or one may deliberately
make mistakes to induce termination, which would then be voluntary.
Research on role exit in organizations has so far been less common that
research on role entry. Ashforth (2001) see two main reasons for this:
1. Organizations seem to be far more concerned with role entry than exit.
Role entry represents the promise to the future: individuals are hired,
promoted, transferred, or even demoted to help the organization, and
selection, training, and socialization may greatly facilitate their adjust-
ment. In contrast, role exit represents the termination or even failure
of the past: individuals are fired or decide to quit or retire, or are
promoted, transferred, or demoted to a new slot. It is often not ap-
preciated that the nature and management of the role exit may also
influence the nature of the subsequent role entry and the morale of
those who remain.
2. A second reason may be that researchers usually find it easier to study
incoming newcomers than outgoing veterans. Newcomers are often
hired and begin en masse, providing a convenient sample, whereas vet-
erans tend to depart individually and often without warning. Also,
entry-level newcomers are often recent graduates of university, high
school, or training programs, again providing a convenient source.
Because of this lopsidedness in research emphasis, there are far fewer
models of role exit than role entry. In the following, I will first present a model
of role exit that was developed by Ebaugh (1988). This model describes the
process of voluntary role exit in four stages: After this, I will display an
expansion of this model by Ashforth (2001), where involuntary role exits are
included, and special consideration is brought to the pull-forces.
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3.3.1 Ebaugh’s Model of Role Exit
The role exit model of Ebaugh (1988) focuses primarily on intra-role and
voluntary transitions, where doubts materialize in the role occupant and
ultimately prompt a role exit. In terms of the phenomenology of role exit this
represents the most complex intersection of locus of change and voluntariness,
because much of the process is intrapsychic.
Ebaugh’s model is based on 185 interviews with a variety of“Ex’s”, includ-
ing occupational roles (e.g., ex-nuns, ex-doctors, retirees), family roles (e.g.,
divorced people, mothers without custody of their children), and stigmatized
roles (e.g., ex-convicts, transsexuals).
For my purpose, a major strength of Ebaugh’s model is her focus on
the interaction of role and identity. Consistent with the focus of this work,
Ebaugh concentrated on exroles that had been central to the identity of her
interviewees.
The model is divided into four stages: First doubts, seeking and weighing
alternatives, the turning point, and creating an exrole. The stages can be
regarded as tendencies rather than fixed and necessary steps that must occur.
Stage 1: First Doubts
Precipitating Events
Individuals are often swept along by the demands and routines of everyday
life and may not actively reflect on their valued identities, goals, and life
trajectories. Thus, reflection is often prodded by events that interrupt the
flow of life. First doubts occur when a person begins to question and possibly
redefine meanings that have previously been taken for granted.
What makes an event a precipitating event is the meaning the individual
derives from it. An event may produce a flash of insight or realization, what
Denzin (1989) referred to as an epiphany. Denzin identified four types of
epiphanies:
1. minor or illustrative, which reveal tensions,
2. major, which provide “moments of truth” where the essence of some-
thing is revealed,
3. cumulative, where a series of events is revealing,
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4. and relived, where one re-experiences an earlier epiphany.
Whatever their form, epiphanies may lead to first doubts.
A variety of events can trigger those first doubts:
• Disappointments:
Because of the high importance ascribed to a secure sense of identity,
meaning, control and belonging in a role, doubts are most likely to
arise when one has experienced a major disappointment, such as a poor
performance appraisal, or a series of smaller disappointments, such as
tensions or conflicts among peers, or difficulties in mastering tasks.
Disappointment triggers attributional processes as one searches for the
cause of this negative event. According to attribution theory (Weiner,
1985; Weiner, 1986), the more an individual attributes causality for the
disappointment to factors that are perceived to be global rather than
specific, stable rather than unstable, external rather than internal, and
uncontrollable rather than controllable, the more likely the individual
will conclude that the problem cannot be solved, and therefore decide
to exit the role.
For example, Whitey and Cooper (1989) found that low job satisfaction
and the perception that the situation would not improve each predicted
preparation for organizational exit. Thus, role exits are often triggered
by a desire to address accumulated disappointments that appear likely
to persist.
• External Changes: Goffee and Scase (1992) found that organiza-
tional changes and uncertainty induced managers to rethink their ori-
entation towards work and their organization. For some of them the
organizational changes and uncertainty were the reason why they de-
cided to become self-employed.
External changes may help crystallize vague feelings of dissatisfaction,
bringing them into focus and increasing the salience of them, thereby
galvanizing action. Thus, ironically, even changes that are meant to
improve the satisfaction of employees may make the context and nature
of work more salient and cause them to question their commitment to it.
The organizational act of changing the status quo sensitizes individuals
to other possibilities, to the limitless potential of change, so that the
external change may be seen as insufficient (this is also what is meant
by the saying: “let sleeping dogs lie”).
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Of course, external changes need not be planned or on a grand scale.
Events such as the resignation of a valued peer, a sudden opportu-
nity, the onset of a major illness, and so forth may similarly provoke
reflection and doubt.
• Milestones: Milestones are significant signposts that punctuate or
conclude a journey. Fulfilling a contract, accomplishing a goal, or sim-
ple anniversaries such as New Year’s Eve or one’s date of hire, last
raise, or birthday may trigger reappraisals.
Milestones are often used as periodic respites, where the temporary
cessation of normal activity allows one to reflect on the past, present,
and future.
Complex and lengthy role transitions are often subdivided into series
of discrete and tightly structured steps, such as the progression from
medical school to internship, to residency, to practitioner. Structuring
the process helps define short-term tasks and goals and gives a sense of
predictability and progress, which in turn helps motivate the individual.
However, the act of structuring socialization also creates natural break-
points when one’s goals and resources may be reassessed.
Similarly, symbolic occasions designed to dramatize and thereby
heighten commitment may also unwittingly provoke a reassessment.
Ebaugh (1988) interviewed former nuns who left the convent shortly
before they were to pronounce their final vows. Rather than
strengthening commitment, the act of publicly declaring commitment
raised their doubts.
• Impending Events: Whether an event is an external change, mile-
stone, or of another kind, the mere anticipation of it may precipitate
doubts.
Ekerdt and DeViney (1993) argued provocatively that as individuals
approach retirement they increasingly express discontent with the work
role as a means of justifying their withdrawal. The justification enables
individuals to resolve their inner conflict about leaving an otherwise
desired role, allowing them to more easily accept and perhaps even
embrace their impending retirement. Ekerdt and DeViney (1993) sur-
veyed men who were 50 to 69 years old and whose planned age for
retirement did not change over the nine years of the study. Controlling
for various factors that could impair job involvement and satisfaction,
they found that reported job tension and fatigue became indeed worse
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with increased proximity to retirement. Thus, as the time remaining
dwindled, they appeared to reinterpret their work situations.
• Internal Changes: Finally, psychological changes may occur in the
absence of a discrete and identifiable event. Two common sources of
internally generated doubts are burnout and the pendulum effect.
Burnout refers to the process by which demanding work roles gradually
drain emotional energy such that one becomes unable to perform effec-
tively or derive satisfaction from the role (Maslach, 1982). Usually, the
turnover begins with some level of dissatisfaction (Lee, Mitchell, Wise,
& Fireman, 1996). Ironically, it appears that precisely those individu-
als who are most strongly—and exclusively—identified with their work
role and committed to perform well that are most susceptible to burn
out (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Hallsten, 1993, as cited in Ashforth,
2001).
The argument for the pendulum effect is that individuals tend to be-
come more habituated to the positive qualities of the status quo than to
the negative qualities. Through repeated exposure, the positive qual-
ities come to seem normal and expected; less a privilege and more a
right. Thus, unless a role’s attractive qualities are at least periodically
reaffirmed (e.g., via social comparison or periodic celebrations), they
tend to become somewhat taken for granted and less salient. A certain
complacency and even boredom may set in. Conversely, research on
information processing (e.g., Leon, 1981) indicates that people attend
and react more strongly to negative rather than positive information.
Although a role’s unattractive qualities may also come to seem normal
and expected, they remain salient if they are viewed as an ongoing prob-
lem. Indeed, issues that were first ignored or tolerated may begin to be
serious problems if the status quo persists. This shift in salience results
over time in a shift from a predominantly positive attitude toward the
role to a more negative attitude.
As either burnout mounts or the pendulum begins to swing, one be-
comes more inclined to interpret ambiguous events in a critical light and
less forgiving of perceived slights. Goodwill accumulated earlier may
be gradually exhausted such that one is less willing to ignore seemingly
negative incidents.
What makes burnout and the pendulum effect insidious is that the
status quo may not necessarily have changed. Instead, what may once
have been regarded as generally positive now seems more negative.
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Improving the Situation
Role occupants experiencing first doubts are inclined to try to cope with
the situation and address their concerns. However, according to Ebaugh
(1988) such attempts are less likely to be successful if
1. the individual has little power, or little willingness or ability to wield
power,
2. the individual is unsure of how to improve the situation,
3. the situation is institutionalized so that members of the role set are
not sympathetic for the individual’s desire for change, or the situation,
even if it was successfully changed, simply regresses to the prior state,
and
4. the doubts are so many that idiosyncratic changes seem pointless.
If the situation can not be improved for whichever of these reasons, the
process of role exit is likely to continue.
Escalation of Doubts
As first doubts arise, the individual may revisit his or her role history,
looking for signs of confirmation of the doubts. If found, these may solidify
to an extent that the individual becomes less receptive to signs of disconfir-
mation and actively seeks confirmation (Ruble, 1994). Indeed, critical events
are often retrospectively inferred, assuming greater significance in hindsight
than when they occurred.
Once an individual is psychologically committed to exit a role, he or
she becomes inclined to interpret and reinterpret circumstances in a way
that supports the decision. Incidents that have aroused little notice earlier
suddenly gain meaning. Ebaugh (1988) describes how physicians who had
earlier seen challenging cases as inherently stimulating came to see such cases
as examples of the annoyance and stress of medicine once they began to
entertain thoughts about leaving the field. Moreover, the escalation of doubts
may spread from a specific focus—such as one’s superior or special tasks—to
a more generalized negative view of the role and organization.
What makes this escalation process dangerous is that much of it emerges
from the mind of the individual: as the process progresses, the subjective
doubts may become less and less tightly coupled to current objective condi-
tions. The process of convincing oneself that it is in fact desirable to leave
a role makes one susceptible to strong perceptual and sense-making biases.
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The stronger the doubts become, the more motivated a person is to validate
the doubts by finding reasons to leave.
Farkas and Tetrick (1989) found in a three-wave longitudinal study of U.S.
Navy enlisted personnel that once the intention to quit or stay crystallizes, job
satisfaction and organizational commitment are either reduced or increased
in a way that the intention is bolstered. This finding is consistent with
predictions of the cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1964), in the sense
that a high job satisfaction is dissonant with the intention to leave this job.
Objective conditions may even be improving as doubts are becoming
stronger (Farkas & Tetrick, 1989). This suggests that an individual is most
likely to be receptive to reality testing and information about the environ-
ment early in the escalation process when emergent doubts are still ill-formed
and the individual is yet reasonably impartial.
However, managers often fail to notice or deal with an employee’s escalat-
ing doubts until they appear to be threatening the health of the relationship.
Because of the incessant and often unpredictable demands of management,
many managers come to operate rather reactively than proactively.
Moreover, it may be difficult for a manager to justify devoting resources
to an issue until it has become defined as an organizational problem (e.g., a
threat to quit). This same critical threshold, however, may signify that the
individual has already withdrawn from the job once the problem is addressed.
As a result, organizational attention and resources are often brought to bear
after the point where they could have reversed the process (Ashforth, 2001).
Ebaugh (1988) suggested that first doubts are associated with various
cues, intended or unintended behavioral signs that commitment is flagging
and that a change may be desirable. For example, some of the ex-nuns that
Ebaugh interviewed remarked that they wore their hair long and stylish,
contrary to the traditional convent customs. Individuals may engage in such
behaviors for at least two reasons:
1. First, overt acts of deviance may precipitate a response from the organi-
zation, thus bringing the issue to a head. By forcing the confrontation,
individuals force a potential resolution of their ambivalence. If they are
dismissed, they are forced to at least ponder their misgivings.
2. Second, following self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) overt behavior
provides indicators for the individuals themselves that can retrospec-
tively be interpreted as evidence of their flagging commitment by both
themselves and others. For example, a meta-analysis by Mitra, Jenkins,
and Gupta (1992) yielded a corrected average correlation of .33 between
absence and turnover. The authors interpret this as an progression in
withdrawal, or in the inference of withdrawal.
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In short, the doubters are building a case against their own current social
identity.
In fact, Ebaugh found that once the decision to exit a role was made,
her interviewees were inclined to retrospectively find cues in their previous
behavior to justify the need for change. It was common for interviewees to
point out early cues as a way of demonstrating that they were unhappy in
their roles long before they made a conscious decision to leave. Such cues may
or may not have actually been caused by unconscious doubts. The important
point is that whatever their cause, the cues were retrospectively interpreted
to have been prompted by such doubts.
Social Validation and Invalidation
The escalation of doubts tends to be moderated by social processes in the
sense that validation strengthens doubt and invalidation weakens it. Since
roles are embedded in often dense role networks, and role occupants often
form strong personal bonds through these networks, the opinion of certain
role set members may matter a great deal. Thus, individuals experiencing
doubt may actively seek and be particularly receptive to the opinions of their
valued social partners.
Based on her interviews, Ebaugh (1988) proposes that the sharing of
doubts serves several purposes:
1. First, it enables reality testing. By its very nature, doubt renders an
issue suspect, so that doubters often fear that they had a biased view-
point. They feel that they could better assess the truth of their emerg-
ing beliefs by comparing them to the perspectives of trusted others who
were somewhat more distanced from the issue.
2. Second, others could provide concrete advice, such as advice about
alternative jobs.
3. Third, expressing doubts serves a signaling function (Breese & O’Toole,
1995). The very act of going into public gives weight and clarity to
the doubts. As self-perception theory suggests, the act of publicly
articulating the doubts informs the doubter and the audience alike that
the doubts must have reached some level of severity.
Depending on the reaction of other relevant persons, the initial doubt may
be weakened or strengthened. From the moment, however, that the doubts
have escalated, individuals are inclined to seek out others who are likely to
reinforce their doubts.
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In sum, the doubting process looks, according to Ebaugh, much like a
snowball gaining momentum as it runs downhill. After a certain moment,
the momentum is such that the individuals are predisposed to seek and find
confirmation for their doubts, crating a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, it
is important to note that Ebaugh found wide variance in the duration of this
escalating process. She found that the duration is longer,
• the smaller the degree of the individual’s conscious awareness of doubts,
• the smaller his or her perceived control over the exit process,
• the smaller the degree to which doubting is externally attributed,
• the less the doubts are shared by one’s peers,
• and the less they are validated by relevant social partners.
Stage 2: Seeking and Weighing Alternatives
Ebaugh suggests in her model that, as doubts crystallize, individuals start to
seek and weigh alternatives. A person’s wishes and desires (i.e., what possible
selves one wishes to realize) as well as the constraints of what is feasible
determine what kind of alternatives are considered. Knowledge of specific
alternatives can sometimes galvanize doubt by creating a salient contrast
with the status quo. For example, knowledge of a friend’s job may show a
person what would be possible and cause him or her to reappraise the own
job.
In Ebaugh’s study, the degree of rationality involved in stage 2 varied
widely. She found that in most cased the process of comparing a current
role with other role options “took place in a vague and on-and-off way over a
period of years until the pressures mounted or events occurred which signifi-
cantly altered the perceived advantages or disadvantages of either the current
or the alternative role” (Ebaugh, 1988, p. 96).
She found that only 6% of the participants (12 of 185 persons) had left a
role without considering any alternatives.
It seems probable that individuals will be less likely to actively consider
work alternatives if:
1. they are reacting to an intolerable status quo where even an uncertain
future is preferable to the odious present,
2. the transition is thought to be reversible or of low magnitude,
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3. they are highly confident that they can secure a satisfactory alternative
(e.g., having high efficacy belief, relying in a high demand for employees,
having reliable job contacts),
4. they do not regard work as a central life interest, and,
5. they are buffered during the transition by financial resources and social
support (Ashforth, 2001).
Although these predictors are additive, there are likely to be associations
among them (e.g., individuals who do not regard work as central for their
lives are less likely to have financial resources).
Stage 3: The Turning Point
Ebaugh (1988) found that, even with concrete alternatives at hand, the vast
majority of her interviewees experienced an abrupt and dramatic turning
point in their decision making process, which triggered the explicit act of
leaving. She defines a turning point as “an event that mobilizes and focuses
awareness that old lines of action are complete, have failed, have been dis-
rupted, or are no longer personally satisfying” (Ebaugh, 1988, p. 123). A
turning point usually culminates in an external expression of an intention to
exit, for instance a letter of resignation.
As with the first doubts in stage 1, turning points are usually triggered by
precipitating events, whether disappointments, external changes, milestones,
impending events, or internal changes. Whether large or small, multiple or
single, simultaneous or sequential, precipitating events symbolize and crys-
tallize one’s ambivalence. Even an otherwise insignificant event may be per-
ceived as the “last straw”, occurring at a point when a person is ready to
make a decision.
The events may also provide a convenient excuse for leaving a role. Be-
cause roles are embedded in role networks, an individual who wants to aban-
don a role is normally very concerned about how valued members of their role
set may interpret the exit. Thus, Ebaugh points out how physicians justified
their role exits with their health problems and police officers took injuries as
justifications for exiting their professions because these issues were viewed
by their respective role sets as socially acceptable reasons to quit.
A role exit may also begin with a turning point and thereby pass the
stages of first doubts and seeking alternatives. However, as Ashforth (2001)
points out, in the absence of first doubts, an event must be interpreted as
highly momentous and meaningful in order to trigger a spontaneous exit.
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Functions of Turning Points
Ebaugh (1988) sees three functions of turning points:
1. They become the focal point for announcing one’s decision to exit.
Ebaugh found that many of her interviewees made their announce-
ment within days of the event that finalized their decision. The act
of publicly announcing one’s decision further commits one to the exit.
Moreover, supporters offer assurances that the decision is correct, and
critics require the articulation of justifications—both of which reinforce
the decision further.
2. Turning points also help to reduce cognitive dissonance. Given the
escalation of doubts and the knowledge of viable alternatives, the indi-
vidual tends to be, as noted before, in an anxiety-provoking state prior
to the turning point. Turning points resolve doubts to the point where
the individual feels able to make and declare a decision. However, the
ambivalence is seldom resolved completely because most roles represent
a complex package of costs and benefits. The decision-making process
itself may even cause one to recognize the potential benefits linked to
the role environment that are now foreclosed (cf. Bell, 1982; Loomes
& Sudgen, 1982 Loomes & Sudgen, 1987).
Thus, the individual is inclined to look for information that is consonant
with the decision of abandoning a role (Festinger, 1964).
3. An other function of turning points is that they help to mobilize the
necessary energy and resources to carry an individual through the pro-
cess of leaving a role.
Rites of Passage: Separation
Rites of passage facilitate role transitions in general, and can be helpful for
role entries as well as exits. In particular, they can facilitate disengagement
from a role (Ashforth, 2001; Ebaugh, 1988). Disengagement can be difficult
for two major reasons:
1. A person defines him- or herself to some extent in terms of the role.
The greater one’s role identification, the more does the role identity
specify one’s very sense of self.
Furthermore, a person is defined by others in the organizational con-
text largely by the role one plays. Individuals in organizations tend to
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meet initially in the function of role occupants while fulfilling their role
obligations. Thus, interpersonal relationships tend to be built initially
on inter-role relationships, even if they grow beyond that in the course
of the development of the relationship.
Consequently, a role exit often jeopardizes the very basis and under-
standing of the relationship.
A major function of rites of separation is to foster a redefinition of
the individual as an ex role occupant—providing a natural breakpoint
for either giving up a relationship or redefining it so that it may be
continued on an other basis.
2. Another reason why role disengagement can be difficult is that reasons
are seldom perceived by their occupants as only good or only bad. Roles
are comprised of many attributes—social networks, tasks, rewards, and
so forth—that provide various kinds of costs and benefits. Thus, even
when one is leaving a generally undesired role, there are often mixed
feelings. For example, Schmid and Jones (1993, as cited in Ashforth,
2001) found that prison inmates felt often ambivalent about their im-
pending release from prison.
The stronger one’s identification with the role and one’s cohesion with
members of the role set, and the more difficult and negatively valued the
anticipated transition, the more likely that one will experience a deep sense
of loss—even if the exit is voluntary (Archer & Rhodes, 1995; Fein, 1990).
Thus, rites of grief and mourning might help to explain the psychological and
social utility of rites of separation. Unfortunately, despite their popularity,
empirical assessment of stage models of grief and job loss is difficult to realize,
and the existing evidence is so far inconclusive (Freeman, 1999).
Stage 4: Creating an Exrole
Ebaugh (1988) pointed out that the physical role exit does not complete the
exit process. The process of becoming an “ex” is part of the process of role
exit, and this involves tensions between one’s past, present, and future. To
be an ex is of course very different from never having been a member of a
particular group or role set.
Individuals generally desire to retain aspects of their prior role that are
socially desirable, that are expected to facilitate subsequent role transitions
or adjustment to life in general, and that are prized or fondly recalled for
their own sake. Conversely, individuals generally desire to shed those aspects
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that are socially undesirable, that are expected to impair future transitions
and adjustment, and that are disliked or conjure bad memories (Ashforth,
2001; Ebaugh, 1988).
Factors Affecting the Ease of Creating an Exrole
Six factors have been named that affect the ease or difficulty with which
an exrole is created (Ashforth, 2001; Ebaugh, 1988): Two situational factors,
magnitude of the transition and visibility of the role or transition; and four
individual difference variables, role identification, sentimentality, nostalgia,
and coping resources.
1. Magnitude of the Transition
The magnitude of transition may simultaneously ease and impair the
creation of an exrole. High magnitude transitions such as a shift to
a very different kind of work, or also retirement, are more difficult to
accomplish than role transitions inside the same organization, because
the gulf between the old and the new role identities and contexts is
so wide for high-magnitude transitions. It is difficult to for instance
transfer what one has learned from the old to the new and to retain
those aspects of the old that one values.
Individuals must actively work to reaffirm valued features of the old
role identity and to maintain social connections to the members of the
old role set (which is also the purpose of alumni associations, veteran’s
groups, or associations of retirees of the same organization).
At the same time, however, the wide gulf makes it somewhat easier
to distance oneself from the aspects of the old role that one wishes to
reject.
Conversely, low-magnitude transitions such as a promotions from vice
president to senior vice president are less difficult to realize, and they
make it easier to actively maintain valued features of the role identity
and contact with members of the old role set.
However, the very overlap in role identities that facilitates the transi-
tion may create some blurring of the roles, and thus can make it more
difficult to distance oneself from undesired aspects of the old role. For
example, a newly promoted manager may find it difficult to deal with
her former peers now in a superordinate-subordinate relationship.
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2. Visibility of the Role Transition
The more visible the role prior to the transition, the more susceptible
is one to the judgments and intrusions of others. For example, Ebaugh
(1988) found that former occupants of highly visible roles such as opera
singer, astronaut, and professional athlete had a particularly difficult
time extricating themselves from their former roles. Presumably, their
celebrity status was highly salient to people in the public, leading to
intrusive questions and conversations and making it difficult for these
individuals to distance themselves from their roles.
3. Role Identification
It was argued earlier that role identification may act as a brake in the
process of role exit. Regarding stage 4, identification may ease or im-
pair the creation of an ex-role, depending on the situational specificity
of the identity. The more specific the identity, the less readily can
one generalize one’s identification to other social identities. Thus, the
experience of exiting an occupation, work group, or organization with
which one strongly identifies tends to be traumatic (cf. Taylor & Cook,
1995). In such cases, strong identification may make it difficult to exit
the role and create an exrole.
Cassell (1991, as cited in Ashforth, 2001) commented on the reluctance
of many surgeons to retire:
Surgeons have invested too much in becoming and being sur-
geons to contemplate giving it up with equanimity. (“I feel
like an amputee!” confided a surgeon who had recently re-
tired.) Many surgeons find it difficult to cut back, to operate
less frequently, or to confide themselves to less interesting,
less challenging procedures. And, as patience and judgment
falter, a surgeon’s arrogance may fill the void (p.147).
Ashforth observed that is often quite painful for members of the role
set to watch someone “hang on too long”, denying that their capability
of executing their job, or also their commitment is decreasing.
Conversely, the more generic the identity, the more readily can a person
transfer his or her identity to other roles. The transferability of the
identity greatly eases the role exit by enabling a person to continue to
derive fulfillment after the exit.
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4. Sentimentality and Nostalgia
Sentimentality is the tendency to retain emotional or tangible ties to
one’s past (e.g., memories, old friends), and to derive pleasure from
discussing or reliving one’s past, whereas nostalgia is a longing for a
fondly remembered past (Mael & Ashforth, 1992).
Both concepts suggest a desire to at least periodically reaffirm previ-
ous attachments. In the short run, sentimentality and nostalgia may
render one less willing to exit a role and make an exit more painful
once the decision to leave has been made. In the long run, however,
sentimentality and nostalgia may serve as transition bridges by:
(a) encouraging a person to properly grieve the loss of the role, which
will enable him or her to move on,
(b) providing a sense of continuity between the past and the present,
and
(c) providing a sense of confidence for the future.
However, it seems likely that if the role contrast is great, nostalgia—
though not sentimentality—may represent more of a retreat into a by-
gone past than a source of confidence for the future.
5. Coping Resources
The easiness of the process of creating an ex-role can also be influenced
by:
(a) psychological resources (e.g., self-esteem or optimism),
(b) social resources (e.g., instrumental and expressive doubts), and
(c) organizational resources (e.g., outplacement counseling and refer-
ral services).
Liminality
Gennep (1960, originally published in 1908) and Turner (1969) have in-
troduced and developed the concept of the liminal phase or liminality, from
limen, Latin for threshold.
In the liminal phase, the role identity of the individual is ambiguous: the
person has disengaged from one role or possibly multiple roles—such as job
holder, work group member, organizational member, and so forth—but has
not yet engaged in new roles. Thus, the individual is without role in that
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specific social domain. (The person retains, however, a store of other roles
and associated social identities, like the role of family member, parishioner,
friend, and so forth.)
Turner writes about liminal entities that they are “neither here nor there,
they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law,
custom, convention, and ceremonial” (Turner, 1969, p. 95).
Ashforth (2001) adds that liminality, framed as a psychological concept,
refers to the experience of this “betwixt and between” state, that is of this
state of being roleless. As such, this experience is not tied explicitly to
physical role exits.
Ebaugh (1988) found that 75% of the persons participating in her study
experienced this kind of vacuum either already right before the decision to
exit or shortly after, when they realized that leaving the role was very likely.
Ashforth (2001) argues that even disidentification provides some sense of
self-definition, in the sense that one is not what the role identity implies.
Thus, the role becomes a foil for defining the self, providing, even through
disidentification, some sort of tie to the work setting. In this line of argument,
Ashforth asserts that liminality exists when a person lacks or soon expects
to lack an actual role in the given social domain, or has a role but lacks even
a modest identification—or disidentification—with it and does not expect
to identify or disidentify with it. As such, liminality is the absence of self-
defining connection to a given social domain, which means also indifference
toward identification with that social domain.
In the work domain, the social psychological dynamics of liminality are
probably most evident in cases of job loss and retirement. Full retirement, al-
though usually voluntary, represents the loss of a work role identity along with
the daily structure, social network, and status and perquisites of employment.
For example, Erdner and Guy (1990) found that work role identification was
negatively associated with attitudes toward retirement.
According to Ashforth, the experience of liminality depends largely on the
value one places on the relevant social domain and on what is expected to
come next. If a person anticipates the assumption of a new role in the same
social domain within a personally and socially acceptable time frame, then
liminality may even be experienced positively. The anticipation of a new role
will give the members of one’s former role set a firmer basis for interaction:
Roles serve as important identity badges, enabling others to locate a person
in the social domain and develop preliminary perceptions and expectations of
this person. In the absence of defined roles, there is less reason or opportunity
to interact in any given milieu and less basis for developing initial perceptions.
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If an individual anticipates a new role, then members of his or her role set are
able to relocate this person in the social domain and, if they so choose, are
able to re-knit their interrole and interpersonal relationships on that basis.
On the other hand, if one does not anticipate assuming a new role within
that social domain within a socially and personally acceptable time frame,
then liminality may be experienced very negatively. Ebaugh’s interviewees
described this liminal phase as a “vacuum”, as feeling “in mid-air”, “un-
grounded”,“neither here nor there”, or“nowhere”. Without anticipatory iden-
tification, one has no basis for locating or anchoring oneself—nor for others
to locate one—in the current social domain. One is no longer a member and
has no role-related basis for interaction. Indeed, in the case of work-based
roles, one has no reason for remaining in the organizational context. Thus,
the ongoing affirmation process on which role identities depend is disrupted.
If the social domain is highly valued, the result may be a sense of disorien-
tation (loss of identity), meaninglessness, lack of control and belonging, and
perhaps depression (Ashforth, 2001; Ebaugh, 1988).
3.3.2 An Expansion of Ebaugh’s Model by Ashforth
The role exit model of Ebaugh (1988) explained voluntary role exits that
have been caused mostly by push-forces. In the 2x2 matrix in Figure 3.2 this
corresponds to the upper left cell.
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Figure 3.2: Origins of role exit (Ashforth, 2001, p. 111).
Ashforth (2001) expanded Ebaugh’s model by considering also involun-
tary role exits and exits caused by pull-forces.
108 3.3. The Process of Role Exit
Involuntary Role Exit
This section focuses on the involuntary push forces cell of Figure 3.1, leaving
the voluntary as well as involuntary pull-forces cell to the next section.
In the context of involuntary role exits, push forces refer to those factors
indigenous to the role or its enactment that prompts an exit, such as poor
performance leading to an individual’s termination or an excessive number
of role occupants—as perceived by management—leading to a layoff.
A model of involuntary role exit is summarized in Figure 3.3, incorporat-
ing a revised ordering of Ebaugh’s four stages. For involuntary exits, much
of the process occurs after the physical exit.
Stage 1 Stage 2
Escalating Doubts
Stage 3
Seeking and
Alternatives
Weighing 
Stage 4
Exrole
Creating anThe Turning Point
Figure 3.3: The phenomenology of involuntary role exit (Ashforth, 2001, p.
143).
• The notice of termination is the de facto turning point and beginning
of the model. The notice triggers attributional processes as individuals
attempt to make sense of what is happening. Given self-serving bi-
ases, individuals are predisposed to attribute blame rather to external
causes—e.g., to incompetent management—than to internal causes—
e.g., poor performance—(Ashforth, 1992, as cited in Ashforth, 2001;An-
drews, 2001; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Silvia & Duval,
2001).
• Moreover, individuals are likely to attempt to distance themselves from
the role—or at least the organization—as a means of controlling their
distress at the loss. The upshot of these tendencies is the escalation of
doubts.
• The fact of role exit (the turning point) in conjunction with escalating
doubts in turn causes individuals to seek and weigh alternatives.
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Figure 3.3 shows the turning point and doubts exerting independent
effects because the exit may force individuals to seek new roles regard-
less of whether they are experiencing retrospective doubts about their
prior role or organization.
• Finally, the turning point in conjunction with the doubts and new al-
ternatives may help individuals in creating an exrole. The fact of exit,
the growing of retrospective doubts, and the consideration of concrete
alternatives each help individuals to come to terms with their former
role and the involuntary exit.
In addition to the revised ordering of Ebaugh’s model, the model of in-
voluntary role exit differs in three key ways from that of voluntary exit.
1. Involuntary exits from push forces tend to be stigmatizing, creating
the additional burden of coping with the weight of shame (Ashforth &
Humphrey, 1995, as cited in Ashforth, 2001).
2. Involuntary exits often come with little or no advance warning, creating
the additional burden of shock and distress (Leana & Feldman, 1992).
3. Because of these two factors, individuals must often exit one role with
no clear alternatives in sight, exacerbating the sense of discontinuity
and liminality that often accompanies role transitions—particularly if
the individuals are compelled to find work in other occupations or in-
dustries.
The upshot of these three factors is that involuntary exit often consti-
tutes a significant threat to one’s identity and sense of meaning, control, and
belonging.
Consequently, as shown in Figure 3.3, the impact of each stage of the
involuntary exit process is not fully mediated by the intervening stages, as in
the model for voluntary exit. For example, the turning point (here stage 1)
exercises both direct and indirect effects of all subsequent stages. In voluntary
exits, individuals usually take a more reflective approach, moving more or less
methodically from first doubts, to seeking and weighing alternatives, to the
turning point, to creating an ex-role. However, in involuntary exits, the often
unexpected displacement forces individuals to try to make sense of and adjust
to their changed circumstances while simultaneously attempting to exit one
role and enter another. This shock and truncation of time may create a
mixture of emotions and actions so that the impact of the four stages is
telescoped and deranged.
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Pull Forces
In reality, most voluntary transitions are a combination of push and pull
factors. Push forces foster a desire to seek and weigh alternatives, thus
helping to pull an individual out of a role. As noted earlier, only 6% of
Ebaugh’s interviewees exited without considering alternatives. Similarly, an
initial set of pull forces, such as the unexpected perspective for an other
job, may cause one to reflect on the status of the current role, fostering
dissatisfaction and thereby pushing one toward role exit. Indeed, it might
be argued that there is no such thing as a pure case of voluntary role exit
caused by pull forces. Pull forces exert their power precisely because they
represent an opportunity not found in the current role.
In the case of involuntary transitions, however, pull forces provide no
opportunity to remain in the current role. For example, turning down a
promotion or transfer may imperil one’s stand in the organization, and failing
health may impair one’s ability to perform effectively. There are two major
forces of pull factors:
• factors extrinsic to one’s career, such as failing health or a spouse who
is transferred, and
• factors intrinsic to one’s career (but, by definition, extrinsic to the
current role per se), such as a promotion or role progression
The social-psychological dynamics for pull forces extrinsic to one’s career
are similar to those discussed for involuntary transitions prompted by push
forces, except that the attribution of causality tends to be much clearer.
In contrast, involuntary exit prompted by pull forces intrinsic to one’s
career is eased considerably by three factors:
1. The transition is usually socially acceptable if not desired. Thus, the
sting of loss may be cushioned by the anticipated challenges and gain
in status and perquisites
2. The transition has often been expected (although the specific job and
location may not have been), thereby allowing some anticipatory iden-
tification with the future role and anticipatory deidentification from the
current role.
3. Given that the future role is likely to build on the lessons of the current
one, an individual’s role identification may generalize quite easily to
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the future role—although the loss of his or her work group and other
attachments may continue to cause distress. For example, an apprentice
mechanic may exit the apprentice role quite seamlessly.
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Chapter 4
Development of Self-Definition
Domains and Identity Diversity
after Retirement
I know that I exist; the question is,
what is this ‘I’ that I know?
Rene´ Descartes (1641)
Meditations of First Philosophy
Has de poner los ojos en quien eres,
procurando conocerte a ti mismo,
que es el ma´s dif´ıcil conocimiento
que puede imaginarse.
Miguel de Cervantes (1615)
Don Quijote
4.1 Introduction
Retirement seems to be a crucial moment in the process of growing oldersince it is generally viewed as a point in time where older age begins
(cf. Borscheid, 1994; Braun, 1992; Filipp & Mayer, 1999). Furthermore,
the profession provides a strong identity throughout our working time. The
question arises of what happens to that vocational identity once the profes-
sion is not practiced anymore. And—more generally—how people in that
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age around the retirement view themselves; and if they change their identity
in any way.
Research on identity development has so far dealt primarily with other
age groups. There is for instance a ten-year longitudinal study of Keupp
et al. (1999) with adolescents and later young adults. Tesch-Ro¨mer (1989)
has investigated identity transformations with middle-aged adults. For older
adults there is an investigation by Pinquart (1998) on the self-concept, where
the central issue was the self-assessment—the question how positive or nega-
tive the self-concept of a person in that age was, and what factors of influence
could be determined. The present study, though, addresses rather the ques-
tion if the contents of identity change, that is, what domains of the personal
identity get more or less important during the transition to retirement.
There is a vast body of philosophical literature discussing the definition
of identity or self, a small part of which was addressed in the first chapter
of this book. However, authors of empirical studies dealing with identity did
mostly not provide any definition of the concept at all, or if they did, the
definitions were very unsatisfying. Keupp (1998) for example, who presented
extensive investigations on identity development, did not even stop at an
obviously circular definition of identity: “Identity is a project aiming at the
creation of an individually desired or needed ‘sense of identity’ ” (Keupp,
1998, p. 34, translated by the author).
Given the fact that I did not find a theoretically acceptable and empir-
ically useful definition in literature on self and identity, I will here assume
a very pragmatic position and merely define identity as self-description or
self-definition (terms that I will use synonymously), since this is the only
aspect of identity that I could acquire empirically.
In this chapter, a special focus will be placed on the development of the
respondents’ professional identity after retirement and their self-definition as
retirees. Another aspect that will be addressed is the question how iden-
tity diversity is linked to life satisfaction for retired persons. Additionally,
three rather explorative issues will be addressed: (1) the question what effect
the retirement has on different identity domains apart from the professional
identity, (2) the question if and how the importance of these different iden-
tity domains change with increasing age, and (3) the question what kind of
changes people perceive in their own persons due to higher age.
4.1. Introduction 115
4.1.1 Professional Identity and Retiree Identity
According to the social identity theory (cf. Section 1.5.4), individuals cate-
gorize themselves and others as a means of ordering the social environment
and locating themselves and others within it. Thus, categories are selected
to provide meaningful distinctions between people or subgroups of people
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
Tajfel argues that because social categories are differentially valued within
a culture, social identities also carry varying degrees of positive and nega-
tive values for the self. Individuals obtain an assessment of their in-group’s
value relative to an out-group through social comparison processes. Tajfel
assumed that humans need positive and distinctive group identities, from
which individual self-esteem and a sense of personal value can be derived.
Thus, if the group to which an individual belongs is less highly valued
than relevant out-groups, the individual becomes motivated to either leave
the group or improve the group’s standing.
Research in the field of stereotypes towards elderly people and images of
aging show that higher age is very often associated to negative attitudes (a
very differentiated review of this field of research is given e.g., by Filipp &
Mayer, 1999).
The beginning of higher age can be dated in very different ways, since
age is a blurred category. Borscheid (1994) pointed out that in pre-industrial
societies a biological understanding of old age was predominating, “old age”
being defined as an increase in frailty—as a summoner of death. Thus only
those persons were seen as “old” whose physical and mental strength had
decreased, and not necessarily those who had passed a certain calendric age.
In the meantime, this biologically oriented concept of age has been re-
placed by a social-political concept, where the beginning of higher age is
essentially defined by regulations of the statutory pension insurances, and
accordingly by leaving the workforce (cf. Borscheid, 1994; Braun, 1992).
This understanding could be confirmed in interview studies where par-
ticipants were asked to rate the beginning of “being old”. Babladelis (1987)
reports average ratings around 60 years, Harris, Page, and Begay (1988)
reports an age range of 65–69 years, where, according to the participants,
people begin to be old1. These age limits correspond in our society to the
1In these studies the participants were students, that is, rather young persons. The
picture changes when older people are asked about the beginning of old age. In an inter-
view study by Oswald (1991), for instance, male participants aged 63–96 years rated the
beginning of “being old” on average at the age of 72 years. At the same time, none of the
participants rated himself as “old”. An own empirical analysis of this phenomenon will be
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age when people leave the workforce rather than to the age of frailty or
physical and mental decline, and thus mirror a social-political rather than
biological definition of higher age.
These considerations imply that retirement is probably not viewed as an
especially attractive social category, since it is linked so tightly to the category
of higher age, and higher age is generally viewed rather negatively. According
to the social identity theory, we can therefore expect that people will not view
their status of being retired (and accordingly the fact that they have left the
workforce) as an important aspect to define themselves. I assume therefore
that the professional identity remains an important aspect of self-definition
even after retirement, and is not replaced by a retiree-identity.
At the same time, we can assume that the attitude towards old age has
an influence on the readiness or reluctance with which people accept a self-
definition as “retirees”. If their personal view of old age is positive, we can
expect them to see their “retiree-identity” as a more important aspect of
themselves than if they have a negative view of old age.
This leads to the following empirical hypotheses:
Hypothesis I: Retired persons will rate their former profession as more
important to characterize themselves than their status of being retired.
Hypothesis II: The persons’ attitude towards old age predicts the extent
to which they view their status of being retired as important to define
themselves. Participants with a positive view of old age will therefore
rate their status of being retired as more important than persons with
a negative view of old age.
From the social identity theory we can further derive a prediction regard-
ing the importance of an individual’s professional identity: According to the
theory’s assertions, we can assume that the more positive a person’s pro-
fession is valued by society—thus carrying a positive value for the self—the
more that person will define him- or herself in terms of his or her profession.
The following empirical hypotheses can therefore be formulated:
Hypothesis III: A person’s self-rated professional status is a significant
predictor for the importance that this person accredits to his or her
professional identity.
provided in the next chapter on age identities.
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Hypothesis IV: The professional status is a better predictor for profes-
sional identity than other job-related demographic and psychographic
measures.
4.1.2 Identity Diversity as a Predictor for High Satis-
faction
According to Linville (cf. section 1.3.1), individuals have a higher self-
complexity to the extent that they use multiple self-aspects in defining them-
selves, and to the degree that these aspects are independent of each other,
that is overlap minimally (Linville, 1985; Linville, 1987; Linville & Carlston,
1994). Linville suggests that greater dimensionality serves as a buffer against
stress-related illness and depression by providing alternative focuses of at-
tention following a stressful event, while greater distinctiveness prevents the
spread of activation from one aspect of the self to other aspects that are asso-
ciated with it through shared attributes. Conversely, low dimensionality and
low distinctiveness are seen as risk factors for adverse outcomes. Consistent
with these predictions, in Linville’s (1985, 1987) studies individuals with low
self-complexity had more extreme affective reactions following a failure ex-
perience and displayed greater variability in affect over an extended period,
whereas subjects with high self complexity were less prone to depression,
perceived stress, psychosomatic symptoms, and illnesses following stressful
events.
The disengagement theory however (cf. section 2.1.1) asserts that older
adults are most satisfied if they disengage from society and find a new balance
with less roles and role identities than when they were younger.
An objective of this study was therefore to verify which of those com-
peting theoretical approaches are more appropriate to describe the identity
development of older persons. Thus the research question was if a high iden-
tity diversity has positive implications also for older adults (which would
suggest that the self-complexity theory applies also for older adults) or if
in higher age less identities are more favorable (which would speak for the
disengagement theory).
The following empirical hypothesis was derived from the self-complexity
theory:
Hypothesis V: Persons who rate many identity domains as important for
their self-definition (i.e., who have a higher identity diversity) will state
a higher level of life satisfaction.
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4.1.3 Explorative Issues
In addition to those hypotheses three rather explorative questions will be
addressed in this study:
1. What effect does retirement have on personal identities (apart from the
professional identity); or in other words, what domains of self-definition
are more or less important for retirees than for not yet retired persons?
2. To what extent can age or cohort predict the importance of domains
of self-definition?
3. What kind of changes do people perceive in their own person due to
higher age?
The first two explorative questions were addressed by means of the ques-
tionnaire data, whereas for the third the qualitative findings of interviews
were analyzed.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants—Characteristics of the Sample
I. Explorative Preliminary Inquiry
The first part of the study consisted of explorative interviews with 13 persons;
six men aged 56 to 67 years (M = 62.33, SD = 4.18) and seven women aged
55 to 66 years (M = 62, 29, SD = 3.86).
The interviews were realized by five interviewers, and the participants
were all recruited out of the personal acquaintances of the interviewers. How-
ever, in order to assure the highest possible anonymity in such circumstances,
each interview was realized by one one of the other interviewers who were
not acquainted with the participant.
The education level of the interviewees was on average rather high, and
with an over-representation of social professions. The sample comprised:
• four teachers of secondary school level; all retired
• a music teacher; retired
• a farmer’s wife 2; retired (the son having taken over the farm)
2The profession of a farmer’s wife (“Ba¨uerin”) is in Switzerland a vocational qualifica-
tion which is different from the qualification as farmer (“Bauer” or “Landwirt”).
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• a social pedagogue/catechist; not retired
• a psychiatrist; not retired (planning to keep his practice until 70)
• two career-counsellors; not retired
• a director of a nursing home for old people; retired
• a secretary; retired
• a social worker/family counselor; not retired
II. Questionnaire Survey
In the second and principal part of the study a questionnaire was sent to a
random sample of 2000 persons3 aged 58 to 70 years who have their residence
in Thun (a town in Switzerland with around 40’000 inhabitants). The random
sample of addresses was drawn by the municipal authority of Thun. 802
questionnaires were completed and sent back, whereof 6 arrived too late (i.e.,
after the statistical analysis had been realized), and 4 were excluded from the
analysis because more than half of the values were missing. So the analysis
included N = 792 persons; 386 men and 406 women. This corresponds to
a rate of return of 39.6%, which can be considered as high, given that the
addressed persons had not been asked before if they wanted to participate
and there was no reward or reminder letter afterwards. The age ranged from
58 to 70 years (M = 63.65, SD = 3.77)
Specifications of further demographic properties of the sample are shown
in Table 4.1.
4.2.2 Apparatus
I. Explorative Preliminary Inquiry
The preliminary inquiry was realized with open face-to-face interviews fol-
lowing an interview-guideline (see Appendix A).
The interview-guideline was constructed as open as possible, since the
goal of these interviews was on one hand to determine what questions were
most interesting and what issues were most important for the participants,
and on the other hand to find concrete hypotheses for the subsequent main
3Since some of the effects were hypothesized to be rather small, a power analysis sug-
gested a sample size of around 500 persons (Cohen, 1988). The return rate of a question-
naire survey without incentives can in general not be expected to exceed 25%. Thus, the
questionnaire was sent to a primary sample of 2000 persons.
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N Men N Women
Marital state
single 8 27
living in partnership 11 2
married 324 288
divorced 18 37
separated 8 12
widowed 12 37
answer missing 5 3
total 386 406
Education
no vocational or higher education 36 92
apprenticeship 222 234
highschool/college 35 35
technical college 57 33
university 36 11
answer missing 0 1
total 386 406
Retirement Status
not yet retired 162 186
retired 223 220
answer missing 1 0
total 386 406
Table 4.1: Specification of demographic sample characteristics
investigation where standardized questionnaires were used with a larger sam-
ple.
The interviews were therefore evaluated with a qualitative analysis that
served as a basis for the development of the standardized questionnaire.
II. Questionnaire Survey
The main part of the study consisted of a survey that was realized with
a standardized questionnaire. The constituent questions or scales that are
relevant for this chapter will be described below. The items have here been
translated into English; for the original German version of the questionnaire
see Appendix A.
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Operationalization of the Variables
1. Satisfaction
To measure the respondents’ general life satisfaction there were ten
items asking them how satisfied they were with different aspects of
their life:
How satisfied are you with the following life domains:.
• your bodily fitness?
• the activities you carry out?
• your relationships to other people
• your interests
• your mental capabilities
• your esteem in society
• your esteem by your family and friends
• your physical attractiveness
• your financial situation
• your life in general
For every item, there were five answer possibilities, from “very satis-
fied” to “very dissatisfied”. These ten items were joined to a scale by
calculating the average of all the ratings.
2. Attitude Towards Higher Age
The respondents’ attitude towards aging and older age was measured
in two different ways:
(a) There were three direct questions asking the respondents how pos-
itive or negative they judged life when one is around 75 years old or
older than 80, and if they would like to get 100 years old provided
that they remained healthy.
The midpoint values of the responses were averaged for all three
items to obtain a scale score.
(b) Additionally, the respondents were asked to rate the fit of the term
“old age” with a list of positive or negative attributes:
How well do the following characteristics fit to the term“old age”?
• Interest
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• Irritability
• Activity
• Dissatisfaction
• Enthusiasm
• Dispiritedness
• Anxiety
• Self-confidence
• Egotism
• Malevolence
• Dependency
There were five answer possibilities to rate every attribute: from
“suits exactly” to “does not suit at all”. The items were partially
recoded, so that all low scores corresponded to highly positive
associations to the term “old age”. The midpoint ratings of the
attributes were then averaged and joined to a scale.
The measure provides information as to how positively or nega-
tively associated a respondent’s image of older age is.
3. Self-efficacy Belief
This study’s measurement of perceived self-efficacy relied on five items
of the German Version of Jerusalem and Schwarzer’s (1981) General
Self-Efficacy Scale (here translated by the author):
• I always succeed to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
• In unexpected situations I always know what to do.
• I think I can cope well with surprising events.
• I always face difficulties with composure because I can deal well
with problems.
• Whatever will happen, I will be able to cope.
There were five answer possibilities to rate every statement: from “I
strongly agree” to “I strongly disagree”.
4. Job Deprivation
The extent to which the respondents missed their former job or enjoyed
their retirement was measured with the following nine items of the
Job Deprivation Scale by Buchmueller, Dobler, Mayring and Schneider
(1997):
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Which of the following statements do you approve when comparing your
life since retirement with your professional life?
• I enjoy not having to turn up for work on time every day.
• I often miss the challenges of professional life.
• I am happy not to have to go to work anymore.
• I enjoy not being exposed to the pressure to perform anymore.
• I miss the contact to other people that I had during work.
• I miss the feeling of being a respected worker.
• I miss the regularity of my daily routine during my working life.
• I am happy that I don’t have to argue with my colleagues anymore.
• I enjoy being able to plan my time more freely.
Two items were in this study newly added to the scale:
• I miss the purpose and meaning of life as it was given by my work.
• I miss the freedom I had because of my work away from home.
There were again five answer possibilities to rate every statement: from
“I strongly agree” to “I strongly disagree”.
5. Measure of Identity (as in Self-Definition), Importance of
Identity Domains, and Identity Diversity
In identity research, there is one question that is frequently used to
find out more about the personal identity of people. It is the open
question: “Who are you?” (cf. Blasi, 1988; Blasi, 1995). Subjects are
normally told to specify as many things as they can think of. Every
answer is considered as part of the subject’s identity, in the sense of a
self-definition.
In the explorative interviews we have asked the subjects that question
in the very beginning, although it is a rather difficult question to start
an interview with, being very open, and at the same time leading to
possibly intimate answers. However, we considered it as important
that the subjects answered that special question as freely as possible,
and thus did not want to activate certain topics or subject-matters by
asking other questions first.
But in order to give them a “second chance”, we came back to that
question later on during the interview and asked them if they wished
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to add things to their list, now that they had talked a bit more about
themselves.
The answers of those oral interviews (which will be presented in more
detail in section 4.3.1) helped us to elaborate relevant identity cate-
gories that we could use in a standardized question for the survey.
There were six domains that could be identified in the interviews:
(a) Profession
(b) Family roles
(c) Friendship roles
(d) Art, culture, hobby
(e) Community functions
(f) Personality, Values
In addition to these domains that we had found in the interviews we
included the status of being retired, since the hypotheses I and II re-
ferred to the importance of this identity domain. We included also
other identity domains that we thought might be relevant for a per-
son’s identity, like one’s nationality, one’s own life story, the age, and
bodily properties.
Furthermore, family roles were split into family and partnership, com-
munity functions were split into honorary posts / volunteer work and
memberships of associations and organizations, and we differentiated
also between personality traits and values. Therefore in the definite
version of the questionnaire we presented fourteen categories (or do-
mains) of self-definition, where the respondents had to rate for every
domain how important it would be for them to characterize themselves.
Thus, the standardized question read as follows:
If you have to characterize yourself, which of the following points are
important for you?
(a) My nationality
(b) My roles within my family (parent-, grandparenthood etc.)
(c) My Partnership
(d) My profession or occupation (for retirees: my former profession)
(e) Honorary posts or volunteer work
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(f) Characteristics of my body / my appearance
(g) Characteristics of my personality
(h) My age
(i) My life story
(j) The associations and organizations I belong to
(k) My circle of friends
(l) My leisure time activities
(m) My values or my belief
(n) For retirees: the fact that I am now retired
For each domain there were five answer possibilities ranging from very
important to not important at all.
To measure identity diversity, the scores of the rated importance of each
identity domain were averaged, thus allowing to differentiate between
respondents who rated many identity domains as important and others
who rated few domains as important.
6. Demographic Measures
Several demographic specifications were asked with direct standardized
questions (see Appendix A):
• Sex
• Year of birth
• Education level:
There were six answer possibilities where the respondents were
asked to indicate their highest achieved level of education, ac-
cording to the Swiss education system. In addition there was the
possibility for the respondents to write down their education level
if they did not find it within the presented answer possibilities.
• Professional status:
The respondents were asked to indicate what kind of professional
function they were holding at the moment, respectively, what func-
tion they had last held before retirement. There were nine answer
possibilities:
– not employed
– un-skilled employee
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– semi-skilled employee
– position requiring a vocational qualification
– lower management position
– middle management position
– upper management position
– self-employed, small company/practice
– self-employed, large company
Again, the respondents had the additional possibility to write
down their function if it was not within the presented answer pos-
sibilities.
• Duration of the last professional occupation in years
• Retirement status (retired vs. not retired)
• Duration of retirement in years
4.2.3 Procedure
The preliminary explorative interviews were conducted within a project
group4, with each member of the project group working as an interviewer.
The interviews were realized at the house of the participants and took
place between July 19th and September 21st 2001. The five interviewers
had a guideline with open questions that were asked during the interview,
but they were free in the detailed wording and order of the questions so
as to give the participants enough freedom to bring up interesting themes.
There was no training of the interviewers, therefore the standardization on
the interviews was not warranted. The interviews took between 45 and 90
minutes (M = 68.05, SD = 12.70), and each conversation was recorded on
audio-tape. The statements concerning personal identities were afterwards
categorized and used to develop the standardized questionnaire.
The questionnaire was sent on the 29th April 2002 by mail to the 2000
randomly drawn citizens of Thun with an accompanying letter (see Appendix
A) and a prepaid addressed response envelope. The receivers were asked to
send back the completed questionnaire within about one week if possible, but
were told that their responses were still very welcome and useful even if they
were not able to meet the deadline.
The analysis of the questionnaire data was realized with SPSS (Version
11.0), COR (Version 1.1) by Staufenbiel, and G*Power (Version 2.0) by Faul
and Erdfelder. The statistical procedures used were t-tests for independent
4R. Lu¨thi, H.-D. Schneider, U. Teuscher, L. Vo¨geli, and I. Wattendorff
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or dependent samples, bivariate and partial correlations, multiple regression,
z-tests for comparing correlations, power analysis and calculation of effect
sizes d.
4.3 Results and Discussion
4.3.1 Evaluation of the Measurements and Scales
In the following section, the operationalization of the variables will be eval-
uated with regard to the reliability of the measurements.
Lienert and Raatz (1998) define the reliability of a test as the “grade of
accuracy with which it measures a certain personality or behavioral charac-
teristic, regardless of whether it claims to measure this characteristic (which
is a problem of the validity)” (Lienert and Raatz, 1998, p. 9, translated by
the author).
Probably the most frequently used procedure to determine the reliabil-
ity of a scale is the calculation of its intern consistency (alpha-coefficient
according to Cronbach). Bortz and Do¨ring (1995) suggest that a reliability
coefficient higher than .80 would be desirable. If the scale is not meant to
differentiate between individuals but only between groups (which was the
case for this study) alpha-coefficients of .50 and higher can be legitimate.
The specific quality of the constituent items regarding the scale can be
tested by means of calculating their corrected item-total correlation, that is,
the correlation of the specific item with the scale score (the sum of all the
single item scores). A high item-total correlation means that the respective
item provides a good differentiation between persons with high scale scores
from others with low scale scores. Items with a low item-total correlation,
on the other hand, generate information that does not correspond with the
overall scale score. They can be regarded as poor indicators of the construct
in question and should therefore be removed from the scale (Bortz & Do¨ring,
1995).
The maximally achievable item-total correlation is 1; a value of 0 would
have no predictive value at all. In test-statistic literature item-total correla-
tions of r > .3 are generally considered to be satisfying. Item-total correlation
above .5 are considered as high (cf. Bortz & Do¨ring, 1995, Diehl & Staufen-
biehl, 2001). Very high item-total correlations, that is, r > .8, result only if
the constituent items measure almost the same thing, which is not ideal with
regard to a good covering of the construct. Moreover, it is not reasonable to
formulate items in a way that they ask the same questions with only slight
variations several times, since this can be annoying for the respondents, or
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even lead them to the suspicion that they are being tested for consistency in
their answers.
Satisfaction Scale
Table 4.2 shows the items of the satisfaction scale with the means and item-
total statistics.
Item: Mean Corrected Alpha
How satisfied are you with the score item-total if item
following life domains: correlation deleted
your bodily fitness 2.13 .57 .86
the activities you carry out 1.87 .68 .85
your relationships to other people 1.80 .60 .85
your interests 1.73 .62 .85
your mental capabilities 1.87 .57 .86
your esteem in society 2.04 .61 .85
your esteem by your family and friends 1.65 .62 .85
your physical attractiveness 2.25 .59 .85
your financial situation 2.14 .41 .87
your life in general 1.68 .64 .85
Table 4.2: Reliability analysis: means and item-total statistics for the mea-
surement of satisfaction
The scale proved to be internally stable with Cronbach’s alpha = .86. All
corrected item-total-correlations were larger than .4, therefore none of the
items had to be removed from the scale.
Attidude Towards Aging
1. Direct Questions
One way of measuring the respondents’ attitude towards old age was by
means of direct questions, the answer possibilities ranging from 1 to 3,
with a score of 1 representing a positive attitude, a score of 3 a negative
attitude towards older age. The midpoint values of the responses were
averaged for all three items to obtain a scale score. As is shown in Table
4.3, all corrected item-total-correlations were larger than .4 and were
therefore kept in the scale. The internal stability of the scale appeared
to be satisfactory with Cronbach’s alpha = .71.
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Item: Mean Corrected Alpha
score item-total if item
correlation deleted
How would you judge life when 2.41 .58 .59
one is about 75 years old?
How would you judge life when 2.91 .67 .45
one is about 75 years old?
Would you want to get 100 years old 2.88 .41 .84
provided that you remain healthy?
Table 4.3: Reliability analysis: means and item-total statistics for the mea-
surement of attitude towards old age (direct questions)
2. Associative Ratings
The second measurement of the respondents’ attitude towards old age
required ratings of how well a list of attributes fitted the term “old
age”. The answer scores have been partially recoded such that 1 always
stands for the most positive association (i.e., “suits exactly” if the term
is positive, “does not suit at all” if the term is negative), and 5 stands
for the most negative association. The midpoint ratings of the items
were then averaged and joined to a scale.
Five of the 16 items had corrected item-total correlations smaller than
.3, and were accordingly removed from the scale. The remaining eleven
items all had item-total correlations higher than .4, as can be seen in
Table 4.4. The definite scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .87, and can
therefore be considered to be internally stable.
Measurement of Self-efficacy Belief
The perceived self-efficacy of the respondents was in this study measured
with five items of the German Version of Jerusalem and Schwarzer’s (1981)
General Self-Efficacy Scale.
With the data of the present study, the five items had a Cronbach’s alpha
of .79, that is, the scale appeared to have a sufficient internal stability. As is
shown in Table 4.5, all corrected item-total-correlations were higher than .5,
therefore none of them had to be removed from the scale.
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Item: Mean Corrected Alpha
How well do the following characteristics score item-total if item
fit to the term “old age”?: correlation deleted
Interest 2.06 .55 .86
Irritability 2.95 .51 .86
Activity 2.31 .51 .86
Dissatisfaction 2.69 .69 .85
Enthusiasm 2.44 .55 .86
Dispiritedness 2.87 .62 .86
Anxiety 3.03 .58 .86
Self-confidence 2.28 .59 .87
Egotism 2.81 .54 .86
Malevolence 2.33 .65 .85
Dependency 2.60 .64 .86
Table 4.4: Reliability analysis: means and item-total statistics for the mea-
surement of attitude towards old age (associative ratings)
Item: Mean Corrected Alpha
score item-total if item
correlation deleted
I always succeed to solve difficult 1.76 .53 .77
problems if I try hard enough.
In unexpected situations I always know 2.26 .54 .77
what to do.
I think I can cope well with surprising 1.97 .66 .73
events.
I always face difficulties with composure 2.18 .63 .74
because I can deal well with problems.
Whatever will happen, I will be able to 1.78 .53 .77
cope.
Table 4.5: Reliability analysis: means and item-total statistics for the mea-
surement of self-efficacy belief
Job Deprivation Scale
The Job Deprivation Scale by Buchmueller, Dobler, Mayring and Schneider
(1997) was used to measure the extent to which the respondents missed their
former job or enjoyed their retirement. Table 4.6 shows the items of the Job
Deprivation Scale with the means and item-total statistics that were obtained
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in this study.
Item: Mean Corrected Alpha
Which of the following statements do you score item-total if item
approve when comparing your life since correlation deleted
retirement with your professional life?
I enjoy not having to turn up for work 1.50 .43 .85
on time every day.
I often miss the challenges of 2.56 .57 .84
professional life.
I am happy not to have to go to work 1.93 .50 .85
anymore.
I enjoy not being exposed to the 1.70 .39 .85
pressure to perform anymore.
I miss the contact to other people that 2.77 .61 .84
I had during work.
I miss the freedom I had because of my 2.10 .61 .83
work away from home.
I miss the purpose and meaning of life 1.93 .66 .83
as it was given by my work.
I miss the feeling of being a respected 2.06 .68 .83
worker.
I miss the regularity of my daily 1.88 .49 .85
routine during my working life.
I enjoy being able to plan my time 1.40 .53 .77
more freely.
Table 4.6: Reliability analysis: means and item-total statistics for the mea-
surement of job deprivation
The item “I am happy that I don’t have to argue with my colleagues any-
more” had a corrected item-total correlation smaller than .3, and was there-
fore removed from the scale.
The remaining ten items all had corrected item-total-correlations of r =
.39 or higher, as can be seen in Table 4.6. Cronbach’s alpha of the definite
scale was .85, which is satisfactory. The scale can therefore be considered as
an internally stable and useful measuring instrument.
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Measurement of the Importance of Identity Domains; and Mea-
surement of Identity Diversity
The development of a measuring instrument for the importance of identity
domains started with the qualitative interviews, were we asked the partici-
pants the classic question of identity research: “Who are you?” (cf. Blasi,
1988; Blasi, 1995). When analyzing the answers we wrote down every self-
defining statement that had been expressed by the respondents. Then we
looked for different categories or domains of self-definition where each of the
self-characterizing statements could be allocated. There resulted six domains
of self-definition:
1. Profession
This category contained references to a person’s profession or former
profession.
(E.g., “I am a career counselor”, or also “I was a teacher”.)
2. Family roles
Under“family roles”we subsumed every self-description that referred to
a person’s position within his or her family, including the partnership.
(E.g., “I am a grandmother”, , “I am a father of adult children”, or “I
am a husband”.)
3. Friendship roles
Self-descriptive statements were considered as “friendship roles” if a
person defined him- or herself in terms being somebody’s friend, or in
terms of his or her circle of friends.
4. Art, culture, leisure
Into this category fell statements concerning leisure time activities.
Some of our interviewees pursued very time-consuming and artful
activities—like painting, sculpturing, handcraft weaving, etc.—that
are almost to be seen as a substitute for the former profession, and
that the term “leisure” does therefore not really do justice to. Thus,
in order to better embrace these almost profession-like activities we
decided to name the category “Art, culture, leisure”.
5. Community functions
This category comprised self-defining statements regarding honorary
posts, voluntary service, commitment in party politics and church, and
also memberships in special organizations, clubs or associations.
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6. Personality, Values
The last category subsumed all the statements that referred to internal
constructs like personality traits, value systems, beliefs and religion.
(E.g., “I am rather introverted”, “I am a joker”, “I am a Christian”.)
Figure 4.1 shows the frequency with which self-definitions belonging to a
certain category were named.
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Figure 4.1: Frequency with which each identity domain was used, collapsed
across all 13 respondents
The domains that were most frequently used by the interviewees to de-
fine themselves were family roles (which were named 21 times). Statements
about the profession or former profession were still named 17 times, that is,
the interviewees—even though nine of them were retired—named on aver-
age more than one self-definition that concerned their work or former work.
Less frequently named were the categories of personality traits, leisure time
activities, community functions, values/beliefs, and friendship roles.
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Two categories were missing entirely that we would have expected to be
used: Nobody mentioned their own age or the fact that they were retired.
That is, there were no statements like: “I am 64 years old” or “I am retired”
as a way of characterizing one-self.
This may be due on one hand to a certain reluctance to talk about one’s
age—and thus also about one’s retirement status, which would be an indi-
rect reference to one’s age. On the other hand, it is also possible that the
participants simply considered their age or retirement status as unimportant
for their own identity. But whatever the reason for this omission was, it
suggested that for our participants the new identity as a retired person was
in no way a substitute for their former professional identity.
This points into the direction of the first hypothesis, which assumed that
retired persons will rate their former profession as more important to char-
acterize themselves than their status of being retired. However, since the
sample was so small, the findings of these interviews should only be seen
as a first illustration; the actual purpose of this preliminary inquiry was to
provide a base for the questionnaire study.
As was described on page 106f we added five more categories and split
up three of the categories, so that the definite standardized question for the
survey contained 14 categories of self-definition. For each of these domains
the respondents were asked to indicate how important they considered these
domains for their own identity.
For the main research questions of this study (regarding the development
of identity after retirement), these items were not joined to scale, but were
analyzed separately. That is, they were not meant to measure only one
super-ordinate construct, like the items in the above presented scales.
However, to measure the identity diversity, the mean of these fourteen
ratings were calculated, that is, the ratings were treated like items of a scale,
providing an overall scale score. Therefore, the items were also analyzed with
regard to the scale reliability.
Table 4.7 shows the means of the items, and the item-total statistics.
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Item: Mean Corrected Alpha
If you have to characterize yourself, score item-total if item
which of the following points are correlation deleted
important for you?
My nationality 3.58 .36 .75
My roles within my family 3.88 .40 .75
(parent-, grandparenthood etc.)
My partnership 4.47 .31 .75
My profession or occupation 3.93 .32 .75
(for retirees: my former profession)
Honorary posts or volunteer work 2.75 .39 .75
Characteristics of my body / 3.68 .50 .74
my appearance
Personality trains 3.90 .52 .74
My age 2.88 .40 .75
My life story 3.06 .50 .73
The associations and organizations I 2.73 .37 .75
belong to
My circle of friends 4.05 .45 .74
My leisure time activities 4.11 .29 .76
My values of my belief 3.78 .28 .76
Table 4.7: Reliability analysis: means and item-total statistics for the mea-
surement of identity diversity
The scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .76, which can be considered as sat-
isfactory. However, two of the items had corrected item-total correlations
smaller than .3. In order to cover all identity domains, the items were nev-
ertheless kept in the scale, but these insufficient item parameters represent
a shortcoming of the measuring instrument which has to be borne in mind
when interpreting the results regarding the identity diversity.
4.3.2 Professional Identity and Retiree Identity
Excerpts of the Interviews: Statements Concerning Profession and
Retirement
When we did the interviews preceding the questionnaire study we were also
interested in the participants’ attitude towards their profession: Would they
consider their profession as very important for their identity? And what
would retirement change in the importance of the profession?
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I will in the following give a few examples of the participants’ reflections
about their profession and retirement. The answers will here be translated
into English. The original answers in German are reprinted in Appendix
B (however, these have also been translated from Swiss German Dialect to
Standard German, in order to ensure better readability).
It appeared that there were huge differences in the way these persons
experienced the importance of their profession or former profession and the
transition to retirement:
There was for instance a psychiatrist for whom his profession was a very
central part of his life and his identity: “During the whole of my working life
I was a psychiatrist, and the whole of my working life was oriented towards
psychiatry. I have already made the Matura [Swiss college degree] with this
objective.” On the question if he thought he would still see himself as a
psychiatrist after retirement he laughed and answered: “I think so, yes. I
have a rather extensive library; the specialized literature is my practice, and
the fiction is at home, and I cannot imagine to get rid of specialized literature.
I am sure that I will continue to read something once in a while. This is
one point where I am aware that I will probably always see myself as a
psychiatrist, because I will always read with the eyes of a psychiatrist.” He
added later on that he would probably still keep some of his clients even after
giving up his practice, since he thought it would be a pity to waste all the
experience he had gathered over the years.
There were others who had also had a profession that had been very im-
portant for them but who had finished with this part of their lives completely
after retirement. For example, a music teacher (she was the wife of the psy-
chiatrist) said: “I do not miss this [making music] any more, which had been
so important for me formerly, and which had seemed the greatest thing on
earth to me. This is just completed.”
Another woman had, together with her husband, directed a nursing home
for old people before they both retired from work. They had lived in the
building of the nursing home while they were working there, so to retire had
also meant for them to move out of the house. She said about her profession:
“I identified very strongly with my work. It was a part of myself, also a sort
of homeland. However, I was prepared for the change, I can now also make
up for things that have not been possible before.”
A different pattern was a gradual cessation of the importance of the pro-
fession, already before retirement. There was for example one woman who
had worked as a secretary before retirement, and who explained this dimin-
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ishing importance in the following way: “That was rather a sort of tapering
off. I had loved my profession, loved to work, but in this age I felt that there
were younger workers, and I did not have this power any more. So this went
into quite a natural gradual termination. But I still liked to work, it was just
not so important anymore.”
In some cases the moment of the transition to retirement seems to be
crucial in order to maintain a positive view of the former profession, as the
statement of a teacher shows: “My work was beautiful and important to me.
The last class was very agreeable (...). This was very important for me, to
quit working at a moment when I very much liked being a teacher, that is
to exit at a peak level.” As he went on explaining, this was for him also one
of the reasons why he went into retirement two years earlier than the official
retirement age. He did not want to start with a new class which he would
have had to give over to his successor in the half time, because this kind of
exit would have seemed unsatisfying to him.
Testing Hypotheses
Based on assertions of the social identity theory as well as on previous re-
search on images of aging and retirement I have assumed that retired persons
would rate their former profession as more important to characterize them-
selves than their status of being retired.
The descriptive results showed that the mean value of the rated impor-
tance of the former profession for self-definition wasM = 3.90 for the retired
persons (SD = 1.18), the scale ranging from 5 = very important to 1 = not
important at all. That is, the retired persons still considered their former
profession as “rather important” to characterize themselves.
Interestingly enough, there was not even a significant difference between
the not yet retired (M = 4.04, SD = .97) and the retired persons, re-
garding the importance of their profession (resp. former profession) for self-
description t(727) = 1.80, p (two− tailed) = .07.
A t-test showed that for the retired persons, the former profession (M =
3.90, SD = 1.18) was significantly more important to characterize themselves
than the fact that they were retired (M = 3.58, SD = 1.23), t(378) = 3.74,
p (one− tailed) < .001, d = .25.
The first Hypothesis was thus confirmed, but with a rather small effect
size.
I have further assumed that respondents with a positive attitude towards
higher age would rate their status of being retired as more important to
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characterize themselves than respondents with a negative attitude towards
higher age.
The results confirmed this assumption both for the direct and the asso-
ciative question:
1. In the direct question respondents with a positive attitude towards
higher age assigned their being retired an average importance of M =
3.68 (SD = 1.24); whereas the average of respondents with a negative
attitude was only M = 3.39 (SD = 1.30), t(475) = 2.09, p(one −
tailed) = .021; d = .23.
2. In the associative ratings respondents who associated high age with
positive adjectives assigned their status of being retired an average
importance of M = 3.78 (SD = 1.28); whereas respondents with neg-
ative associations had a mean answer score of M = 3.36 (SD = 1.26),
t(478) = 3.16, p(one− tailed) = .001, d = .33.
The second hypothesis was therefore also confirmed, although here as well
the effect sizes were rather small.
Based on the social identity theory, I have assumed that the professional
status is a good predictor for the professional identity.
Table 4.8 shows the correlations between the professional identity (mea-
sured as the rated importance of the respondents’ profession or former pro-
fession to characterize themselves) and several demographic and job-related
variables.
The correlations were all not very high, the highest being the professional
status with r = .256. Regarding this work’s focus, it is interesting to note
that neither the status of being retired, nor the duration of retirement, nor
the age of the respondents correlated significantly with the importance of the
professional identity. Directly job-related variables and gender seemed to be
more useful predictors.
In order to find out more about the predictive value of those variables, a
multiple regression analysis was realized.
Out of the potential predictors that were included into the analysis, three
showed to have a significant predictive value: professional status, job depri-
vation, and self-efficacy belief. This means that higher importance of the pro-
fessional identity went together with higher professional status, higher feeling
of job deprivation after retirement, and higher self-efficacy belief. These three
variables explained together 11.4 percent of the variance (R = .337).
Variables like gender or duration of the last occupation, on the other
hand, had no predictive value, although they correlated significantly with
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Correlation with high Degrees of
importance of freedom
professional identity (n− 2)
Whole sample:
Sex (male) .129 ** 721
Age -.052 716
High education level .015 727
High professional status .256 ** 725
Being retired -.071 727
High self-efficacy belief .173 ** 714
Retirees only:
Duration of last professional occupation .130 ** 430
Duration of retirement -.012 355
High job deprivation .125 * 383
Table 4.8: Pearson correlations between professional identity and different
job-related variables; *p < .05; **p < .01
professional identity when they were not controlled for other variables (cf.
Table 4.8).
Table 4.9 shows the coefficients for the dependent variable professional
identity.
Unstandardized Standardized
coefficients coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 3.235 .296 10.925 .000
Professional Status .134 .028 .250 4.792 .000
Job deprivation .303 .088 .181 3.435 .001
Self-efficacy belief -.283 .094 -.160 -3.001 .003
Table 4.9: Stepwise multiple regression: coefficients for the dependent vari-
able professional identity
Cross validation proved the model to be internally stable; z(390/402) =
.46, p (two− tailed) = .65, see also Appendix C.
These Results confirmed the hypotheses III and IV so far, since the profes-
sional status was a significant predictor for the importance of the professional
identity, explaining more variance than any other of the measured variables.
However, with 11.4 %, the part of the variance that could be explained
through the here measured variables was quite small. It can therefore be
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assumed that there exist other variables that were not measured here, but
that do have an important influence on the professional identity, maybe more
so than the professional status.
4.3.3 Identity Diversity as a Predictor for High Satis-
faction
In accordance with the self-complexity theory, I assumed that people with
high identity diversity (i.e. for whom many identity domains are important to
characterize themselves) would be more satisfied with their lives (hypothesis
V).
The results confirmed this assumption: high identity diversity was found
to be correlated with a high satisfaction across different life domains. The
correlation between the identity diversity and the score in the satisfaction
scale is r(775) = .354, p (one− tailed) < .001.
There is no significant effect of age on identity diversity: age does not
correlate negatively with high identity diversity, as the disengagement theory
would have predicted, r(774) = -.065, p = .07.
Surprisingly, there is an effect of retirement that goes even into the oppo-
site direction: identity diversity is higher for retirees (M = 3.71, SD = .56)
than for the not yet retired persons (M = 3.60, SD = .57), t(785) = −2.626,
p (one − tailed) = .009, d = .21. Looking at the single identity domains,
all the differences that could be observed were going into the direction that
the identity was more important for the retirees than for the not retired
persons. There was no identity domain that got significantly less important
after retirement.
That is, retired people had more domains that were important for them
to characterize themselves than people who were still working.
The identity diversity value appeared to be higher for the women (M =
3.73, SD = .57) than for the men (M = 3.58, SD = .56), t(786) = -3.502, p
(one− tailed) < .001, d = .27. There was no significant interaction between
identity diversity before and after retirement and gender, F (1) = .076, p =
.782.
The fact that high identity diversity correlated with high life satisfactions
suggests that it is not a failure of adjustment to higher age if people do not
give up role identities when getting older, as it was suggested e.g., by the
disengagement theory. It seems on the contrary that also for older adults,
high identity diversity is something positive.
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4.3.4 Effects of Retirement on the Importance of
Other Identity Domains
As a rather explorative issue, the question was addressed what effects the
retirement might have on the importance of other identity domains than the
profession. To know more about this, the two groups—retired and not yet
retired persons—were compared.
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the rated importance of each self-
definition domain for the entire sample.
Figure 4.3 shows the same answer distribution, the sample being here
split into not yet retired participants (left half of the columns) and retired
participants (right half of the columns).
Since people have more time after their retirement than before, it was
self-evident to assume that leisure time activities, occupations like volunteer
work or honorary posts, and commitment in organizations or associations
would be more important for retirees than for working people.
For the importance of the category of leisure time activities for self-
definition, there was indeed a significant difference between the not yet re-
tired (M = 4.00, SD = .855) and the retired persons (M = 4.23, SD =
.821), t(769) = −3.709, p < 0.001, d = .28. If controlled for the age of
the participants, the partial correlation between retirement (a dichotomous
variable) and the importance of leisure time activities was still significant
(r = .117, p < 0.001). It can therefore be assumed that it was really the
event of retirement and not just a cohort or age effect that caused the differ-
ence between the retirees and the not yet retired persons.
For the importance of honorary posts or volunteer work for self-definition,
however, there was no significant difference between the not yet retired (M =
2.73, SD = 1.196) and the retired persons (M = 2.87, SD = 1.338), t(718) =
−1.428, p (two− tailed) = .159.
There was a similar result for the importance of membership in organiza-
tions or associations for self-definition: there was no difference between the
not yet retired (M = 2.73, SD = 1.239) and the retired persons (M = 2.86,
SD = 1.371), t(719) = −1.305, p = .192.
That is, neither honorary posts and volunteer work nor the membership
in organizations, clubs or associations were more important for the retirees
than for the not yet retired participants. In fact, the ratings of those two
categories were highly correlated, r(688) = .552, p < 0.001. It seems thus
that persons who engaged in voluntary work and saw this as an important
aspect of their identity were to a large extent the same as those who saw
their memberships in organizations as self-defining. An explanation for this
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Figure 4.2: Rated importance of different domains for self-definition (entire
sample)
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Figure 4.3: Rated importance of different domains for self-definition (sample
split by retirement status)
144 4.3. Results and Discussion
might be that volunteer work is probably often linked to a specific orga-
nization the volunteering person belongs to as a member. Organizations that
provide important social identities may often require some sort of volunteer
commitment of their members. Furthermore, a high voluntary commitment
for an organization will probably lead to a higher identification with the
organization, thus resulting in a higher importance of the membership for
self-definition.
4.3.5 Effects of Age or Cohort on the Importance of
Identity Domains
Another explorative issue that was addressed in this study was the question
what effect the age of the persons had on the importance of the different
identity domains. Since there was naturally a rather high correlation of
r(776) = .53 between the age of the participants and their retirement status,
all of the here presented correlations were controlled for the retirement status
of the participants.
In the following domains there was a significant but small correlation
between the age of the participants and the rated importance of the respective
domain of self-definition:
• Age: r(753) = .097, p = 0.007
• Life story: r(740) = .078, p = 0.034
• Nationality: r(750) = .186, p < 0.001
That is, the participants rated their own age, life story, and nationality
as more important for self-definition with increasing age.
Personality traits were rated as less important with increasing age,
r(730) = −.109, p = 0.003.
For all the other identity categories there was no significant correlation
between the age of the participants and the rated importance of the domain.
Since this was not a longitudinal study, no distinction can be made for
these results between age and cohort effects. It seems probable that the
difference for nationality, for instance, might rather be due to a cohort than
an age effect, in the sense that the older people of this sample might have
been socialized in a time when to be Swiss was something more self-defining
that it was later on. For instance, the older people of this age cohort have
been adolescents during World War II, whereas the youngest probably do not
have any own memories of that time. These different historical backgrounds
may have had a considerable effect on the importance of the Swiss nationality
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for the respondents’ identities. For the identity domain of the own life story,
it seems understandable that it gets more important with increasing age.
The own life story is not only getting longer, and thus richer in the course of
a lifetime, but also more special, in the sense that there are, with increasing
age, less and less other persons who share the same memories of one’s early
life. The increasing importance of one’s age might be explained with the
increasing salience, higher age being a more salient—because more extreme—
social category than middle age. Yet it is nevertheless astounding that higher
age should become more important for self-definition, given the fact that old
age is generally valued in a rather negative way by the society.
It should, however, be noted that all these correlations were very small,
although significant. It appears indeed that the age of the respondents did
not have a substantial influence on their identity or self-view—that is on how
important they judged these different domains to define themselves.
4.3.6 Self-perceived changes due to higher age
The third explorative issue of this study concerns the participants’ self-
perceived changes that they attributed to their advanced age. In order to get
a better understanding of these changes, findings from the interviews will be
analyzed.
When we did the face-to-face interviews we were interested in what kind
of changes the persons had experienced about themselves during the last ten
or more years. In the following, the changes that were mentioned during the
interviews will be presented and discussed.
1. Decreasing Importance of Social Roles; Withdrawal and Pri-
vacy
Several persons emphasized that different social roles, especially public
roles, were getting less important, and also that they were paying less
attention to the opinion of other people:
• “Until I was 40 years old I spent much more time acting roles than
being myself. Actually almost exclusively.”
• “Today I am caring increasingly about myself. Formerly success
was more important to me, in my work, with other people, with
women. To be appreciated, esteemed and so on. To be respected.”
• “I manage better to take my distance. I am still inter-
ested/commiserate, but I know that some things are other
people’s problems.”
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• For one man, a recently retired teacher, it was very important that
he learned to live more ascetically. This meant for him on one hand
to live with less material goods—he planned to move from a large
farmhouse, where he was living with his wife, to a small studio,
where he intended to bring only the most necessary things with
him. His wife would stay in the farmhouse, but he emphasized that
this separation concerned only their way of living; and that they
would stay a couple and where getting along well with each other.
On the other hand, beside the renouncement of material comfort,
it was important for him to decrease his social commitments, like
communal politics, honorary posts and so on:
“During the last 20 years I have abandoned many roles, quite
consciously. There has really been a conscious withdrawal. It is
important for me to see that I am capable of giving off, that I can
do without all this. I have the inner vision of my cat lolling in
the sun on my balcony. I would like to become like that, to be
satisfied with nothing more than a little sun.”
He specified this gradual role-withdrawal in the following way: “It
was not only the number of the roles that decreased, but also
the intensity, the binding character, and the time commitment.
Those roles that I still occupy could be given up anytime. This
[withdrawal] has begun with the move-out of our children. The
father-role was of course the most binding, most intensive, around-
the-clock role. And then the profession. And now I take only
small, shorter tasks (...). Letting go, letting go—this is what I
have to learn now.”
He saw this clearly as a way of practicing, in order to be able
to cope more easily with the losses that might come with older
age. He agreed also definitely with me when I asked him if this
living with less (things and persons) around him was also a way
of choosing deliberately what might happen anyway later on.
Besides this cut-back in social obligations and commitments, some in-
terviewees observed on the other hand a gain in family roles, because
new relationships are emerging, namely with sons- and daughters-in-
law and with grandchildren.
However, when analyzing the statements across all life domains, there
was a pronounced tendency towards fewer social roles. 9 of the 13
persons reported to have experienced a decrease of social roles over the
past 10 to 20 years, and for the remaining 4 persons the number of
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roles remained the same. Nobody reported an overall increase in social
roles across all life domains.
2. Stronger Inward-Orientation, Increasing Importance of the
Own Person
A probably related tendency to the decrease in roles was an increasing
orientation towards one-self, and towards the “inside”, as the following
statements show:
• “I have the feeling that I come closer and closer to myself. ‘Become
who you are’—this is getting more and more true. I am becoming
more and more authentic.”
• “My interests are increasingly oriented towards the inside.”
• “I have got to know myself better.”
• “I succeed better in staying with myself.”
• “There was a change in the sense that I have any goals at all, and
these goals are rather oriented inwardly than towards the outside:
For example, that I can deepen my satisfaction, in my work, in
everyday life.”
• “I am happy that I can do things for my own sake. I always
objected to this when I was younger.”
There were no statements documenting the inverse direction, that is,
a stronger outward-orientation, stronger extraversion or a decreased
importance of the own person.
3. Increased Self-confidence, Stronger Will
The following statements illustrate the feeling of several of the partici-
pants that their self-consciousness had got stronger, and that they were
succeeding better in pursuing their interests than when they had been
younger:
• “I know better what I want and what I do not want.”
• “Today I don’t do any more things that I should do, only that I
want to do.”
• “I am clearly more daring to face challenges.”
• “My self-confidence has increased, I have become more secure. I
have also ceased to feel guilty for all sorts of unnecessary things.”
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Here as well, the statements all documented the same direction of
change, from less to more self-confidence and will-power, and never
the opposite tendency.
4. Increased Composure, Calmness
The change that was named most often by the interviewees was that
they considered themselves as more composed than when they were
younger. The German term “Gelassenheit” ( = composure, calmness,
placidity) was used by five of the 13 participants. Others used related
terms, like patience, considerateness, but also passivity. Examples for
such statements are the following:
• “This is very clear to me that I have become calmer and do not
have so much energy either. Many things, also the activity, have
decreased. (...) It is not always easy to let go, but there is some-
thing you get back—tranquility I would say. A certain serenity.”
• “I have become more patient and composed.”
• “I’m calmer, more considerate, more composed, also more merci-
ful. (...) However, I have also realized that balance and stability
are not very desirable after all, because the deepness with which
you can experience psychic lows determines also how high you can
get in a psychic high.”
In Figure 4.4 all named personality changes (across all 13 participants)
are listed, and grouped according to their similarity. This yielded two larger
groups and seven single statements describing how the participants perceived
changes in their own person. The two larger groups of similar statements
comprised on one hand the tendency to be calmer and quieter, on the other
hand the tendency of giving the own person more importance and focusing
more on oneself.
What is especially striking in this exploration is the unanimity of the way
the different participants experienced the development of their own person-
alities over their later adulthood. That is, the direction of the changes was
always the same. There were for example several persons asserting that they
were calmer or more passive than formerly, and nobody stated the contrary,
that he or she was getting more vivid or more active. These 13 persons have
otherwise very diverse personalities and life situations, and for other life do-
mains (for example for the changes in attitudes) we could not make out such
general tendencies.
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more composed, calmer
more inwardly oriented
10I do more what I want
more self/confident
less feelings of guilt
more open
more tolerant
more courageous, bolder
more sociable
I live more in the present
I take more pleasure in life
maybe more forgetful
12more balanced
more patient
more considerate
more mature
more passive
Figure 4.4: Self-description of changes in personality (number of sponta-
neously expressed changes)
The changes that were named were mostly of a positive nature, which
suggests the possibility that the answers were biased by social desirability.
But even if we assume that all persons saw their personal development as
positive, this does not explain why the contents of the changes were so similar.
For example, nobody had the impression of getting more active or more
extraverted, even though these traits would be at least as socially desirable
as the change towards calmness and introversion.
Another possibility is that the interviewees memorized and interpreted
their own development in accordance with common (mainly positive) stereo-
types of aging. In order to out-rule this possibility a longitudinal study would
be necessary, where the changes are not measured through retrospection but
over various measure points.
4.4 General Discussion
A prediction derived from the social identity theory was that people tend to
see their socially highly valued and distinctive identities as more important
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than their less valued identities. This prediction was confirmed by several
findings: retirees rated their former profession as more important for self-
description than the fact that they were retired; the respondents’ attitude
towards older age predicts how important they see their status as retired; and
the professional status is more appropriate than all other measured variables
to predict the importance of the professional identity.
One of the most surprising findings in this study was that the profession
was as important for retired as for not yet retired respondents to describe
themselves. The loss of the professional role after retirement does apparently
not lead to a loss of the professional identity. It seems that for a lot of persons
the profession is indeed such an important part of the identity that it just
remains an important aspect of the self, even if it is not practiced anymore.
An important implication of this finding on role and identity research is that
roles should not be confounded with role identities. They seem to be entirely
different constructs, role identities being probably much more continuous
than roles.
In general, the retired persons estimated more domains of self-description
as important than did the not yet retired persons, which means that the iden-
tity diversity was higher for the retired than for the not yet retired persons.
In addition, high identity diversity correlated with a high satisfaction across
different life domains. This finding has important implications for psycholog-
ical theories of older adults’ development, disproving strongly the view that
role disengagement be inherent to successful or even to normal aging.
However, the findings concerning identity diversity were based on a scale
that was not entirely satisfactory with regard to the item-total correlation
of the items. Therefore the results should be interpreted cautiously as long
as they have not been replicated with other measuring instruments. One
promising possibility would be to use Linville’s (1985; 1987) trait-sorting task.
This instrument was developed to measure self-complexity—a construct that
is very closely related to identity diversity.
In the explorative analyzes there were also some unexpected findings.
Leisure time activity was the only domain where there was a difference be-
tween retired and not retired respondents, no differences were found for vol-
unteer work or memberships. These findings, however, do not rule out the
possibility that honorary posts, volunteer work, or memberships may get
more important as activities after retirement. It was only the importance
of these domains regarding the self-definition that was measured here. The
extent to which people identify with volunteering might be highly dependent
of cultural factors. It is possible that volunteer work is e.g., viewed less pos-
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itively in Switzerland than in the United States. In Switzerland, volunteer
work is sometimes even criticized as a threat to the manpower market, espe-
cially in times with high unemployment rates. This ambivalent assessment of
voluntary work by the society might detain many people from an engagement
as volunteers. In the United States, on the other hand, there seems to be a
much more unanimously positive attitude towards volunteering, a fact that
may also be due to a more urgent need for voluntary helpers in the social
system.
Given that the study was cross-sectional, it should be borne in mind
that all these differences between retired and not yet retired persons are not
necessarily changes due to retirement, but differences between the groups—
although the results can be controlled for age, so that we can rule out a
mere age or cohort effect. The only possibility to measure real changes in
individuals would be to acquire longitudinal data, which time restrictions did
not permit for this study.
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Chapter 5
Age Identity of the “Young
Old”
To me, old age is always fifteen
years older than I am.
Bernard Baruch (1955)
Life is the art of being
well-deceived; and in order that the
deception may succeed it must be
habitual and uninterrupted.
William Hazlitt (1817)
5.1 Introduction
Active Retirees are often referred to as the “young old”, a term thatshows some of the uncertainty of these persons’ age identity. They
often do not feel old (O¨berg & Tornstam, 2001), but nevertheless find them-
selves suddenly belonging to the category of the “elderly” or “seniors” (Filipp
& Mayer, 1999). In this chapter several issues concerning the age identity of
people in their seventh life decade (between 58 and 70 years) will be examined
and discussed.
Three problems will be addressed:
1. A measurement model of subjective age will be evaluated,
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2. two theoretical approaches to explain the subjective age bias will be
introduced and empirically assessed,
3. and a predictive structural model of subjective age will be developed.
5.1.1 Measurement of Subjective Age
Kastenbaum et al. (1972) defined functional age as a multi-dimensional
concept that includes four different domains of a person’s subjective age.
Respondents are asked to tick an age-decade (20’s to 90’s) in response to
four questions of the form:
1. feel-age: “I feel as if I were in my...”;
2. look-age: “I look as if I were in my ...”;
3. do-age: “My activities are like those of people who are in their...”;
4. interest-age: “My interests are like those of people who are in their...”.
Barak (1979) (as cited in Barak, 1987) joined the four items to a cognitive-
age scale, which showed to have a very high internal stability (alpha > 0.9).
Subsequently, numerous studies used Kastenbaum et al.’s four aspects as a
subjective age measure (cf. Barak, Mathur, Lee, & Zhang, 2001; Barak,
Mathur, Lee, Zhang, & Erondo, 2001; Barak & Rahtz, 1990; Mathur et al.,
2001; Staats, 1996; Staats et al., 1993). The four aspects have been used on
one hand to measure a person’s absolute subjective age (as in the questions
above) as well as to measure comparative subjective age (e.g., “In comparison
to people my age I look...”—the answer categories ranging frommuch younger
to much older).
These four aspects of subjective age (feel-age, look-age, do-age, and
interest-age) have often been referred to as four “dimensions of functional
age” (e.g., Barak, Mathur, Lee, & Zhang, 2001; Barak & Stern, 1986). In
my opinion, however, the high internal stability of the scale suggests that
the four items measure only one dimension.
It is one goal of this study to evaluate this measurement model, not just
with a reliability analysis providing an alpha-value for internal stability, but
also with a path model giving an account of the dimensional structure of the
construct. Additionally, I will include in this study other aspects that might
be important parts of subjective age (e.g., social aspects that have so far
not been considered), and verify if there are indeed different dimensions—or
factors—of subjective age. For example, it is possible that bodily aspects of
subjective age differ considerably from social or cognitive aspects.
Two hypotheses can thus be specified:
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Hypothesis I: The subjective age measurement model based on Kasten-
baum’s four aspects is an appropriate model. Including other aspects
of subjective age does not increase the goodness of fit of the model.
Hypothesis II: Subjective age is a one-dimensional construct. That is, the
model does not consist of various factors. This is also true if we include
more questions about additional aspects of subjective age.
5.1.2 Theoretical Approaches to Explain the Subjec-
tive Age Bias
The concept of subjective age has been studied empirically since the 1970’s
(cf. Section 2.2), so that there is now a considerable empirical descriptive
basis. However, there is still a lack of theoretically founded psychological
explanations for the phenomenon that most elderly people feel considerably
younger than their calendric age.
One promising theoretical approach might be the domain of positivity bias
or positive illusions. Many people do not possess entirely accurate self-views
when it comes to self-knowledge of an evaluative nature (i. e., people’s ideas
about their socially valued qualities and abilities). Instead, there is extensive
evidence that most people regard themselves as better than they really are
(see e.g., Silvia & Duval, 2001; Gramzow, Elliot, Asher, & McGregor, 2003;
Kwan, Love, Ryff, & Essex, 2003; Sedikides et al., 2003; Sedikides, Herbst,
Hardin, & Dardis, 2002; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003).
Brown (1998) reports for example that students who have to rate their
own loyalty, kindness, intelligence, attractiveness, and so forth, rate them-
selves above the scale midpoint on all of the positively valued attributes,
and far below the scale midpoint on all of the negatively valued attributes
(Brown, 1998). They think of themselves for example as very loyal, attrac-
tive, kind, and talented, and not at all as inconsiderate, unpopular or dumb.
This positivity bias affects only self-ratings. When the students rate “most
other people”, the ratings hover around the scale midpoint. Collapsed across
the various attributes, 89 percent of the students rate themselves more posi-
tively than they rate most other people, and 92 percent of the students rated
themselves less negatively than they rate most other people. These findings
suggest that people often do not possess an accurate view about themselves.
Although it is not possible from such data to know which of the persons were
mistaken, all values over 50 percent represent inaccuracy. This means that
around 40 percent of the respondents possess unrealistically positive beliefs
about themselves.
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The results of this study are just one illustrative example out of an ex-
tensive amount of evidence showing that most people regard themselves in
highly favorable terms.
The tendency of viewing oneself as younger than age cohorts could be
seen as a special case of self-enhancement, since to feel, look and act young
is in our society considered as something positive. That explanation would
assume that people have a motivation to feel young.
However, besides that motivational approach there is another—purely
cognitive—possible explanation for this phenomenon of a generally too young
subjective age: It can be assumed that elderly people do really look younger
today than they did a few decades ago, since the health state of elderly people
is a lot better today. Therefore, the inner prototype image that we have of
a person in his or her 60’s might not correspond anymore to the aspect of
today’s “normal” people in their 60’s. If people have to decide whether they
look younger than other people of the same age, it is possible that they
compare themselves not only with people who have now the same age, but
also with older people whom they remember at that age. And it is very
probable that a woman who is now 65 years old looks indeed a lot younger
than did her mother at the same age.
According to this explanation, the general tendency to feel younger than
ones real age would be merely a question of information-processing. There
is no motivational component in this explanation, and it is therefore simpler
than the self-enhancement hypothesis.
How can we tell which of the two explanations is more accurate? There are
some specific predictions for each of the explanations, which will immediately
lead to three further hypotheses for this study. (For the formulation of the
hypotheses the existence of a motivational component in the subjective age
bias will be assumed.)
• One difference concerns the attitude towards older age in society. If
the tendency to view oneself as younger was a special case of self-
enhancement, we would expect the attitude towards older age to play
an important role. Feeling especially young can only be positive for a
person’s well-being if “to be or feel old” is seen as something negative.
We would therefore expect a moderating effect of the attitude towards
old age on the correlation between a young subjective age and a high
life satisfaction. This correlation should be especially high for people
with a negative attitude towards old age. For the information process-
ing explanation, on the other hand, the attitude towards aging is not
supposed to make a difference.
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Assuming a motivational component leads therefore to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis III: The attitude towards old age has a moderating in-
fluence on the correlation between a young subjective age and a
high life satisfaction.
• A strong tendency of self-enhancement and positive illusions about one-
self is highly related to other personality traits like optimism and self-
efficacy belief, as well as to life satisfaction (Myers & Diener, 1995).
So if a young subjective age was a special case of self-enhancement, we
would expect a correlation between a young subjective age on one side
and high optimism, high self-efficacy belief, and high life satisfaction
on the other side. For the information-processing explanation however,
there would be no reason for such a connection.
It follows therefore:
Hypothesis IV: A young subjective age is positively correlated with
high scores in optimism, self-efficacy belief and life satisfaction.
• Self-enhancement tendencies are usually stronger for domains that can-
not easily be verified, that is, where no objective feedback is avail-
able or where standards are ambiguous and subjective (cf. Dunning,
Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Felson, 1981). I assume that for bodily
aspects of subjective age, like fitness or attractiveness, there is usually
more feedback available and standards are less ambiguous than for the
general subjective age, that is for the general question of how old or
young a person feels. If we further assume that the underestimation
of subjective age is a special case of the self-enhancement tendency,
we would expect people to feel younger for the general subjective age
than for bodily aspects of subjective age. As opposed to that, no such
difference could be expected if the information-processing explanation
was accurate. We would in that case, on the contrary, expect the bod-
ily subjective age to be rather younger, since the difference between
today’s elderly people and former generations is most salient for bodily
aspects (e.g. health, fitness, or physical appearance).
Therefore I suggest the following hypothesis, assuming a motivational
component:
Hypothesis V: The general subjective age is younger than the sub-
jective age regarding bodily aspects like fitness or attractiveness.
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5.1.3 A Predictive Model of Subjective Age
In Section 2.2 a correlative model has been developed on the basis of previous
findings, suggesting that numerous variables are connected with subjective
age.
A goal of this study was to further analyze the relationship of several of
those variables, thus providing a structural model of subjective age predic-
tors.
Of all the correlates that were found in the literature, two groups of
variables can be presumed to be especially important predictors for subjective
age:
1. Bodily aspects like health state and satisfaction with ones fitness and
attractiveness :
Whereas self-concept and subjectivity have traditionally been concep-
tualized in terms of the mind, more recent work has focused increasingly
on the body (cf. Catterall & Maclaran, 2001; Shilling, 1993 and Turner,
1996).
This greater emphasis on the body challenges a long-standing philo-
sophical and academic tradition of accepting a mind-body dichotomy,
whereby the body is a vessel that encases the active mind. In this
ontological dualism of the Platonic-Christian tradition body and soul
are seen as hierarchical opposites. This traditional view still influences
not only our everyday understanding but also scientific work (Nu´n˜ez,
2001). O¨berg (1996) for example points out the paradox that in social
gerontology the body has been absent to a considerable extent, despite
the fact that aging is experienced via the body. Post-structuralists have
questioned this body-mind dichotomy by pointing out the importance
of the body to a person’s self-concept (Catterall & Maclaran, 2001).
Shilling (1993) and Turner (1996) assumed that in postmodern west-
ern societies the body is increasingly central to the self-concept. Turner
(1996) argued that the increased importance of the body as constitutive
of the self is a feature of post-modern consumer culture with its promi-
nence of body images and emphasis on pleasure, desire, and playfulness.
There is obviously a strong commercial and consumerist interest in the
body as a sign of good life and an indicator of cultural capital. In
addition to this theme of consumption there is a specific focus on the
beautiful body, on the denial of the aging body, on the importance of
sport and on the general moral value of keeping fit. Thus, post-modern
consumer culture highlights the significance of the body as a personal
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resource and as a social symbol, which gives off messages of a person’s
identity. Catterall and Maclaran (2001) point out that subjective age
reflects therefore wider expectations that we must maintain a youthful,
fit body. A young and healthy body is supposed to be a sign of a young
and healthy mind.
The importance of the body is also reflected in concerns about health
and loss of physical strength and agility, which have been identified as
the main concern of the older consumer in a major study of the U.S.
population (Moschis, Lee, Mathur, & Strautman, 2000).
It can therefore be expected that bodily aspects are good predictors
for a young subjective age. This connection has been confirmed in
previous studies for the respondents’ health state (Baum & Boxley,
1983; George et al., 1980; Gwinner & Stephens, 2001; Markides &
Boldt, 1983; Markides & Ray, 1988; Mutran & George, 1982; Sirgey
et al., 1991) as well as attractiveness (Guiot, 2001); see also Section
2.2.
The variable of bodily fitness was included newly in this work, it has
to my knowledge not yet been examined in earlier studies on subjective
age correlates.
2. General life satisfaction and Personality aspects like self-efficacy belief
and optimism:
Myers and Diener (1995) showed that positivity bias is stronger for
people with high life satisfaction, self-efficacy belief and optimism. It
was therefore hypothesized that life satisfaction, self-efficacy belief, and
optimism correlate with a young subjective age, assuming that the
general tendency to a young subjective age is a special case of positivity
bias.
The connection of subjective age with self-efficacy belief and satisfac-
tion has already been shown in previous literature (cf. Baum & Boxley,
1983; Barak & Gould, 1985; George et al., 1980; Mutran & George,
1982). The variable of optimism has to my knowledge never been ex-
amined in earlier studies, and was newly included here.
The following behavioral variables were newly included in this study and
are also hypothesized to correlate with subjective age:
1. Recently learnt things: According to the socio-emotional selectivity the-
ory, which was described in Section 2.1.4 (cf. Carstensen et al., 1999;
Fung et al., 1999; Lang & Carstensen, 2002), the limited future time
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perspective that comes along with aging leads to an increased impor-
tance of emotional goals, and a decreased importance of knowledge-
oriented goals. If subjectively old people also perceive time to be more
limited than subjectively young people, we would expect them to have
less knowledge-oriented goals, that is to be less interested in learning
new things.
2. Openness for new media: For the same reason, we would expect subjec-
tively young people to be more interested in interacting with computers,
e-mail and internet, but also gadgets like mobile phones, since dealing
with these media means also having constantly to learn new things.
3. Engaging in “youth-preserving” activities: There are a lot of activities
that are supposed to delay the process of aging (or at least the process
of looking or feeling older) like exercise, healthy food, cosmetic prod-
ucts, surgery, youthful clothing, memory training, and so forth. If at
least some of these activities are useful—or entail effort justification—,
engaging in them should lead to a young subjective age.
Demographic correlates are presumed not to play a very prominent role as
subjective age predictors, since previous findings showed inconsistent results.
Instead of formulating single hypotheses for each of these potentially pre-
dictive variables, the above discussed considerations are in integrated in a
hypothetical predictive model, as shown in Figure 5.1.
An additional hypothesis concerns the attitude towards old age, which is
an interesting variable, since there are two possible ways of influence: From
first intuition we would probably suppose that a negative attitude towards
old age will lead to a young subjective age, because people who view old
age negatively would try to dissociate themselves from being old. However,
Gwinner and Stephens (2001) found that people who felt older were also more
likely to hold negative attitudes towards the elderly. The authors ascribe
this finding to their highly educated sample, but there is an other possible
explanation that would speak for a real correlation between an old subjective
age and negative views of old age: a positive attitude towards aging as well
as feeling young are both genuinely positive things for an individual, both
probably correlated to life satisfaction, and therefore also to each other. In
that case, however, the correlation is expected to vanish if it is controlled for
satisfaction.
Hence I have included the attitude towards old age into the hypothetical
predictive model, where I have placed it into the same group as optimism
and self-efficacy. In addition I suggest the following hypothesis:
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subj. health
personality/
attitude
behavior
satisfaction
body
feel−age
look−age
interest−age
activity−age
subjective age
finances
cogn. abilities
computer
youth−pres.
activities
self efficacy
optimism
view of old age
phone
social life
activities
general
recently
learnt thing
sick leave
attractiveness
fitness
Figure 5.1: Predictive path model of subjective age
Hypothesis VI: A positive attitude towards aging correlates with a young
subjective age, but the correlation will disappear when controlled for
satisfaction.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
The characteristics of the sample are described in detail in Section 4.2.1.
5.2.2 Apparatus
These research questions were addressed in the same survey that was de-
scribed in the previous chapter. The entire standardized questionnaire is
included in Appendix A. In the following, the constituent questions or scales
that are relevant for this chapter will be described (the items have here been
translated into English by the author).
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1. Subjective Age Measures
The study used nine items to determine the participants’ comparative
subjective age 1 in general as well as regarding specific domains. The
domains covered bodily, cognitive and social aspects of how old one
feels.
One item measured the subjective age in general with the question: “If
you compare yourself to people your age, how old do you feel in gen-
eral?” There were five answer possibilities ranging from “much older”
to “much younger”.
Eight items then covered specific bodily, social and cognitive domains
of subjective age:
If you compare yourself to people your age and think about different
life domains, how old do you feel, regarding:
• your bodily fitness?
• your activities?
• your relations to other people?
• your interests?
• your mental abilities?
• your esteem by society?
• your esteem by your family and friends?
• your attractiveness?
For every item, there were again the same five answer possibilities rang-
ing from “much older” to “much younger”.
Four of these overall nine items corresponded to Kastenbaum et al.’s
(1972) four aspects of subjective age (“ages of me”): the general feeling
( = feel-age), the activities ( = activity-age), the interests ( = interest-
age), and the attractiveness ( = look-age)
Additionally, the participants were asked how old they felt in years,
how old other persons would estimate them and how old they would
prefer to be.
1Since the age range of the participants in this study was not much more than a decade
(58–70 years), the subjective age was not measured with the more frequently used subjec-
tive age measure “age-decade scale” (Barak, 1987; Kastenbaum et al., 1972). Instead, a
comparative age measure for the various domains was used, presenting answer possibilities
from “much older” to “much younger”
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2. Health Measures
There were two items regarding the health state of the participants,
one on the general subjective health state, asking: “How would you
characterize your general health state?”, with five answer possibilities
from “very good” to “very bad”.
Another item referred to behavioral consequences of the health state,
asking: “How many times have you been ill in the past 12 month, so that
you could not accomplish important everyday tasks?”, with five answer
possibilities: “never”, “once”, “twice to three times”, “more than three
times”, and “chronically”.
3. Demographic Measures
Several demographic specifications were asked with direct standard-
ized questions, which have been described in Section 4.2.2 (see also
Appendix A): sex, year of birth, education level, professional status,
and retirement status (retired vs not yet retired).
4. Psychographic Measures
Self-Efficacy: This study’s measurement of perceived self-efficacy re-
lied on five items of the German Version of Jerusalem and Schwarzer’s
(1981) General Self-Efficacy Scale. The items have been specified in
Section 4.2.2.
Optimism: The respondent’s optimism was measured with five items
of Scheier and Carver’s (1985) Optimism Scale (German translation by
Wieland-Eckelmann & Carver, 1990).
The items were here re-translated into the English language, the origi-
nal wording can be seen in the questionnaire in Appendix A.
• I always face the future optimistically.
• Things are never never developing the way I would like them to.
• I always see the good side of things.
• I believe in the idea that bad days will be followed by good days.
• I seldom pay attention to the good things that are happening to
me.
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There were five answer possibilities to rate every statement: from “I
strongly agree” to “I strongly disagree”.
Satisfaction: There was a satisfaction scale of ten items asking the
respondents how satisfied they were with different life domains, as was
described in Section 4.2.2.
Attitude Towards Aging: The measurement of the respondents’
attitude towards aging is also described in more detail in Section 4.2.2:
(a) There was a scale of three direct questions asking the respondents
how positive or negative they judged higher age.
(b) Additionally, there was a scale with associative ratings providing
information as to how positively or negatively associated a respon-
dent’s image of older age was.
5. Behavioral Measures
Work with Computer, E-mail and Internet: Respondents were
asked how often they worked on a computer or with e-mail or Internet.
There were five answer possibilities to both questions (“not at all” to
“several times a week”). The midpoint values of responses to both items
were averaged to obtain a scale.
Mobile Phone: There was one item asking the respondents if they
have a mobile phone or not.
Learning New Things: Respondents were asked what they had
learnt in the last few years. They were given five answer suggestions
(e.g., a foreign language, working with the computer, etc.) and were
asked to mark with a cross every appropriate answer. Furthermore,
they were given free space to list additional things that they had learnt.
The number of crosses and free answers were counted.
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Engaging in “Youth-preserving” Activities: Respondents were
asked what they did to feel or appear youthful. They were given eight
answer suggestions (e.g., taking exercise, dying hair, training memory
skills etc.) and were asked to mark with a cross every appropriate an-
swer. Furthermore, they were given free space to list additional things.
The number of crosses and free answers were counted.
5.2.3 Procedure
The explorative interviews and the questionnaire study were realized as de-
scribed in Section 4.2.3. For the data analysis, the following statistical pro-
cedures were used: Structural equation modeling with AMOS (Version 4.0);
scale reliability analyses, t-tests, factor analyses, correlations and multiple
regression analyses with SPSS (Version 11.0), and testing for significant dif-
ferences between correlations with COR (Version 1.1) by Staufenbiel (2001).
5.3 Results and Discussion
5.3.1 Qualitative Interviews
Feeling Old
In the explorative interviews we have asked the participants:
“Do you sometimes feel old or older?”. 2
This question is strictly speaking not an open question, since it would
be possible to answer it only in terms of “yes” or “no”. Nevertheless, the
participants always gave more precise and explaining answers, some of which
will be presented in the following. The answers will here be translated in
English; the original answers in German are reprinted in Appendix B.
The majority of the participants gave a rather clear“no”, saying that they
did not feel old or older:
A teacher who had voluntarily retired at the age of 62—just two months
before the interview took place—said: “Not at all. My working efficiency and
ability is still very good, in comparison to colleagues, several of whom are
completely burnt out.”
2Paradoxically, older is by most people considered as younger than old—or also as
“not as bad as old”. It is possible that older is not seen always as a comparison to old
(in the sense of the grammatical forms of comparison: old, older, oldest), but equally as
a comparison to young, so that the rank order of increasing age would then rightly be:
young, older, old.
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An other 62-year old man said: “No, and I know also that I give the
impression of being younger than I am. (...) I am not very tolerant towards
elderly people. For example, they often get on my nerves when they are so
slow, when they get in my way, for instance when I go shopping, or in public
transports.”
One woman said: “I am now 67 years old, but I do not have the feeling
that I am getting old or older. I don’t know how I will be later, the way I
will be and if I will be fine. But at the moment I have the feeling that I’m
living and I’m doing fine.”
A 67-year old man stated also quite unmistakably: “No, actually I never
feel older or even old. (...) I am just amazed at the fact that I should be older
than 60 already!” At a different point of the interview she illustrated this
further with an example: “One day our municipal community here invited the
people who were 60–70 years old, in order to hear their wishes and concerns.
Somehow I did not feel that this addressed me at all.”
So these people clearly distanced themselves from being old or belonging
to the category of the elderly. The last quoted man did not even feel addressed
by an invitation for people his age, even though the invitation was directed
in a quite neutral way to the “60-70-year old”, thus avoiding to categorize
these people as elderly or seniors. It seems however that “60-70 years old” is
not really considered as neutral by this man, but already as a category he
does not feel he belongs to.
In all statements it is clear that to feel old is something rather negative.
Only two of the 13 persons stated clearly that they did feel old or at least
older. Interestingly, the two were a couple (but were interviewed indepen-
dently).
The husband, who was 67 years old, stated that he felt “older at any rate,
yes”, older being for him clearly less negative than old, which was a term that
he was reluctant to use.
His wife put it in a more straightforward way: “I don’t really see this as
a problem. With 66 years you are old, for 66 years you have lived, and so
many things are not to come any more, and this is simply a fact. This is
also why I don’t dye my hair and all these things. Sometimes it is not so
easy either, for example when I go shopping and want to buy clothes. But as
long as you don’t lose your humor, the older age shows also its beautiful side.
(...) The memories, for instance, are something beautiful, telling stories to
my grandson or so.”
So, this woman was the only one of the participants who agreed fully with
being in the category of the old.
Another woman was much more ambivalent and showed a very pro-
nounced discrepancy between the way she felt, and the social category of
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“being old” which she thought she belonged to: “Well, I do not feel old.
Older—this—I feel it only through my environment: that I am getting older.
When I am going to the baths and want to buy my ticket, they ask me:
‘are you a retiree?’ [therefore entitled to enter at a reduced price]. There
it annoys me, but I find myself very often as an elderly woman now, and
this—I have to get over this somehow—this is what I am. It’s what I am,
and I know it’s what I am, but I don’t feel like that.”
This statement is a very revealing illustration of the fact that the age
identity of people in that age is very ambivalent and holds a potential for
inner conflict.
Personal Definitions and Criteria of Old Age
We were furthermore interested in how the participants would define old
age, that is, what criteria would have to be fulfilled so that a person would
say: “now I am old”, or “now I feel old”. Therefore, the persons who said
that they already felt old were asked since when this had been the case. On
the other hand, the persons who did not feel old were asked what would
have to happen for them to feel old, and at which point they would start to
consider themselves as old. All of the persons were asked if there were special
situations or circumstances when they felt more or less old.
There were several criteria that seemed to be substantial for “being old”:
1. Bodily decline:
• “if my legs feel heavy”
• “the wrinkles on my skin”
• “Since I have hurt my knee on a walk. At that moment I realized:
You are not like the young anymore.”
• “A year ago, after that shoulder accident, I felt old as the hills.
That feeling was over as soon as the shoulder was cured. At that
time, age was negatively charged, so sapless and feeble, exhausted,
tired out, finished. (...) When I don’t feel well physically, it can
happen that I sometimes feel older, but as strong as after the
shoulder accident—there it was really very bad.
• “The libido is not as strong anymore. Everything that is corporeal
is not as full of relish as it was formerly.”
• “The rheumatic pains, the heart rhythm disturbance—, one is not
actually quite young anymore!”
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2. Retirement:
• “In the last months, since I was retired, I thought many a time:
Now you have put yourself on the scrap heap, with the early re-
tirement.”
• “(...) that I don’t have a concrete task anymore like I had in my
job formerly.”
3. Inner feeling:
• “(...) however, this is not a constant feeling. It’s stronger if I don’t
feel so well.”
• “My age is determined by my inner well-being”
4. Being out-of-date, incompetent:
• “(...) to have deficits, efficiency and motivation deficits, not to be
professionally and technically up-to-date anymore”.
• “(...) if I don’t continue with my professional develop-
ment/permanent education.
5. Experience:
• “... but on the other hand: the experience with patients [in the
psychiatrist’s practice]. There the age is an advantage. This is
sometimes even explicitly demanded by the patients, that they
want somebody who is already older.”
6. Limitation of the future:
• “The age has rather an impact through the choices I make myself,
for instance that I withdraw from certain roles. The awareness
that I have only a certain number of years left has more impact
than that I would feel something.”
7. Social roles:
• “... when I am with my grandchildren”.
8. Calendric age limit:
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• “From 80 years on, people are old for me, there I would set the
limit”.
Thus, the feeling of being old can be grounded on a variety of charac-
teristics. Most of all bodily aspects—mostly deficits—were named. This
confirms the view of O¨berg (1996) who asserts that aging is mostly experi-
enced through the body.
Reflections about Youth
Another way of approaching the question of attitudes towards aging is to
look at the contrary of old age: youth. We have therefore analyzed those
statements occurring during the interviews that alluded to young people or
youth in general. Additionally, we have included into the interview-guideline
the explicit question if the interviewee would like to be young again.
Of all 13 respondents only one woman said that she would: “I would like
to start being 30 again. I would have liked to become a veterinarian.” And
later in the interview she added: “Young people are freer and more daring.”
On the other hand, there were three respondents who stated unambigu-
ously that they would by no means like to be young again:
• “No, to be young is not what I would prefer to be. Nor would I want
any of their [young persons’] characteristics.”
• “I don’t envy them [young people] at all.”
• “I wouldn’t like to be young again. At the moment no characteristic of
youth occurs to me that I would like to have.”
All other respondents were a bit more ambivalent: They all stated quite
clearly that they would not want to be young again (especially not nowadays,
as several of the respondents emphasized), however, they acknowledged that
there were positive aspects of youth that they missed sometimes, or that
their higher age had also serious disadvantages:
• “Nowadays I would not want to be young again (...) [e.g., there are very
different conditions of studying medicine today]. But I am not glad to
be as old as I am, no, I couldn’t say this either. I would judge higher
age rather negatively (...). The end simply approaches irrevocably, and
I don’t find this so funny.”
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• “I would not want it [being young] any more, in spite of everything.
I’m sometimes afraid about what might await them [the young].”
• “Well, there is this feeling sometimes [that I want to be young again],
but the other thing is more frequent, that I am glad to be so old.” The
feeling of wanting to be young again occurs “(...) mostly regarding my
physical ability and fitness, for example when I go mountain climbing.
Or also regarding the relations to the opposite sex. These are rare
moments where this feeling flares up.”
• “Well I have been young, I wouldn’t want this anymore. It’s so normal
actually. Life has its beautiful aspects in each stage.” (...) “I do envy
them [the young] their vitality (...) a certain insouciance and the mental
agility.”
• “I would not want to be young again, no, but I would like to stay as
I am now, as long as possible. This is really something that bothers
me, that the future is so limited now. When I was younger I never had
this feeling, this awareness that I will not be able to do everything in
my life that I would like to do. For example regarding traveling: there
are lots of beautiful places on earth which I will probably never get to
know, simply because there is not enough time for everything.”
Thus, there were different aspects that these persons see as problems of
higher age: one negative aspect seems to be the bodily decline, and as a
consequence the decreasing fitness and attractiveness. Further, the mental
ability and flexibility of younger people seem to be an enviable characteristic
of younger people. An altogether different consideration is the increasingly
limited future perspective, which is clearly a threatening aspect of higher
age, independently of how positive or negative this stage of life is judged in
general.
5.3.2 Evaluation of the Measurement Models
In the following, the operationalization of the variables in the questionnaire
will be evaluated. Some of the here relevant variables (namely the satisfac-
tion, the attitude towards aging, and the self-efficacy belief) have already
been assessed in the last chapter and will therefore not be included in this
description.
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Structural Measurement Model of Subjective Age
One of the objectives of this work was to evaluate Kastenbaum et al’s (1972)
model of subjective age, which has often been used, especially in marketing
psychology (cf. Barak et al., 2001a; Barak et al., 2001b; Barak & Rahtz,
1990; Mathur et al., 2001; Staats, 1996; Staats et al., 1993), but was never
evaluated or compared with other measures of subjective age.
The measurement model of subjective age will therefore be analyzed in
more detail than the other variables, the assessment including not only reli-
ability and factor analysis, but also a structural equation model in order to
determine the fit of the measurement model with the empirical data. Struc-
tural equation modeling has the advantage of simultaneously estimating the
strength of each relationship within the model and explicitly accounting for
error variance.
Table 5.1 shows the means and item-total statistics of the subjective age
scale comprising all nine items that were acquired in this study. That is, the
scale included not only Kastenbaum et al.’s items (items 1, 3, 4, and 9: “feel-
age”, “activity-age”, “interest-age”, and “look-age”) but also five additional
items concerning other aspects of subjective age.
Item: Mean Corrected Alpha
(domain of subjective age) score item-total if item
correlation deleted
general feeling 3.73 .63 .84
fitness 3.51 .57 .85
activities 3.65 .62 .84
relations to others 3.56 .54 .85
interests 3.66 .54 .85
mental abilities 3.53 .56 .84
esteem by society 3.46 .60 .84
esteem by family and friends 3.63 .59 .84
attractiveness 3.49 .62 .84
Table 5.1: Reliability analysis: means and item-total statistics for the mea-
surement of subjective age
The scale proved to be internally stable with Cronbach’s alpha = .86; all
corrected item-total-correlations were larger than .5.
When only those items were joined to a scale that formed Kastenbaum
et al’s (1972) scale (items 1, 3, 4, and 9), Cronbach’s alpha decreased to
.74; all four corrected item-total-correlations being larger than .4. This still
represents an satisfactory reliability. The shortness of this reduced scale is
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certainly an advantage regarding the usability of the scale—given that it is
still reliable—because the economy of a scale is an important criterion for
most questionnaire studies.
Figure 5.2 shows a structural equation model that represents Kastenbaum
et al’s four aspects of subjective age.
The modeling was realized with AMOS, a program that uses full informa-
tion maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation as an own built-in imputation
procedure to deal with missing values. The details of the estimation can be
viewed in Appendix C.
The goodness of fit of this model proved to be high; χ2(2) = 1.223,
p = .542, TLI = 1.00, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00. Especially the chi-square
was astonishingly low (and the p-value accordingly high), given the fact that
these criterions are usually not used because they are considered to be too
severe to be realistic (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Since the chi-square value is
sample-sensitive, it is especially difficult to obtain non-significant p-values
for large sample sizes. Thus, it appears safe to say here that Kastenbaum’s
model fitted the empirical data exceptionally well.
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Figure 5.2: Structural measurement model of subjective age, based on Kas-
tenbaum et al.’s “ages of me”
Adding more items, as well as exchanging one or more of Kastenbaum et
al’s items with any other of the nine items resulted in a dramatic decrease
of the goodness of fit, all modified models showing chi-squares larger than
χ2(2) = 11 (p < .01), and RMSEA larger than .1. This is a clear confirmation
of the first hypothesis suggesting that Kastenbaum et al’s (1972) four aspects
are a good measurement model for subjective age.
This high model fit suggests that the structure of Kastenbaum et al.’s
(1972) four aspects of subjective age is one-dimensional. A factor analysis
including those four items showed indeed that they all load on the same
factor (see Appendix C). However, including all nine items in a factor analysis
provided two factors, as can be seen in Table 5.2 (cf. also Appendix C).
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Component
1 2
general feeling .626
fitness .944
activities .730
relations to others .827
interests .801
mental abilities .743
esteem by society .644
esteem by family and friends .579
attractiveness .798
Table 5.2: Principal component analysis with different aspects of subjective
age: rotated component matrix (Oblimin with Kaiser normalization, absolute
values less than .3 suppressed)
This finding contradicts the second hypothesis: the construct of subjective
age seems to consist not only of one but of two—though not independent—
factors. A possible interpretation of the two factors is that Factor 1 covers
the cognitive and social aspects, whereas Factor 2 covers the rather body-
oriented aspects of subjective age.
If the term dimension is interpreted as independent factor, even the nine
items that loaded on two different factors do not belong to different dimen-
sions, as can be seen clearly in the component plot in Figure 5.3.
Thus, these findings confirmed only the first part of Hypothesis II: The
model of Kastenbaum et al. (1972) seems indeed to be a one-dimensional
model. It is therefore not indicated to refer to these four aspects as a four-
dimensional model of subjective age. However, if more aspects of subjective
age are analyzed, it appears that the construct of subjective age consists of
two factors, one of them covering cognitive and social aspects, and the second
covering bodily aspects.
Since Kastenbaum et al’s (1972) four aspects showed to be appropriate
to measure subjective age, all of the following computations in this chapter
are based on that four-item scale instead of the expanded scale consisting of
nine items, in order to allow better comparability of the present results to
the results of previous (and hopefully future) studies.
174 5.3. Results and Discussion
Component Plot in Rotated Space
Component 1
1.0.50.0-.5-1.0
Co
mp
on
en
t 2
1.0
.5
0.0
-.5
-1.0
attractiveness
esteem by fam. + friesteem by society
mental abilities
interestsrelations to others
activities
fitness
general feeling
Figure 5.3: Principal component plot in rotated space showing different as-
pects of subjective age (Oblimin with Kaiser normalization)
Measurement of Optimism
The measurement of optimism relied on five items of Scheier and Carver’s
(1985) Optimism Scale (German translation by Wieland-Eckelmann &
Carver, 1990).
Table 5.3 shows the items of the scale with the means and item-total
statistics.
The scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .64, which is not very high but suffi-
cient, given that in this study the scale was not used to differentiate between
individuals but between groups. All corrected item-total-correlations were
above .3 and could therefore be kept in the scale.
Work with Computer, E-mail, and Internet
The two questions regarding the frequency of the respondents’ use of comput-
ers, e-mail and Internet could be joined to a reliable scale, with Cronbach’s
alpha = .87. As is shown in Table 5.4, the corrected item-total correlation
was accordingly high with r = .78.
5.3. Results and Discussion 175
Item: Mean Corrected Alpha
score item-total if item
correlation deleted
I always face the future optimistically. 1.91 .44 .57
I always see the good side of things. 1.78 .48 .56
I believe in the idea that bad days will 1.41 .46 .59
be followed by good days.
Things are never never developing the way 2.60 .32 .64
I would like them to.
I seldom pay attention to the good things 2.11 .38 .61
that are happening to me.
Table 5.3: Reliability analysis: means and item-total statistics for the mea-
surement of self-efficacy belief
Item: Mean Corrected
score item-total
correlation
How often do you use a computer? 2.57 .78
How often do you use e-mail or Internet? 2.06 .78
Table 5.4: Reliability analysis: means and item-total statistics for the vari-
able: work with computer, e-mail and Internet
It can be concluded from these analyses that all measurement models used
in this study were satisfactorily reliable, and are therefore usable instruments
to investigate the present research questions.
5.3.3 The Tendency of People to Underestimate Their
Age: Descriptive Results
The participants’ average real age was 63.65 years (SD = 3.77), but they
rated their subjective age or feel-age on average 5.57 years younger, that is
57.94 years old (SD = 6.18). They estimated the age that others would give
them 57.78 years old (SD = 5.26), i.e. 5.72 years younger than their real
age. When asked how old they would like to be, participants specified their
ideal age as 55.07 years old (SD = 12.49), that is 8.38 years younger than
their real age.
The standard deviation was higher for subjective than for real age, and
still higher for the ideal age. That is, the respondents gave less homogenous
answers when asked how old they felt or how old they would prefer to be
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than when asked about their real age.
When participants were asked to compare themselves to other people,
67.7% stated that they felt younger or very much younger, 29.7% that they
felt about equally old, and only 1.9% that they felt older or very much older
than most other people of their age cohort (see Figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.4: Answer distribution of comparative subjective age ratings
These percentages suggest that a considerable part of the participants did
not possess an accurate view concerning their own and other people’s subjec-
tive age, since it is not possible that more than 50% are younger than most
other people. Assuming that the sample was tolerably representative, the
distribution should be more or less symmetrical if the ratings were accurate.
This was clearly not the case here.
These findings were consistent with previous studies on subjective age,
all showing a considerable general underestimation of one’s age. However,
the results for the absolute subjective age showed that in this study the
discrepancies between real age and feel-age as well as ideal age were much
less pronounced than they were in former studies with other samples: For
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instance, O¨berg and Tornstam (2001) found that Swedish people in that age
group felt around 15 years younger than their real age, and the ideal age
was even around 20 years younger than the real age. It is possible that
these considerable differences between the studies were due to intercultural
differences.
5.3.4 Assessment of Two Theoretical Approaches Ex-
plaining Subjective Age Bias
Based on the self-enhancement approach, a question of this study was if
the subjective age bias implies a motivational component. The next three
hypotheses deal with this question:
Attitude Towards Aging and its Moderating Influence on Subjec-
tive Age Correlates
Hypothesis III concerns the moderating influence of the attitude towards old
age, the question being: is the correlation between a young subjective age and
a high life satisfaction stronger for people with a negative attitude towards
old age?
towards old age
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Figure 5.5: Correlation between young subjective age and high life satisfac-
tion showing a moderating effect of the attitude towards old age
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Figure 5.5 shows that this was indeed the case: for both measures of atti-
tude towards old age (the direct and the associative question), a moderating
effect on the interrelationship between subjective age and satisfaction could
be shown. People who felt young were in general more satisfied with different
aspects of their life—the correlation was in any case considerable—but this
connection was especially strong for people with a negative view of old age.
The difference between the correlations was highly significant for both mea-
sures; for the direct question: z(275, 475) = 3.15, p(one − tailed) < 0.001;
for the associative ratings: z(359, 399) = 4.71, p(one− tailed) < 0.001.
So these results so far suggested that there is a motivational component
in people feeling younger than their real age.
However, the results showed also that a negative attitude towards old
age could not entirely explain the fact that people felt more satisfied if they
felt younger than their age cohorts. Even for people with a very positive
view of old age, there was a connection between feeling young and a high life
satisfaction.
In other words, there was a moderating, not a mediating effect of the
attitude towards old age on the interrelationship of subjective age and sat-
isfaction. The general negative view of old age in our society can therefore
probably not be made entirely responsible for the fact that subjectively young
people were more satisfied with different life domains.
Correlation of subjective age with optimism and self-efficacy belief
Hypothesis IV concerned the correlation of a young subjective age with opti-
mism and self-efficacy belief. If the general age underestimation is a special
form of self-enhancement, young subjective age is supposed to correlate with
high optimism and self-efficacy belief.
The findings showed indeed such a correlation for both personality traits:
young subjective age correlates with high self-efficacy belief: r(772) = .305**,
p < .001 and with high optimism: r(772) = .303**, p < .001.
Both correlations remained also significant if controlled for satisfaction or
health state, which is important because high satisfaction and good health
do normally correlate with one another and also with a young subjective age,
and those correlations would not necessarily imply a motivational component.
So, also for this hypothesis, it can clearly be said that the self-
enhancement explanation is preferable, because those correlations would
make no sense for the information-processing explanation.
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Bodily versus general subjective age
Hypothesis V regards the question if the subjective age is younger for bodily
aspects or for the general subjective age.
The results showed that when the participants were asked about their
general subjective age (i.e. the question: “If you compare yourself to people
your age, how old do you feel in general?”) their subjective age was younger
(M = 3.72, SD = .59) than when they were asked about bodily aspects of
subjective age, i.e:
1. the subjective age regarding attractiveness (M = 3.48, SD = .79),
t(765) = 9.14; p (one− tailed) < 0.001; d = 0.35,
2. the subjective age regarding fitness (M = 3.50, SD = .80), t(780) =
8.54; p (one− tailed) < 0.001; d = 0.31.
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Figure 5.6: Answer distribution for different domains of subjective age
Figure 5.6 shows the average ratings of all subjective age domains that
were measured here, illustrating the difference between the general subjective
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age on one side and the bodily aspects (fitness and attractiveness) on the
other side.
So this result as well speaks for the self-enhancement explanation, because
people estimated themselves as younger for domains where there are less
standards and less feedback, from the mirror for example.
So the conclusion to draw from this analysis is that the phenomenon of the
subjective age bias implies a motivational component. It is not explainable
merely with an information processing approach. We makes therefore sense
to assume the subjective age bias to be a special form of the general tendency
of self-enhancement or positivity bias.
5.3.5 A Predictive Structural Equation Model of Sub-
jective Age
Table 5.5 shows the bivariate correlations between a young subjective age and
different biological and physiological, demographic, psychographic and social
psychological, and behavioral variables. Biological and physiological vari-
ables (i.e., bodily aspects like fitness and attractiveness) and psychographic
variables (optimism, satisfaction, and self-efficacy belief) show the highest
correlation with a young subjective age.
Since these bivariate correlations might be intercorrelated and are there-
fore probably not equal to the real predictive value of a variable, a multi-
ple regression analysis was performed. Out of the potential predictors that
were included into the analysis, five showed to have a significant predictive
value: (1) satisfaction with the own bodily fitness, (2) satisfaction with the
own physical attractiveness, (3) optimism, (4) the engagement in supposedly
youth-preserving activities, and (5) subjective health state. This means that
a young subjective age went together with higher satisfaction with fitness and
attractiveness, higher optimism, more activities aimed to preserve youth, and
a good health state. These five variables explained together 22.5 percent of
the variance (R = .594).
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Correlation Degrees of
with young freedom
subj. age (n− 2)
Biological and Physiological Variables
Health
Good self-descriptive general health .387 ** 787
Low frequency of sick leave .229 ** 783
Satisfaction with physical attractiveness .432 ** 760
Satisfaction with fitness .454 ** 769
Demographic Variables
Sex (male) .058 788
Marital status
Being married .005 780
Living in a partnership .001 780
Chronological age .019 775
High education .069 * 787
High professional status .162 ** 785
Being retired -.125 ** 787
Psychographic and Social Psych. Variables
High self-efficacy belief .305 ** 772
High optimism .303 ** 772
High life satisfaction .483 ** 773
Social support
Frequency of contact to different people -.013 780
Supportiveness of different contacts .005 779
Positive attitude towards aging
Direct question .271 ** 765
Associative question .154 ** 771
Behavioral Variables
Amount of recently learnt things .162 ** 700
Amount of supposedly youth-preserving activities .309 ** 781
Working with computer, e-mail and internet .207 ** 785
Using a mobile phone .125 ** 788
Table 5.5: Pearson correlations between subjective age and different vari-
ables; *p < .05; **p < .01
182 5.3. Results and Discussion
Table 5.6 shows the coefficients for the dependent variable subjective age.
Cross validation proved the model to be internally stable, both halves
of the randomly split sample showing approximately equal R-values;
z(390/402) = 1.02, p(two− tailed) = .31, see also Appendix C.
Unstandardized Standardized
coefficients coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 4.647 .120 38.726 .000
Fitness -.106 .033 -.181 -3.203 .001
Attractiveness -.142 .033 -.222 -4.336 .000
Optimism -.152 .042 -.155 -3.644 .000
youth-preserving act. .049 .014 .155 3.614 .000
Optimism -.128 .036 -.178 -3.563 .000
Table 5.6: Stepwise multiple regression: coefficients for the dependent vari-
able subjective age
To further explore the relationships between various predictors and sub-
jective age, structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test for signifi-
cant relationships.
Figure 5.7 shows the final path model, which is based on the hypothetical
model as shown in Figure 5.1.
Again, the modeling was realized with AMOS, that is, full information
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used. The details of the estima-
tion can be viewed in Appendix C.
The chi-square fit index was χ2(160) = 670.72, p < .001. A significant chi-
square statistic signifies that the model differs significantly from the empirical
data. However, since the chi-square statistic is sensitive to sample-sizes, it
has been found to over-reject substantially true-population models in settings
with large sample sizes (cf. Hu & Bentler, 1998; Backhaus, 1996). Thus, the
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) were additionally examined,
the RMSEA being especially appropriate for complex models. All of these
indices provide evidence of adequate model fit; TLI = .97, CFI = .97, RMSEA
= .09.
The model can therefore be accepted. It shows that all included latent
variables were meaningful predictors for subjective age, the best predictors
being bodily aspects and satisfaction.
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Figure 5.7: Predictive structural equation model of subjective age
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As it can be seen in the structural model, there is a significant path be-
tween the respondents’ attitude towards higher age and the subjective age.
A positive attitude towards higher age correlated positively with a young
subjective age; for the direct question: r(767) = .271, p < .001; for the asso-
ciative ratings: r(773) = .154, p < .001. This corresponds to the unexpected
findings of Gwinner and Stephens (2001), suggesting that these findings were
not just, as the authors assumed, measurement artifacts due to sample irreg-
ularities, but that they reflect correlations that do exist in the population. In
the sixth hypothesis it was suggested that this correlation can be explained
by a higher life satisfaction of both people with positive attitudes towards
higher age and subjectively young people. For the associative ratings, the
correlation between feeling young and viewing higher age positively indeed
disappeared when controlled for satisfaction, r(757) = .02, p = .67. However,
for the direct question, the correlation remained significant, r(749) = .15, p
= .001.
Hypothesis VI was thus only partly confirmed: life satisfaction can not
entirely explain the counter-intuitive fact that respondents who felt young
had at the same time a positive view of old age.
5.4 Conclusion
The findings presented in this chapter support the classic measurement model
of subjective age developed by Kastenbaum et al. (1972) that consists of four
aspects, the so-called ‘ages of me’. However, it could be shown that these
four aspects cannot be interpreted as different dimensions as it was often
done in previous literature (e.g., Barak et al., 2001b; Barak & Stern, 1986),
but that the model is one-dimensional. The evaluation of this measurement
model suggests that the model can be recommended for further use, since
it has both exceptionally good fit indices as well as economic advantages,
consisting of only four items.
The results showed further that the phenomenon of the subjective age
bias implies a motivational—that is, self-enhancing—component. This does
not rule out an influence of the fact that elderly people really may look
younger today; what was shown here is only that this simpler approach is
not sufficient as an explanation. So we can assume that the subjective age
bias is a special form of the general tendency of self-enhancement or positivity
bias. It would make sense to include this theoretical frame in future studies
of the phenomenon, because there is a rich body of research in the field of
self-enhancement which has so far been ignored by studies of subjective age.
The predictive path model of subjective age showed that bodily aspects
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explain the largest part of the variance of subjective age. The importance of
the body in the experience of aging was further shown in the factor analysis of
the different aspects of subjective age, where the general feeling of subjective
age loads higher on the factor comprising bodily aspects than on the factor
comprising cognitive and social aspects. Also in the qualitative interviews,
bodily deficits were named most frequently as characteristics of old age. All
these findings confirmed the view of O¨berg (1996) that aging is experienced to
a large extend via the body, which is not enough taken into account by social
gerontological research. It would thus be important for further research in
the social gerontological field to overcome the still present implicit dualism
of the Platonic-Christian tradition—seeing body and mind as hierarchical
opposites—and include considerations about the body increasingly into the
studies (O¨berg, 1996).
The structural equation model showed further that psychographic vari-
ables like satisfaction, personality and attitude towards aging are also valid
predictors for subjective age. That is, people who feel especially young are
more satisfied with their lives, have high self-efficacy belief and are optimistic.
Interestingly, they even have a more positive attitude towards aging. Thus,
the tendency to feel younger than one’s calendric age seems not to be the
consequence of a negative image of old age. However, it could be shown
that the connection between a young subjective age and high satisfaction
was stronger for people with a negative attitude towards aging. A possible
interpretation of these findings would be that our view of old age has an
influence on how important it is for our well-being to feel young. A negative
view of old age does apparently not make people feel especially young, but it
may have the effect that people get more unhappy if they feel old. Of course,
the causal direction of this interpretation remains speculation. It would be
interesting to prove this hypothesis with an experimental design, for exam-
ple activating negative or positive associations to old age in the subjects and
then comparing the connection between feeling happy and feeling young.
The predictive value of the number of recently learnt things on the sub-
jective age can be interpreted in the framework of socio-emotional selectivity
theory: People who perceive their future time perspective as more limited
have been shown to focus more on emotional and less on knowledge-oriented
goals (e.g., Carstensen, 1992; Carstensen et al., 1999; Carstensen et al.,
in press; Fung & Carstensen, in press; Fung et al., 1999). Learning new
things can clearly be seen as knowledge-oriented behavior. The fact that sub-
jectively younger respondents specified more things that they had recently
learnt indicates that to feel young might be linked to a less limited time
perspective—in other words, people who feel young might indeed perceive
death as further away than people who feel old.
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Engaging in activities that are supposed to delay the process of aging (like
exercise, cosmetic activities, healthy eating, memory training, etc.) was also
a significant predictor for a young subjective age. The conclusion that these
activities are therefore effective means of preventing people from feeling old
is, however, only one way of interpreting this result. It is equally possible
that these activities lead to effort justification, in the sense that people think
that they must feel younger than other people if they do more for their
looks, health, fitness and so on. It is even possible that the causal direction
is inverse—that feeling young causes people to behave more youthfully. An
experimental design might rule out the last interpretation, but not the impact
of effort justification.
The finding that demographics, on the other hand, explain no significant
part of the variance has consequences for marketing psychology. It implies
that to get information about subjective age persons have to be questioned
directly. The information cannot be derived from more easily available data,
like sex, education, profession, family demographics, and so forth.
As expected, the respondents felt in general considerably younger than
their calendric age. The comparison to a study in Sweden (O¨berg & Torn-
stam, 2001), however, indicated that the respondents of the present study
showed a much smaller discrepancy between their subjective and chronolog-
ical age. To learn more about the reasons for these intercultural differences
it might be interesting to compare the self-enhancing tendencies, as well as
to analyze the images of aging and the attitude towards higher age of these
different cultures.
Chapter 6
General Conclusion
My intention is to tell
of bodies changed to different
forms.
The heavens and all below them,
Earth and her creatures,
All change,
And we, part of creation,
Also must suffer change.
Ovid
Metamorphoses
The findings of the present work allow us to draw one major conclusionthat is shared by both empirical studies—holding for identity contents
as well as for age identity: the development of identity with older adults is
characterized by a high degree of continuity.
This was shown on one side for the domains of self-definition, where very
few changes could be measured: there were only few differences between re-
tired and not retired persons—with small effect sizes—, and no or only small
correlations between increasing age and the importance of self-definition do-
mains. The most significant effect of retirement on people’s self-description
was found for leisure time activities that appeared to be more important for
retired than for working people. There were some surprising persistences af-
ter retirement where changes could have been expected, the most surprising
finding being probably that the professional identity was as important for
the retired as for the working persons. It was not substituted by a kind of
‘retiree identity’. Neither were there any differences in the domains of vol-
unteer work and memberships in clubs or associations: these were not more
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important for retired than for working people.
On the other side this continuity was also shown regarding the respon-
dents’ subjective age, which was in most cases younger that the calendric
age.
Recent findings with older age-groups suggest that this high internal con-
tinuity is also met by a high stability in the health state. It could be shown
for example in the Swiss Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on the Oldest
Old (SWILSO-O) that even in very old age a continuity of physical health—in
good as well as bad health—was the most frequent pattern of aging. Over a
period of five years, a decline of health concerned only one out of five persons
over 80 years (Lalive-d’Epinay et al., 2001; Spini, 2001).
We have also seen that in general, the retired persons estimated more do-
mains of self-description as important than did the not yet retired persons—
no domain at all was getting less important after retirement. That is, the
identity diversity was higher for the retired than for the not yet retired per-
sons. The fact that high identity diversity correlated with a high satisfaction
across different life domains speaks also for continuity and against the dis-
engagement theory. The finding suggests that role disengagement is neither
the normal nor the most successful way of aging. We might on the contrary
assume positive consequences for people who maintain a high identity diver-
sity, or even show an increase of identity diversity. (This is, however, only a
hypothesis, since no causal direction can be inferred in this study.)
Thus, we can assume that the transition to retirement and to higher age
does not imply a lot of changes in personal identities. It seems not to be a
transition that leads to identity crises and transformations. This does not
mean that the life situation of persons does not undergo substantial changes,
but these appear not to have a strong influence on personal identities.
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1Leitfaden für Explorationen zum Thema
"Identitäten beim Älterwerden"
Fassung 19. 7. 2001
Eine Arbeitsgruppe beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie wir Menschen uns sehen, wenn wir
zwischen 55 und 70 Jahre alt sind. Ich danke Ihnen, dass Sie bereit sind, dazu einige
Fragen zu beantworten.
Selbstverständlich können Sie Fragen, die Ihnen in irgend einer Weise unangenehm sind,
nicht beantworten. Wir gehen dann einfach zum nächsten Punkt über. Sie können dieses
Gespräch auch jederzeit abbrechen, wenn Sie dafür irgend einen Grund sehen. Ich denke
aber, es sind nur ganz normale und alltägliche Themen, die ich ansprechen möchte.
1. Welche Antworten würden Sie geben auf die Frage "Wer bin ich" ? Durch welche
Merkmale würden Sie sich beschreiben?
• Und durch was noch?
• Und durch was noch?
Evtl. Nachfrage, falls vor allem Adjektive genannt werden: „Sie haben jetzt vor allem beschrieben,
wie sie sind, können Sie noch mehr dazu sagen, wer Sie sind?“
 
• Wie wichtig sind diese Eigenschaften oder Rollen für Sie?
• Welches ist die wichtigste?
 
• Wie wichtig ist Ihr (ehemaliger) Beruf (der Beruf Ihres Mannes) für Sie? (Bitte erläutern
lassen)
• Wie wichtig war Ihr ehemaliger Beruf (der Beruf Ihres Mannes) für Sie im Alter zwischen 55
und 60 Jahren?
2. Wenn Sie sich heute mit früher, also mit der Zeit vor 10 oder 20 Jahren
vergleichen, welche Veränderungen sind da eingetreten?
Welche wichtigeren Veränderungen haben Sie persönlich in den letzten 10/20 Jahren erlebt bei
den Menschen Ihrer Umwelt - Menschen aus Ihrer Familie, Ihrer Nachbarschaft, Ihrem Freundes-
kreis, den Organisationen, denen Sie angehören, Ihrer Wohngemeinde (der Schweiz, der
"Gesellschaft"), Erwartungen und Normen?
Welche wichtigeren Veränderungen haben Sie persönlich in den letzten 10/20 Jahren erlebt in der
dinglichen Umwelt - Ihrer Wohnung, Ihrer Wohngemeinde (der Schweiz, der Welt)?
Welche wichtigeren Veränderungen haben Sie persönlich in den letzten 10/20 Jahren erlebt an
Ihrem Körper, an der Art und Weise, wie Sie Ihren Körper wahrnehmen und mit ihm umgehen?
Welche wichtigeren Veränderungen haben Sie persönlich in den letzten 10/20 Jahren erlebt an
den Aufgaben, die Sie erfüllen - Aufgaben im Beruf, in der Familie, in der Freizeit, in
Organisationen?
2Welche wichtigeren Veränderungen haben Sie persönlich in den letzten 10/20 Jahren erlebt an
Ihrer Person - Ihren Fähigkeiten, Ihren Eigenschaften, Ihren Zielen, Ihren Werten und
Einstellungen?
• Sind Sie heute in einigen Dingen anders sind als früher?
• In welchen Dingen?
• Welche Gefühle haben Sie dabei?
3. Wenn Sie sich heute mit der Zeit in 10 oder 20 Jahren vergleichen, welche
Veränderungen werden da wohl noch eintreten?
Mit welchen wichtigeren Veränderungen rechnen Sie persönlich in den nächsten 10/20 Jahren bei
den Menschen Ihrer Umwelt - Menschen aus Ihrer Familie, Ihrer Nachbarschaft, Ihrem
Freundeskreis, den Organisationen, denen Sie angehören, Ihrer Wohngemeinde (der Schweiz, der
"Gesellschaft"), Erwartungen und Normen?
Mit welchen wichtigeren Veränderungen rechnen Sie persönlich in den nächsten 10/20 Jahren in
der dinglichen Umwelt - Ihrer Wohnung, Ihrer Wohngemeinde (der Schweiz, der Welt)?
Mit welchen wichtigeren Veränderungen rechnen Sie persönlich in den nächsten 10/20 Jahren an
Ihrem Körper, an der Art und Weise, wie Sie Ihren Körper wahrnehmen und mit ihm umgehen?
Mit welchen wichtigeren Veränderungen rechnen Sie persönlich in den nächsten 10/20 Jahren an
den Aufgaben, die Sie erfüllen werden - Aufgaben im Beruf, in der Familie, in der Freizeit, in
Organisationen?
Mit welchen wichtigeren Veränderungen rechnen Sie persönlich in den nächsten 10/20 Jahren an
Ihrer Person - Ihren Fähigkeiten, Ihren Eigenschaften, Ihren Zielen, Ihren Werten und
Einstellungen?
Werden Sie in 10/20 Jahren voraussichtlich in einigen Dingen anders sein als früher? In welchen
Dingen? Welche Gefühle haben Sie, wenn Sie an diese Zeit denken?
4. Kommt Ihnen jetzt, nachdem Sie über verschiedene Veränderungen in Ihrem
Leben gesprochen haben, noch mehr in den Sinn zu der ersten Frage „Wer bin ich“?
5. Sie haben sich oben in  verschiedener Weise beschrieben. Fühlen Sie sich immer so
oder nur in bestimmten Lagen? Wovon hängt es ab, ob Sie sich  so fühlen?
• Kommt es vor, dass Ihre verschiedenen Eigenschaften, die Sie gleichzeitig oder nacheinander
inne haben, im Konflikt zueinander oder zu Ihrer Umgebung stehen?
• Wodurch werden diese Konflikte ausgelöst?
• Wie erleben Sie diese Konflikte?
• Wie wirken sie sich aus?
5. Wie wohl fühlen Sie sich als (eine Aussage über die eigene Person nennen)? (Skala)
Sehr wohl   Sehr unwohl
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Wann fühlen Sie sich wohler oder weniger wohl?
3Und wie wohl fühlen Sie sich als (zweite Aussage über die eigene Person nennen)? (Skala)
Sehr wohl   Sehr unwohl
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Wann fühlen Sie sich wohler oder weniger wohl?
Und wie wohl fühlen Sie sich als (evtl. dritte Aussage über die eigene Person nennen)? (Skala)
Sehr wohl   Sehr unwohl
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Wann fühlen Sie sich wohler oder weniger wohl?
6. ÜBERPRÜFEN, OB DIE FRAGE ZUTRIFFT
Sie haben ja in den letzten Jahren deutliche Veränderungen erlebt. Haben Sie dabei
einen richtigen Bruch in der Art und Weise, wie Sie sich sehen, erlebt?
• Wenn ja, wodurch wurde dieser Bruch ausgelöst?
• Welche Bedeutung hatte dieser Bruch für Ihr weiteres Leben?
7. Was ist Ihnen heute wichtig an Ihrer Person?
Und was war Ihnen früher, vor 10/20 Jahren, wichtig?
8. Fühlen Sie sich manchmal älter oder alt?
WENN JA: Seit wann haben Sie den Eindruck, älter oder alt zu sein?
WENN NEIN: Was müsste eintreffen, damit Sie sich als alt oder älter fühlen würden?
Ab wann würden Sie sich als alt oder älter bezeichnen?
• Von welchen Eigenschaften, die mit dem Alter zu tun haben, wird Ihr Bild von Ihnen
bestimmt?
• Wie wirkt sich Ihr Lebensalter heute (oder auch Ihr Lebensalter in 10/20 Jahren) auf die Art
und Weise aus, wie Sie sich sehen und was Sie denken?
• Wenn Sie junge Leute sehen, möchten Sie da auch noch einmal jung sein?
• Gibt es vielleicht Eigenschaften von jungen Leuten, die Sie gerne hätten?
9. Was ist Ihnen noch wichtig, wenn Sie an die Person denken, die Sie sind?
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Hilfe!
Fre ib urg,  2 9.  April 2 00 2
Fragebogen: Übergänge und Veränderungen beim Älterwerden
Sehr geehrte Dame, sehr geehrter Herr,
Der Übergang ins Rentenal ter ist ein wichtiger Moment im Prozess des
Älterwerdens und stel lt e ine gesellschaftlich defin ierte Grenze zum höheren
Alter dar. Dies, obwohl  vie le  pensionierte Menschen sich noch keineswegs al t
füh len und von ihrer Umwelt auch nicht als al t wahrgenommen werden.
Gle ichzei tig liefert der Beruf für viele Menschen e ine wichtige Identität, die nach
der Pensionierung n icht ohne weiteres durch e ine Rentneridentität abgelöst
wird.
Die Universität Fre iburg führt nun eine Umfrage bei  Menschen durch, d ie  sich
ein ige Jahre vor oder nach dem Übergang ins Rentenalter befinden.
Sie erhal ten den beil iegenden Fragebogen, wei l Sie zu e iner zufäl lig aus-
gewählten Stichprobe von 2000 EinwohnerInnen von Thun gehören, die an d ie-
ser Studie te ilehmen können. Dami t unsere Studie gelingt, sind wi r auf eine
möglichst grosse Teilnehmerzahl  angewiesen. Deshalb wären wir Ihnen sehr
dankbar, wenn Sie sich kurz Zei t nehmen würden, um den Fragebogen
auszufü l len.
Es hat sich gezeigt, dass es gut ist, wenn man dabei re la tiv rasch, ohne al lzu
lange nachzudenken, antwortet. Lassen Sie b itte  keine Fragen aus. Dies ist
kein Test, es g ib t also keine richtigen oder fa lschen Antworten. Es geht einzig
um die Erfassung von persönlichen Meinungen und Einschätzungen zur ei -
genen Person. Der Wert dieser Erhebung hängt davon ab, wie ehrl ich Sie den
lic. ph il. Ursina  Teu sche r
Dep arte me nt  für Psych olog ie
UNIVERSITÄT FREIBURG
Rte  d e Fa ucig ny 2
CH - 17 00   Freibu rg
Sch we iz
Tel: 0 26  3 00  7 6 43
Fax: 0 26  3 00  9 7 12
e -Mail:  u rs in a@te usch er.ch
URL : www.teu sche r.ch /u rsin a
For tsetzung auf der  R ücksei te
Fragebogen ausfül len. Die Befragung geschieht anonym, Sie brauchen also
Ihren Namen n icht anzugeben.
Wenn Sie uns Zusatzin formationen zukommen lassen wollen, so haben Sie am
Ende des Fragebogens Raum für e igene Anmerkungen.
Die Resul ta te der Studie werden auf der Websi te  http://www.teuscher.ch/aging
zugängl ich gemacht oder sind auf di rekte Anfrage erhältlich.
Bitte  senden Sie den ausgefül lten Fragebogen bis am 8. Mai 2002 mi t dem
bei liegenden vorfrankierten Umschlag zurück. Falls Sie diesen Termin nicht
e inhal ten können, sind wir Ihnen tro tzdem dankbar, wenn Sie uns den Frage-
bogen so bald wie möglich nachschicken.
Mit herzl ichem Dank für Ihre Mi th il fe
U. Teuscher
1. In welchem Jahr sind Sie geboren? 19 …
2. Welches ist Ihr Geschlecht? ❑ Männlich ❑ Weiblich
3. Welchen Familienstand haben Sie?
❑ Ledig ❑ Verheiratet ❑ Getrennt lebend
❑ In Lebenspartnerschaft ❑ Geschieden ❑ Verwitwet
4. Welche Schulbildung haben Sie? (Bitte alles ankreuzen, was auf Sie zutrifft)
❑ Primarschule
❑ Sekundarschule
❑ Berufsschule, Lehrabschluss
❑ Mittelschule/Kantonsschule/Gymnasium
❑ Fachhochschule/HTL/Lehrerseminar
❑ Universität/ETH
❑ Anderes: was? …………………………………………………………………………………...
5. a) Welche berufliche Tätigkeit führen Sie momentan aus bzw. haben Sie zuletzt ausge-
führt?
❑ Ich war nicht berufstätig
❑ Ungelernte Tätigkeit
❑ Angelernte Tätigkeit
❑ Tätigkeit mit Lehrabschluss
❑ Untere Kaderposition
❑ Mittlere Kaderposition
❑ Obere Kaderposition
❑ Selbständig, eher kleiner Betrieb/kleine Praxis
❑ Selbständig, eher grösserer Betrieb/grössere Praxis
❑ Anderes: was? ……………………..
b) Welchen Beruf haben oder hatten Sie? ……………………………………………………….
c) Für Pensionierte: Wie lange haben Sie an Ihrem letzten Ort gearbeitet? …… Jahre
6. Wie würden Sie Ihren allgemeinen Gesundheitszustand beschreiben?
❑ Sehr gut ❑ Gut ❑ Mittel ❑ Schlecht ❑ Sehr schlecht
7. Wie oft waren Sie in den letzten 12 Monaten krank, so dass Sie wichtige Alltagstätig-
keiten nicht mehr ausführen konnten?
❑ Nie ❑ Einmal ❑ Zwei- bis dreimal     ❑ Mehr als dreimal    ❑ Chronisch
8. Wie häufig benutzen Sie den Computer? 
❑ Gar nicht ❑ Ein- bis dreimal monatlich      ❑ Mehrmals wöchentlich
❑ Weniger als einmal monatlich ❑ Etwa einmal wöchentlich 
9. Wie häufig benutzen Sie e-Mail oder Internet?
❑ Gar nicht ❑ Ein- bis dreimal monatlich      ❑ Mehrmals wöchentlich
❑ Weniger als einmal monatlich ❑ Etwa einmal wöchentlich 
10. Haben Sie ein Mobiltelefon (Handy)?
❑ Ja ❑ Nein
11. Wie würden Sie sich beschreiben, wenn Sie jemand fragen würde, wer Sie sind?
Schreiben Sie möglichst viele Antworten auf!
(Wenn Sie diese Frage nicht beantworten möchten, gehen sie bitte einfach weiter zur
nächsten Frage!)
12. Wenn Sie sich mit Menschen Ihres Alters vergleichen, fühlen Sie sich dann ganz all-
gemein etwa ebenso alt, eher jünger oder eher älter?
❑ Viel älter ❑ Eher älter ❑ Etwa ebenso alt ❑ Eher jünger ❑ Viel jünger
13. Ist dieses Gefühl meistens gleich oder schwankt es öfter?
❑ Es ist meistens gleich ❑ Es schwankt öfter
14. Wenn Sie sich mit Menschen Ihres Alters vergleichen und an verschiedene Lebens-
bereiche denken, wie fühlen Sie sich dann, bezogen auf:
  Viel   Eher    Etwa   Eher   Viel
  älter   älter    gleich   jünger    jünger
       alt
a) Ihre körperliche Fitness? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
b) Die Aktivitäten, die Sie ausführen? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
c) Ihre Beziehungen zu anderen Menschen? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
d) Ihre Interessen? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
e) Ihre geistigen Fähigkeiten? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
f)  Ihr Ansehen in der Gesellschaft? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
g) Ihr Ansehen bei Familie und Freunden? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
h) Ihre körperliche Attraktivität? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
15. Was haben Sie in den letzten Jahren neu gelernt?
❑ Eine Fremdsprache ❑ Ein Musikinstrument spielen
❑ Gesellschaftsspiele ❑ Mit dem Computer umgehen
❑ Kochen, neue Rezepte ❑ Anderes: was? …………………………………………………
16. Was tun Sie, um jung zu wirken oder sich jung zu fühlen? 
❑ Fitness/Bewegung/Sport ❑ Haare tönen/färben ❑ Bewusst flexibles Verhalten
❑ Jugendliche Kleidung ❑ Crèmes, Make up ❑ Bewusste Ernährung/Diät
❑ Gedächtnistraining ❑ Schönheitsoperationen ❑ Nichts Besonderes
❑ Anderes: was? ………………………………………………………………………………………..
17. Wenn Sie sich selbst beschreiben sollten, welche der folgenden Punkte sind dann für
Sie wichtig?
Sehr Ziemlich Mittel Wenig Gar nicht
  wichtig wichtig wichtig wichtig wichtig
Meine Nationalität ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Rollen in der Familie ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
(Eltern/Grosselternschaft etc.)
Meine Partnerschaft ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Mein Beruf/meine Erwerbstätigkeit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
(bei Pensionierten: mein ehemaliger Beruf)
Ehrenamtliche Tätigkeiten ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Eigenschaften meines Körpers ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Eigenschaften meiner Persönlichkeit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Mein Alter ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Lebensgeschichte ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Die Vereine und Organisationen, denen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
ich angehöre
Mein Freundeskreis ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Freizeitbeschäftigungen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Bei Pensionierten:
Die Tatsache, dass ich jetzt pensioniert bin ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Werthaltungen oder mein Glaube ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Anderes: was?………………………. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
………………..………………………. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
………………..………………………. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
18. Welche der folgenden Eigenschaften passen Ihrer Meinung nach zum Begriff „Alter“?
Passt   Passt  Weder Passt Passt
genau   eher  noch weniger gar nicht
Interessiertheit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Reizbarkeit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Aktivität ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Unzufriedenheit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Begeisterungsfähigkeit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ruhelosigkeit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Belastbarkeit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Bedrücktheit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Weisheit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ängstlichkeit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Selbstbewusstsein ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Egoismus ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Gelassenheit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Missgunst ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Geselligkeit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Unselbständigkeit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Anderes: was?……………………. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
……………………………………… ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
……………………………………… ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
19. Wie oft haben Sie zu den im Folgenden aufgeführten Personen Kontakt?
Täglich   Mehrmals Mehrmals   Seltener Nie  Habe
  wöchentl. monatlich  keine
Eltern ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Kinder ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Enkel ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Geschwister, nahe Verwandte ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Freunde ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
(Ehemalige) Berufskollegen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Kollegen in Vereinen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Nachbarn ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Andere: wer?………………… ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
20. Wie unterstützend oder belastend empfinden Sie den Kontakt zu den im Folgenden
aufgeführten Personen?
Sehr  Eher Weder   Eher  Sehr  Habe
unter- unter- noch belas-  belas-  keine
stützend stützend  tend  tend
Eltern ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Kinder ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Enkel ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Geschwister, nahe Verwandte ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Freunde ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
(Ehemalige) Berufskollegen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Kollegen in Vereinen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Nachbarn ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Andere: wer?………………… ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
21. Falls Sie in einer Partnerschaft leben: Wie alt ist Ihr(e) Partner(in) im Vergleich zu Ih-
nen? 
❑ Mehr als 10 Jahre älter ❑ Weniger als 4 Jahre Unterschied   ❑ Mehr als 10 Jahre jünger
❑ 4 bis 10 Jahre älter   ❑ 4 bis 10 Jahre jünger
22. Wie zufrieden sind sie mit den folgenden Lebensbereichen?
Sehr zu-    Eher zu-     Mittel    Eher un-    Sehr  un-
frieden    frieden         zufrieden   zufrieden
Ihre körperliche Fitness? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ihre Aktivitäten, die Sie ausführen? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ihre Beziehungen zu anderen Menschen? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ihre Interessen? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ihre geistigen Fähigkeiten? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ihr Ansehen in der Gesellschaft? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ihr Ansehen bei Familie und Freunden? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ihre körperliche Attraktivität? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ihre finanziellen Verhältnisse? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ihr Leben insgesamt? ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
23. Jetzt folgt eine Reihe von Aspekten, die sich mit dem Alter ändern können. Womit
sind Sie in den letzten Jahren zufriedener geworden, wo ist es eher gleich geblieben,
und womit sind Sie eher unzufriedener geworden?
Damit bin Das ist Damit bin Entfällt
ich zufrie- gleich ge- ich unzu- für
dener blieben friedener mich
Mein Aussehen ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine finanzielle Situation ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine körperliche Fitness ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine geistigen Fähigkeiten ❑ ❑ ❑
Mein Interesse an Neuem ❑ ❑ ❑
Mein Verständnis für Vorgänge in der Welt ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Fähigkeit, neue Kontakte zu schliessen ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Beziehungen zu meinen Kindern ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Beziehungen zu meinen Eltern ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Beziehungen zu meinen Enkeln ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Beziehungen zu meinem/r Partner(in) ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Mein Glaube, meine religiösen Einstellungen ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Persönlichkeit ❑ ❑ ❑
Meine Freizeitgestaltung ❑ ❑ ❑
Mein Leben insgesamt ❑ ❑ ❑
24. Wie wichtig sind Ihnen die folgenden Inhalte des Lebens?
Sehr Ziemlich Mittel Wenig    Gar nicht Entfällt
wichtig wichtig wichtig wichtig    wichtig für mich
Ehe/Lebenspartnerschaft ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Familie ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Nachbarschaft ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Freundschaft ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Mein Beruf (für Pensionierte: mein ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
ehemaliger Beruf)
Sport, Bewegung ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Organisationen, Partei, Kirche ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Kultur (Musik, Literatur, Kunst) ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Natur (Tiere, Pflanzen, Landschaft) ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Wissenschaften ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Reisen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Beschäftigung mit mir selbst ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Die Verwirklichung von inneren ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Werten
Mein Glaube ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Anderes: was? ………………………………………………………………………………
25.  Sind Sie berufstätig?
❑ Ja, vollzeitlich  gehen Sie bitte weiter zu Frage 28
❑ Ja, teilzeitlich 50 % oder mehr  gehen Sie bitte weiter zu Frage 28
❑ Ja, teilzeitlich, unter 50 %  gehen Sie bitte weiter zu Frage 28
❑ Nein, ich bin pensioniert.  Seit wann? ……… (Jahr)
❑ Nein, ich bin nicht erwerbstätig und noch nicht im Rentenalter  gehen Sie bitte weiter zu Frage 28
26. Welche von diesen Interessen sind Ihnen wichtiger geworden, seit Sie nicht mehr be-
rufstätig sind?
Wurde Wurde Blieb Etwas Viel Entfällt
viel etwas gleich weniger weniger für mich
wichtiger wichtiger wichtig wichtig wichtig
Ehe/Lebenspartnerschaft ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Familie ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Nachbarschaft ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Freundschaft ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Sport, Bewegung ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Organisationen, Partei, Kirche ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Kultur (Musik, Literatur, Kunst) ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Natur (Tiere, Pflanzen, Landschaft) ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Wissenschaften ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Reisen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Beschäftigung mit mir selbst ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Die Verwirklichung von inneren ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Werten
Mein Glaube ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Anderes: was? ………………………………………………………………………………
27. Welchen dieser Aussagen können Sie zustimmen, wenn Sie Ihr Leben im Ruhestand
vergleichen mit Ihrem Leben als Berufstätige/r?
    Stimme   Stimme   Teils Stimme Stimme
    sehr   eher   teils eher gar
    zu   zu nicht zu nicht zu
Ich geniesse es, dass ich nicht mehr täg- ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
lich pünktlich zur Arbeit erscheinen muss.
Ich vermisse oft die Herausforderung des ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Berufslebens.
Ich freue mich, dass ich nicht mehr zur ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Arbeit muss.
Ich geniesse es, dem Leistungsdruck bei ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
der Arbeit nicht mehr ausgesetzt zu sein.
Ich vermisse es, mit anderen Leuten bei ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
der Arbeit zusammen zu sein.
Ich vermisse die Freiheiten, die ich durch ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
meine Arbeit ausser Haus hatte.
Mir fehlt die Sinnhaftigkeit des Lebens, ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
wie sie durch den Beruf gegeben war.
Ich vermisse das Gefühl, eine respektierte ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Arbeitskraft zu sein.
Mir fehlt die Regelmässigkeit in meinem ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Tagesablauf, wie sie durch den Beruf
gegeben war.
Ich bin froh, dass ich mich nicht mehr mit ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
meinen Arbeitskollegen auseinander-
setzen muss.
Ich geniesse es, meine Zeit freier planen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
zu können.
28. Bitte lesen Sie die folgenden Aussagen durch und kreuzen Sie an, wie sehr diese auf
Sie zutreffen.
Stimmt Stimmt Weder Stimmt Stimmt
völlig teil- noch eher gar
weise nicht nicht
Die Lösung schwieriger Probleme gelingt ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
mir immer, wenn ich mich darum bemühe.
Ich erwarte fast nie, dass die Dinge in ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
meinem Sinne verlaufen.
Es bereitet mir keine Schwierigkeiten, mei- ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
ne Absichten und Ziele zu verwirklichen.
Ich blicke stets optimistisch in die Zukunft. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Manchmal fühle ich mich zu nichts nütze. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
In unerwarteten Situationen weiss ich ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
immer, wie ich mich verhalten soll.
In unsicheren Zeiten erwarte ich gewöhnlich ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
das Beste.
Auch bei überraschenden Ereignissen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
glaube ich, dass ich gut damit zurecht-
kommen werde.
Wenn etwas schlecht für mich ausgehen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
kann, so geschieht das auch.
Eigentlich bin ich mit mir ganz zufrieden. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ich sehe stets die guten Seiten der Dinge. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Ich glaube an die Idee, dass auf schlechte ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Tage auch wieder gute Tage folgen.
Schwierigkeiten sehe ich immer gelassen ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
entgegen, weil ich mit Problemen gut
umgehen kann.
Die Dinge entwickeln sich nie so, wie ich es ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
mir wünsche.
Ich beachte selten das Gute, das mir ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
geschieht.
Was auch immer passiert, ich werde ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
schon zurechtkommen.
29. Wie alt fühlen Sie sich? …… Jahre
30. Wie alt schätzen andere Menschen Sie ein? …… Jahre
31. Wie alt wären Sie am liebsten? …… Jahre
32. Wie beurteilen Sie das Leben, wenn man  ca. 75 Jahre alt ist?
❑ Sehr positiv ❑ Eher positiv ❑ Mittel ❑ Eher negativ ❑ Sehr negativ
33. Wie beurteilen Sie das Leben, wenn man älter als 80 Jahre alt ist?
❑ Sehr positiv ❑ Eher positiv ❑ Mittel ❑ Eher negativ ❑ Sehr negativ
34. Möchten Sie gerne 100 Jahre alt werden, sofern Sie dabei gesund bleiben könnten?
❑ Ja, sehr gern ❑ Ja, gern ❑ Weiss nicht ❑ Nein, ungern ❑ Nein, sehr ungern
35. In vielen Dingen ändert man sich ja auch im Erwachsenenalter. Welche der Verände-
rungen treffen auf Sie für die letzten 10 Jahre zu?
Keine Veränderung
Ich bin unruhiger geworden ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich bin ruhiger geworden
Ich geniesse das Leben ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich geniesse das Leben
mehr als früher weniger als früher
Ich bin mutiger geworden ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich bin weniger mutig
Ich bin ausgeglichener ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich bin weniger ausgeglichen
Ich bin vergesslicher ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich bin weniger vergesslich
Das Urteil von anderen ist ❑ ❑ ❑ Das Urteil von anderen ist
mir wichtiger geworden mir weniger wichtig
Ich achte mehr auf meinen ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich achte weniger auf
Körper meinen Körper
Ich bin passiver geworden ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich bin aktiver geworden
Ich bin selbstsicherer ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich bin weniger selbstsicher
Ich bin toleranter geworden ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich bin weniger tolerant
Ich bin mehr nach innen ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich bin mehr nach aussen
gerichtet gerichtet
Ich tue mehr, was ich ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich tue mehr, was die anderen
möchte möchten
Ich bin offener geworden ❑ ❑ ❑ Ich bin weniger offen
36. Wann haben Sie diesen Fragebogen beantwortet? (Falls Sie ihn zu verschiedenen Zei-
ten beantwortet haben: Wann haben Sie ihn hauptsächlich ausgefüllt?)
Datum:………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Ungefähre Uhrzeit:…………………………………………………………………………………....…..
Bemerkungen:
Nochmals ganz herzlichen Dank für Ihre Mithilfe!
Bitte schicken Sie den ausgefüllten Fragebogen möglichst umgehend mit dem beiliegenden
vorfrankierten Couvert zurück!
Für Interessierte: Die Resultate der Studie werden auf der Website
http://www.teuscher.ch/aging zugänglich gemacht.
Appendix B
Excerpts of the Qualitative
Interviews
B.1 Aussagen zum Stellenwert des Berufs
nach der Pensionierung
• Psychiater: “Wa¨hrend meines ganzen Erwerbslebens war ich Psychiater, und
mein ganzes Erwerbsleben war auf Psychiatrie ausgerichtet. Ich habe bereits
die Matur mit diesem Ziel gemacht.” Ob er sich nach der Berufsaufgabe
noch als Psychiater fu¨hlen werde: (lacht) “Ich glaube es schon. Ich merke
das daran, ich habe eine relativ grosse Bibliothek, die Fachbu¨cher habe ich
in der Praxis und die Belletristik daheim, und ich kann mir nicht vorstellen,
mich von den Fachbu¨chern zu trennen. Ich werde sicher auch weiterhin
manchmal was lesen.”
“Wie der relative Stellenwert sein wird der Psychiatrie nach der Pension-
ierung, das weiss ich nicht.” Ersatz nach der Pensionierung? “Nein, sonst
wu¨rde es mir leichter fallen.”
• Heimleiterin: “Ich identifizierte mich schon stark mit dem Beruf. Er war
ein Stu¨ck von mir selbst, auch ein Stu¨ck Heimat. Ich war aber auf die
Umstellung vorbereitet, kann jetzt auch aufholen, was vorher nicht mo¨glich
war.”
• Musiklehrerin: “Ich vermisse das nicht mehr, was mir fru¨her so wichtig
war, das mir als das Gro¨sste erschien, dieses Musizieren. Das ist einfach
abgeschlossen”.
“Ab und zu kommen wieder ein paar ehemalige Schu¨lerInnen (Erwachsene),
um zu spielen/Tee zu trinken. Das mo¨chte ich aber nicht regelma¨ssig, das
ist jetzt einfach vorbei.”
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• Pensionierung des Ehemannes: “Das wird auch eine Vera¨nderung der
Lebensform geben. Das Thema wird von uns etwas vermieden, es ist fast
ein wenig ein ‘Unthema’. Die Krankheit hat auch einen Einfluss, wir hoffen,
diese Pensionierung—es komme u¨berhaupt dazu.”
• Sekreta¨rin: (wie wichtig ist ihr ehemaliger Beruf noch fu¨r Sie?) “Jetzt?
Gar nicht mehr, das ist—das ist fort.” (Und wie wichtig war er vor der
Pensionierung?) “Ja, das war eher ein Auslaufen. Ich hatte meinen Beruf
sehr gern, habe sehr gern gearbeitet, aber in diesem Alter habe ich schon
gespu¨rt, da sind Ju¨ngere, und ich hatte auch nicht mehr diese Power. Und
dann ging das ganz natu¨rlich ins Auslaufen. Aber ich habe trotzdem immer
noch gern gearbeitet, aber es war nicht mehr so wichtig, nein”.
• Hauswirtschaftslehrerin: “Ich fu¨hle mich eigentlich noch gar nicht so richtig
pensioniert, weil mein Mann noch arbeitet. Ich denke, wenn er pensioniert
ist, wird es eine gro¨ssere Umstellung geben, dann ko¨nnen wir auch unsere
gemeinsame Zeit freier einteilen, la¨nger wegsein und so. Sein Beruf war und
ist mir immer auch wichtig, also zu wissen und zu verstehen, was er macht
und was ihn bescha¨ftigt.”
• Sekundarlehrer: “Der Beruf war scho¨n und wichtig fu¨r mich. Die letzte
Klasse war angenehm. Das war wichtig fu¨r mich, in einem Moment aus dem
Beruf auszusteigen, als mir das Lehrersein optimal gefallen hat” [freiwillige
fru¨hzeitige Pensionierung].
B.2 Vera¨nderungen, die an der eigenen Per-
son wahrgenommen werden
Ko¨rper:
• “Ko¨rperpflege ist intensiver geworden. Andere Sachen nehme ich mir vor,
mache es dann aber nicht, z. B. jeden Tag 1-2 Stunden an die frische Luft.
Das ta¨te mir gut. Der Ko¨rper wu¨rde mehr Bewegung brauchen als fru¨her.”
• “(bezogen auf den Ko¨rper:) Ich werde schon weniger schnell.”
• “... angeschlagene Gesundheit, in verschiedener Hinsicht ...” [Herzrhyth-
mussto¨rungen, fu¨r die immer Medikamente genommen werden mu¨ssen, Dick-
darmkrebs]
“Ja, es gab eine klare Vera¨nderung der Identita¨t, fru¨her habe ich mich immer
gesund gefu¨hlt. Dieses Selbstversta¨ndnis hat sich vera¨ndert. ... ist schon so
ein Damoklesschwert.”
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• “Ja, ko¨rperlichen Vera¨nderungen gab es schon auch ... ich bin langsamer
geworden. Das merke ich vor allem auf Bergtouren. Auch weniger attraktiv.
Das ist zeitweise schon schwierig zu akzeptieren.”
“Auf der anderen Seite ist das Intaktsein der Ko¨rpers auch nicht mehr so
wichtig wie fu¨r ju¨ngere Leute, die alles noch erleben mu¨ssen. Ich habe das
ja gehabt! Ich habe das alles gehabt.”
“Ungefa¨hr mit 50 hatte ich eine gro¨ssere Krise ... Abgeben einer gewissen
Ma¨nnlichkeit ... Ich habe mich dagegen aufgeba¨umt, wollte nicht wahrhaben,
dass ich meine Attraktivita¨t einbu¨ssen ko¨nnte. Dies hat sich dann in ver-
schiedenen Freundschaften mit sehr viel ju¨ngeren Frauen gea¨ssert. Bis ich
dann realisiert habe, dass das nichts war, und mir gesagt habe, hey, jetzt
musst du in Wu¨rde altwerden!”
• “Ja, der Blick in den Spiegel zeigt einem natu¨rlich schon: man altert!”
• “Mein Ko¨rper zeigt deutliche a¨usserliche Merkmale, zum Beispiel dass sich
die Haut vera¨ndert. Wenn ich Beschwerden wahrnehme, mache ich schneller
etwas dagegen als fru¨her und ich versuche, der Ursache auf den Grund zu
kommen.”
• “Ich schaue fast mehr zu diesem Ko¨rper als fu¨her.” [Regelma¨ssig Gymnastik,
Hometrainer (morgens und Abends 5 km), Wanderungen gemeinsam mit
dem Mann, neu auch Rudern auf dem Thunersee]. “Jetzt habe ich auch
mehr Zeit, darum schaue ich mehr zu diesem ‘Gestell’.”
Sta¨rkere Innen-Gerichtetheit, Wichtigkeit der eigenen Person:
• “Habe besser gelernt, im Moment zu leben.”
• “Habe das Gefu¨hl, ich komme immer etwas mehr zu mir selber—werde der,
der du bist...—das stimmt immer mehr. Ich werde immer authentischer.”
• “Ich habe ... mich perso¨nlich besser kennengelernt.”
• “Meine Interessen sind mehr nach innen gerichtet.”
• “Ich habe in den letzten 20 Jahren viele Rollen abgegeben, ganz bewusst.
Da hat schon ganz bewusst ein Ru¨ckzug stattgefunden. Es ist mir wichtig zu
merken, dass ich abgeben kann, dass ich ohne all das auch auskomme. Ich
habe so dieses Bild von meiner Katze, die sich auf dem Balkon in der Sonne
ra¨kelt. So mo¨chte ich werden, mit nichts als ein bisschen Sonne zufrieden
sein.”
“... Es haben von daher nicht nur die Anzahl, sondern auch die Intensita¨t,
die Verbindlichkeit, und das zeitliche Engagement der Rollen abgenommen.
Die jetzt noch vorhandenen Rollen ko¨nnten jederzeit aufgegeben werden.
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Das hat angefangen mit dem Auszug der Kinder. Die Vaterrolle ist ja die
verbindlichste, intensivste, Rund-um-die-Uhr-Rolle. Und dann der Beruf.
Und jetzt mache ich nur noch kleinere, ku¨rzere Aufgaben (wie zum Beispiel
die Stadtfu¨hrung heute). ... Gehen lassen, gehen lassen—das ist etwas was
ich lernen muss.”
• “Freue mich, dass ich etwas um meiner selbst Willen tun kann. Das lehnte
ich fru¨her total ab.”
• “Ich weiss besser, was ich will und was ich nicht will”
• “Heute mach ich nichts mehr was ich sollte, nur noch was ich will.”
• “Es gelingt mir besser, bei mir zu bleiben.”
• “Ich kann mich besser abgrenzen. Ich nehme weiterhin Anteil, weiss aber,
dass gewisse Sachen ihre [anderer Leute] Probleme sind.”
• “Habe bis 40 viel mehr Rollen gespielt, als ich mich selber war. Eigentlich
fast ausschliesslich.”
• “Ich nehme mich heute selber zunehmend wichtiger. Fru¨her war mir mehr
der Erfolg wichtig, im Beruf, bei andern Leuten, bei den Frauen. Angesehen
sein, gescha¨tzt sein und so weiter. Respektiert sein.”
• “Es hat sich vera¨ndert, dass ich u¨berhaupt Ziele habe, und diese Ziele sind
mehr nach innen gerichtet als nach aussen: dass ich zum Beispiel meine
Zufriedenheit vertiefen kann, im Beruf, im Alltag.”
Perso¨nlichkeit:
• “... (ich bin) geduldiger und gelassener geworden.”
• “Ich bin ruhiger, u¨berlegter, gelassener geworden, auch barmerziger”
“... Ich habe aber auch gemerkt, dass Ausgeglichenheit nicht sehr
erstrebenswert ist, denn so tief wie seelische Tiefs erlebt werden ko¨nnen, so
hoch ko¨nnen auch die seelischen Hochs erlebt werden.”
• “Ich wage bedeutend mehr, mich Herausforderungen zu stellen.”
• “Das ist ganz klar, dass ich ruhiger geworden bin und auch nicht mehr so
mag. Viel, auch die Aktivita¨t, ist zuru¨ckgegangen. Dass ich a¨lter geworden
bin, dass ich das spu¨re, aber positiv, finde ich eher eine positive Vera¨nderung.
Obwohl man das eben ko¨rperlich auch spu¨rt. Das sind ganz klar gemischte
Gefu¨hle. Da ist etwas loslassen, das ist nicht einfach aber man kriegt etwas
... Ruhe wu¨rde ich sagen. Einfach eine gewisse—Zufriedenheit.”
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• “Ich habe weniger das Gefu¨hl, etwas ‘erzwingen’ zu mu¨ssen. Ich lasse mich
weniger ins Bockshorn jagen.”
• “Mein Selbstvertrauen ist gestiegen, bin sicherer geworden. Ich habe auch
weniger Schuldgefu¨hle, fu¨r weiss nicht was alles, das u¨berflu¨ssig ist.”
“Ich wurde toleranter gegenu¨ber menschlichen Schwa¨chen.”
“Ich kann das Leben zunehmend geniessen, mehr Lebensfreude leben.”
Einstellungen:
• “Man weiss besser wie’s geht auf der Welt, ist weniger frustriert von gewissen
Tatsachen. Man weiss, dass man relativ wenig machen kann, um sie zu
vera¨ndern.”
“Fru¨her hatte ich mehr den Eindruck, man sollte etwas bewirken in der Welt.
Heute mo¨chte ich zufrieden werden mit dem, was ist.”
“Ich bin in gewissen Dingen nachla¨ssig geworden ... Gefu¨hl, mein Leben
nimmt langsam ein Ende, jetzt sollen die andern schauen, oder?” (bezogen
auf die Oekologie, mit der “ich es nicht mehr so genau nehme wie fru¨her”).
• “...gehe weniger der Frage nach, warum etwas so ist, frage mich eher: was
kann ich aus dieser Situation lernen?”
• “Fru¨her war das eher fu¨r mich so schwarz-weiss, jetzt hat es viele Schat-
tierungen. Was ist wert, was ist fu¨r den einen das, fu¨r den anderen das.”
• “Es gelingt mir besser zu akzeptieren, was mir gelingt und was nicht.”
• “Ziele? Heute lasse ich mich eher u¨berraschen von dem was auf mich
zukommt. Ich bin immer wieder erstaunt, was mir alles zufa¨llt.”
“Ziel ist fu¨r mich offen sein fu¨r das, was kommt”
“... freue mich auch, wer alles auf mich zukommt. Fru¨her fu¨hlte ich mich als
Aussenseiter.”
• “Mir ist bewusst geworden, dass alles Vera¨nderungen unterworfen ist, und
dass ich mich wieder daran erinnere.”
Anderes:
• “Die Vera¨nderungen erlebte ich alle als eine kontinuierliche Entwicklung,
nicht als Bruch ausgelo¨st durch Alter oder Pensionierung.”
• “Fru¨her habe ich immer auf ein spezielles Ziel hin gearbeitet, zum Beispiel
eine Auffu¨hrung oder so [Musik], auf etwas hingelebt. Wenn dies nicht
mehr besteht, ist man plo¨tzlich mit sich allein. Das ist eine unglaubliche
Bereicherung—dieses Innehalten.”
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B.3 Definitionen von Alter, Altersidentita¨t
Antworten auf die Frage: Fu¨hlen Sie sich manchmal a¨lter oder alt?
• “U¨berhaupt nicht. Meine Leistungsfa¨higkeit ist noch gross, im Vergleich mit
[Lehrer-] Kollegen, die zum Teil vo¨llig ausgebrannt sind”
• “Nein, ich weiss auch, dass ich ju¨nger wirke als ich bin.”
“Ich bin nicht sehr tolerant alten Leuten gegenu¨ber, ich nerve mich zum
Beispiel ha¨ufig, wenn sie so langsam sind, wenn sie mir im Weg sind, zum
Beispiel beim Einkaufen oder im o¨ffentlichen Verkehr.”
“Das Jung-erhalten soll aber nicht ku¨nstlich sein.”
• “Ich war jetzt 67, aber ich habe nicht das Gefu¨hl ich werde alt und a¨lter.
Wie ich dann bin und wie es geht, weiss ich nicht. Aber im Moment habe
ich das Gefu¨hl ich lebe und es geht mir gut.”
• “Also, alt fu¨hle ich mich nicht. Als a¨lter—das—spu¨re ich nur, an meinem
Umfeld, dass ich a¨lter werde. Wenn ich in die Badi gehe, schwimme, dann
am Abonnement, ‘Sind Sie AHV?’. Dort sto¨rt es mich, aber ich finde mich
jetzt sehr oft als a¨ltere Frau, und das—muss mich irgendwie dazu aufraffen—
ich bin das. Ich bin es, und ich weiss ich bin es, aber ich fu¨hle mich nicht
so.”
• “Nein, ich fu¨hle mich eigentlich nie a¨lter oder sogar alt.”
“Ich staune einfach, dass ich bereits u¨ber 60 sein soll!”
“Einmal lud zum Beispiel unsere Gemeinde hier die 60-70-ja¨hrigen ein, um
ihre Anliegen zu ho¨ren. Ich fu¨hlte mich irgendwie gar nicht angesprochen.”
• “A¨lter auf jeden Fall.”
• “Da habe ich nicht so Mu¨he: Mit 66 ist man alt, 66 Jahre hat man gelebt,
und so manches gibt es ja nicht mehr, und das ist einfach eine Tatsache.
Deshalb fa¨rbe ich auch nicht die Haare oder so. Manchmal ist es auch nicht
so einfach, z. B. beim Kleiderkaufen. Solange man aber den Humor nicht
verliert, hat das Alter auch sein Scho¨nes ... Die Erinnerungen sind zum
Beispiel etwas Scho¨nes, dem Enkel Geschichten erza¨hlen oder so.”
Wenn JA: Seit wann haben Sie den Eindruck, a¨lter oder alt zu sein?
Wenn NEIN: Was mu¨sste eintreffen, damit sie sich alt oder a¨lter
fu¨hlen wu¨rden?
Ab wann wu¨rden Sie sich als alt oder a¨lter bezeichnen?
• “In den letzten Monaten, seit der Pensionierung, denke ich o¨fters: Jetzt hast
du dich selbst zum alten Eisen getan, mit der Fru¨hpensionierung. Ist aber
nicht ein Grundgefu¨hl. Oder wenn ich nicht so mag.”
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• “Dann denke ich: Also gut, dann bist du halt mal nicht so fit, so vital.
Vielleicht kommt es dann wieder. Ich habe nicht das Gefu¨hl, dass es nur
noch bergab geht. Ich hatte diese Stimmung. Ich kenne dieses Gefu¨hl, ich
kenne es gut. Aber es ist nicht meine Grundstimmung. Ich habe aber auch
nicht mehr das Gefu¨hl, es ko¨nne nur noch besser werden—dieses Gefu¨hl
hatte ich fru¨her schon.”
• “In der letzten Zeit sehr oft:
– wenn die Beine schwer sind,
– die Runzeln auf der Haut,
– wenn ich keine Weiterbildung mehr mache,
– wenn ich Grossmutter bin.”
• “Seit ich mir bei einem Spaziergang das Knie verletzt habe. Da habe ich
gemerkt: Du bist nicht mehr wie jung!”
• “Vor einem Jahr, nach dem Schulterunfall fu¨hlte ich mich uralt. Das war
vorbei, als die Schulter wieder geheilt war. Damals war Alter negativ besetzt:
so saft- und kraftlos—erledigt, erscho¨pft, mag nicht mehr.”
“Wenn ich mich ko¨rperlich nicht gut fu¨hle, kann es eher vorkommen, dass
ich mich manchmal a¨lter fu¨hle, doch so massiv wie beim Schulterunfall—da
war es ganz massiv.”
• “Mein Alter wird von meinem inneren Befinden heraus bestimmt.”
• “Defizite haben, gesundheitliche, Leistungs-/ Antriebsdefizite, fachlich nicht
mehr auf dem neusten Stand sein ...”
“Aber auch: Erfahrung im Umgang mit Patienten, dort ist das Alter ein
Vorteil. Das wird zum Teil auch explizit verlangt von Patienten, dass sie
jemanden suchen, der schon a¨lter ist.”
• “Das Alter wirkt sich eher durch das Selbstgewa¨hlte aus, das freiwillige
Abgeben von Rollen zum Beispiel. Das Bewusstsein, dass ich noch soundso-
viele Jahre habe, wirkt sich mehr aus, als dass ich irgendetwas spu¨rte.”
• “Ab 80 sind Leute fu¨r mich alt, dort wu¨rde ich die Grenze setzen.”
• “Alte Leute sind fu¨r mich immer noch a¨lter als ich.”
• “Man muss viele Sachen nicht mehr, man darf sie, wenn man noch will ...
Zur Ruhe kommen, Innehalten ... Man nimmt vieles nicht mehr so tragisch,
wie man das fru¨her getan hat.”
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Alter als Einflussfaktor
• “Ich muss langsamer, achtsamer, sorgfa¨ltiger werden”
• “Man leistet sich mehr Bequemlichkeiten, eine gewisse Beha¨bigkeit macht
sich breit ... habe das Gefu¨hl, das verdient zu haben.”
• “alt sein heisst auch: langsamer, umsta¨ndlicher, auf andere angewiesen sein,
werde nicht mehr grosse Reisen machen, der Lebenskreis wird kleiner.” Auf
Gefu¨hle angesprochen: “Hatte noch keine schlaflosen Na¨chte deswegen. Aber
ich denke auch nicht gern daran.”
• “...grosse Befriedigung, dass trotz Alter noch Steigerung mo¨glich ist.”
• “Das Alter merke ich manchmal schon, an verschiedenen Dingen:
– dass ich keine konkrete Aufgabe habe wie fru¨her im Beruf,
– ... ich bin auch empfindlicher geworden gegenu¨ber La¨rm oder vielen
Leuten,
– ... Herzrythmussto¨rungen, Gliederschmerzen ... man ist halt schon
nicht mehr jung.
– ... kann auch nicht mehr so schnell die 150 Tritte zu meinem Haus
hochsteigen wie ju¨ngere Nachbarn,
– ... werde beim Velofahren viel u¨berholt.
– Man hat nicht mehr eine so grosse Libido. Alles Ko¨rperliche ist weniger
lustvoll.
– Es braucht mehr Zeit um eine Sprache zu erlernen. ... Die geistige
Beweglichkeit nimmt einfach ab im Alter.”
• “Neue Techniken machen mir nicht besonders Freude.” [Als Indiz fu¨r das
A¨ltersein]
B.4 Ueberlegungen zum Jungsein
Junge Leute:
• “Beneide ich gar nicht.”
• Wieder Jungsein wollen:
“...gibt es schon, aber das andere ist ha¨ufiger, dass ich froh bin, so alt zu
sein.”
... Am ehesten bei der ko¨rperlichen Leistungsfa¨higkeit, zum Beispiel beim
Bergsteigen, oder bei den Beziehungen zum anderen Geschlecht. ... Es sind
wenige Momente, in denen das auﬄammt.”
234 B.4. Ueberlegungen zum Jungsein
• “In der heutigen Zeit mo¨chte ich nicht mehr jung sein [z.B. ganz andere
Studienbedingungen] Aber ich bin nicht froh, dass ich so alt bin, nein, so
ko¨nnte ich das auch nicht sagen. Das Altsein wu¨rde ich auf dieser Skala
doch negativer beurteilen. Es geht einfach unaufhaltsam dem Ende zu, und
das finde ich dann wieder nicht so lustig. Das ist schon widerspru¨chlich.”
• “Ich mo¨chte es [Jungsein] trotz allem nicht, habe manchmal Angst, was sie
[die jungen Leute] erwartet.”
• “Ich bin ja jung gewesen, ich mo¨chte das jetzt nicht mehr. Es ist so normal
eigentlich. Das Leben hat zu jederzeit seine scho¨ne Zeit.”
“Um was ich sie beneide, ist ihre Vitalita¨t ... eine gewisse Unbeku¨mmertheit
und die geistige Beweglichkeit. Mag ihnen den freieren Umgang zwischen
den Geschlechtern go¨nnen, da hat sich ja schon viel vera¨ndert.”
• “Ich mo¨chte nochmals mit 30 anfangen. Ich wa¨re gerne Tiera¨rztin geworden.”
“Junge Leute sind freier, gewagter.”
• “Ich mo¨chte nicht mehr jung sein, nein, aber ich wu¨rde gern noch lange so
bleiben, wie ich jetzt bin.”
• “Nein, jung mo¨chte ich nicht mehr sein. Ich mo¨chte auch keine von ihren
Eigenschaften.”
“Der Kontakt zu jungen Leuten ist mir wichtig, ich bin gerne in Kontakt mit
ihnen, finde es scho¨n, wenn sie sich freuen, dass ich auch tanzen komme.”
“Ich glaube, ich habe als a¨lterer Mensch die Chance, die a¨ussere Be-
weglichkeit, die man bei Kindern so gut sieht, als innere Beweglichkeit und
Lebendigkeit zu spu¨ren”
• “Wenn ich mit ganz jungen Leuten zusammen bin, dann fu¨hle ich mich
einfach an einem andern Ort—nicht alt im negativen Sinn, so fu¨hle ich mich
nicht. Schon a¨lter, aber nicht negativ besetzt. Erfahrener, la¨nger auf dieser
Welt, mehr gesehen, so.”
“Ich mo¨chte nicht wieder jung sein. Kommt mir im Moment keine Eigen-
schaft in den Sinn, die ich mo¨chte.”
Appendix C
Statistics
C.1 Scale and Item Analyses
C.1.1 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of
Subjective Age
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. SA_GEN 3.7253 .5866 708.0
2. SA_FIT 3.5120 .7979 708.0
3. SA_ACT 3.6476 .7459 708.0
4. SA_REL 3.5607 .6727 708.0
5. SA_INT 3.6596 .6847 708.0
6. SA_COGN 3.5304 .6750 708.0
7. SA_SOC 3.4555 .6414 708.0
8. SA_FAM 3.6292 .6567 708.0
9. SA_ATTR 3.4866 .7881 708.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 32.2069 18.4384 4.2940 9
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Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
SA_GEN 28.4816 15.2055 .6314 .8397
SA_FIT 28.6949 14.3672 .5678 .8453
SA_ACT 28.5593 14.3720 .6207 .8390
SA_REL 28.6462 15.1543 .5407 .8468
SA_INT 28.5473 15.1000 .5393 .8470
SA_COGN 28.6766 15.0303 .5641 .8446
SA_SOC 28.7514 15.0605 .5959 .8419
SA_FAM 28.5777 15.0123 .5885 .8424
SA_ATTR 28.7203 14.1445 .6196 .8393
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 708.0 N of Items = 9
Alpha = .8579
C.1.2 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of
Health State
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. HEALTHST 2.0446 .7584 785.0
2. SICKLEAV 1.5968 1.0250 785.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 3.6414 2.5214 1.5879 2
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Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
HEALTHST 1.5968 1.0506 .5761 .
SICKLEAV 2.0446 .5752 .5761 .
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 785.0 N of Items = 2
Alpha = .7105
C.1.3 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of Sat-
isfaction
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. SAT_FITN 2.1324 .9409 729.0
2. SAT_ACT 1.8669 .8569 729.0
3. SAT_REL 1.7977 .7388 729.0
4. SAT_INT 1.7277 .7274 729.0
5. SAT_COGN 1.8663 .7570 729.0
6. SAT_SOC 2.0370 .7668 729.0
7. SAT_FAM 1.6543 .7080 729.0
8. SAT_ATTR 2.2524 .8641 729.0
9. SAT_FIN 2.1379 .9639 729.0
10. SAT_LIFE 1.6831 .6986 729.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 19.1557 29.7844 5.4575 10
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Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
SAT_FITN 17.0233 23.6705 .5711 .8572
SAT_ACT 17.2888 23.3798 .6842 .8466
SAT_REL 17.3580 24.7920 .6044 .8539
SAT_INT 17.4280 24.7623 .6206 .8528
SAT_COGN 17.2894 24.9347 .5657 .8567
SAT_SOC 17.1187 24.5762 .6078 .8534
SAT_FAM 17.5014 24.9169 .6178 .8532
SAT_ATTR 16.9033 24.0356 .5904 .8547
SAT_FIN 17.0178 24.9145 .4095 .8725
SAT_LIFE 17.4726 24.8138 .6440 .8515
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 729.0 N of Items = 10
Alpha = .8679
C.1.4 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of Op-
timism
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. OPT2 1.9056 .9629 752.0
2. OPT5 1.7846 .8213 752.0
3. OPT6 1.4149 .6574 752.0
4. OPT7 2.6044 1.1298 752.0
5. OPT8 2.1097 1.2037 752.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 9.8191 9.8301 3.1353 5
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Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
OPT2 7.9136 6.6889 .4445 .5695
OPT5 8.0346 7.0621 .4796 .5621
OPT6 8.4043 7.7165 .4604 .5857
OPT7 7.2148 6.6779 .3213 .6379
OPT8 7.7094 6.1042 .3828 .6103
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 752.0 N of Items = 5
Alpha = .6448
C.1.5 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of Self-
Efficacy
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. SEEF1 1.7593 .6888 756.0
2. SEEF3 2.2639 .8993 756.0
3. SEEF4 1.9709 .8214 756.0
4. SEEF5 2.1759 .9290 756.0
5. SEEF6 1.7824 .7927 756.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 9.9524 9.4620 3.0760 5
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Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
SEEF1 8.1931 7.0481 .5303 .7706
SEEF3 7.6885 6.2197 .5425 .7673
SEEF4 7.9815 6.1142 .6581 .7283
SEEF5 7.7765 5.7970 .6263 .7385
SEEF6 8.1700 6.6562 .5323 .7683
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 756.0 N of Items = 5
Alpha = .7943
C.1.6 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of Job
Deprivation
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. JOBDEP01 1.5036 .8927 411.0
2. JOBDEP02 2.5596 1.1804 411.0
3. JOBDEP03 1.9331 1.0825 411.0
4. JOBDEP04 1.7007 .9755 411.0
5. JOBDEP05 2.7664 1.1683 411.0
6. JOBDEP06 2.0973 1.0911 411.0
7. JOBDEP07 1.9294 1.0649 411.0
8. JOBDEP08 2.0608 1.1744 411.0
9. JOBDEP09 1.8783 1.0864 411.0
10. JOBDEP11 1.3990 .6959 411.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 19.8285 47.7760 6.9120 10
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Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
JOBDEP01 18.3248 41.9729 .4328 .8503
JOBDEP02 17.2689 38.1355 .5657 .8402
JOBDEP03 17.8954 39.7622 .5012 .8456
JOBDEP04 18.1277 41.8867 .3910 .8539
JOBDEP05 17.0620 37.7163 .6059 .8362
JOBDEP06 17.7311 38.3550 .6090 .8359
JOBDEP07 17.8990 38.0148 .6570 .8316
JOBDEP08 17.7676 36.9782 .6594 .8309
JOBDEP09 17.9501 37.5640 .6782 .8295
JOBDEP11 18.4294 42.8694 .4853 .8478
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 411.0 N of Items = 10
Alpha = .8542
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C.1.7 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of At-
titude Towards Old Age (Associative Questions)
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. INTER18 2.0607 .9880 643.0
2. REIZB18 2.9510 1.0647 643.0
3. AKTIV18 2.3072 1.0372 643.0
4. UNZU18 2.6882 1.1505 643.0
5. BEGEI18 2.4425 1.0854 643.0
6. BEDRU18 2.8748 1.0853 643.0
7. AENGS18 3.0319 1.1771 643.0
8. SELBS18 2.2846 .9430 643.0
9. EGOIS18 2.8095 1.1836 643.0
10. MISSG18 2.3258 1.1594 643.0
11. UNSEL18 2.6019 1.2216 643.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 28.3779 64.3118 8.0195 11
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
INTER18 26.3173 55.3088 .5462 .8620
REIZB18 25.4269 55.1177 .5099 .8643
AKTIV18 26.0708 55.4152 .5065 .8645
UNZU18 25.6897 51.5808 .6903 .8515
BEGEI18 25.9355 54.3334 .5500 .8616
BEDRU18 25.5031 53.3333 .6183 .8570
AENGS18 25.3460 52.9194 .5843 .8593
SELBS18 26.0933 56.8760 .4603 .8672
EGOIS18 25.5684 53.5685 .5392 .8627
MISSG18 26.0521 52.1433 .6464 .8547
UNSEL18 25.7760 51.5868 .6401 .8551
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Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 643.0 N of Items = 11
Alpha = .8712
C.1.8 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of At-
titude Towards Old Age (Direct Questions)
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. JUDG75 2.4125 .7872 714.0
2. JUDG80 2.9083 .9118 714.0
3. JUDG100 2.8845 1.1936 714.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 8.2052 5.4694 2.3387 3
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
JUDG75 5.7927 3.2038 .5841 .5917
JUDG80 5.2969 2.6445 .6723 .4540
JUDG100 5.3207 2.4966 .4105 .8377
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 714.0 N of Items = 3
Alpha = .7114
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C.1.9 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of
Work on the Computer
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. COMP 2.5691 1.8392 789.0
2. EMAIL 2.0684 1.6695 789.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 4.6375 10.9446 3.3083 2
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
COMP 2.0684 2.7872 .7775 .
EMAIL 2.5691 3.3826 .7775 .
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 789.0 N of Items = 2
Alpha = .8725
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C.1.10 Reliability Analysis for the Measurement of
Identity Diversity
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. ID_NAT 3.5837 1.2338 520.0
2. ID_FAM 3.8769 1.0771 520.0
3. ID_PARTN 4.4731 1.0006 520.0
4. ID_PROF 3.9288 1.1284 520.0
5. ID_VOLU 2.7500 1.2809 520.0
6. ID_BODY 3.6760 .9583 520.0
7. ID_PERS 3.9010 .8954 520.0
8. ID_AGE 2.8808 1.0508 520.0
9. ID_BIOGR 3.0615 1.1035 520.0
10. ID_ORG 2.7308 1.3171 520.0
11. ID_FRIEN 4.0529 .8700 520.0
12. ID_LEIS 4.1125 .8676 520.0
13. ID_VALUE 3.7827 1.0810 520.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
SCALE 46.8106 50.7690 7.1252 13
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Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Alpha
if Item if Item Total if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted
ID_NAT 43.2269 43.3935 .3601 .7508
ID_FAM 42.9337 43.8429 .4042 .7452
ID_PARTN 42.3375 45.5925 .3090 .7547
ID_PROF 42.8817 44.7052 .3175 .7547
ID_VOLU 44.0606 42.6259 .3888 .7477
ID_BODY 43.1346 43.5146 .5011 .7366
ID_PERS 42.9096 43.8223 .5183 .7361
ID_AGE 43.9298 44.0900 .3995 .7458
ID_BIOGR 43.7490 42.3333 .5026 .7344
ID_ORG 44.0798 42.7176 .3669 .7508
ID_FRIEN 42.7577 44.7947 .4480 .7428
ID_LEIS 42.6981 46.5484 .2929 .7558
ID_VALUE 43.0279 45.5305 .2790 .7582
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 520 N of Items = 13 Alpha = .7621
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C.2 Professional Identity: Multiple Regres-
sion
C.3 Domains of Subjective Age: Factor
Analyses
C.4 Predictors for Subjective Age: Multiple
Regression
C.5 Structural Equation for Subjective Age:
Measurement Model and Predictive
Model
Linear Regression with crossvalidation for the dependent variable professional 
identity 
 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b
self-efficacy
belief .
Stepwise (Criteria:
Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050,
Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100).
job deprivation .
Stepwise (Criteria:
Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050,
Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100).
professional
status .
Stepwise (Criteria:
Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050,
Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100).
Model
1
2
3
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
Dependent Variable: professional identitya. 
Models are based only on cases for which Approximately 50 % of cases
(SAMPLE) =  Selected
b. 
 
 
 
Model Summaryd,e
.163a .026 .024 1.049
.223b .050 .045 1.038
.265c .295 .070 .063 1.028
Model
1
2
3
Approximately
50 % of cases
(SAMPLE) = 
Selected
(Selected)
Approximately
50 % of cases
(SAMPLE) ~=
Selected
(Unselected)
R
R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), self-efficacy beliefa. 
Predictors: (Constant), self-efficacy belief, job deprivationb. 
Predictors: (Constant), self-efficacy belief, job deprivation, professional
status
c. 
Unless noted otherwise, statistics are based only on cases for which
Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) =  Selected.
d. 
Dependent Variable: professional identitye. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVAd,e
11.592 1 11.592 10.537 .001a
426.866 388 1.100
438.458 389
21.744 2 10.872 10.097 .000b
416.714 387 1.077
438.458 389
30.777 3 10.259 9.713 .000c
407.681 386 1.056
438.458 389
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
2
3
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), self-efficacy beliefa. 
Predictors: (Constant), self-efficacy belief, job deprivationb. 
Predictors: (Constant), self-efficacy belief, job deprivation, professional statusc. 
Dependent Variable: professional identityd. 
Selecting only cases for which Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) =  Selectede. 
 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b
4.486 .186 24.138 .000
-.290 .089 -.163 -3.246 .001
3.863 .274 14.109 .000
-.343 .090 -.192 -3.805 .000
.344 .112 .155 3.071 .002
3.412 .312 10.941 .000
-.310 .090 -.173 -3.441 .001
.359 .111 .161 3.226 .001
7.409E-02 .025 .145 2.924 .004
(Constant)
self-efficacy belief
(Constant)
self-efficacy belief
job deprivation
(Constant)
self-efficacy belief
job deprivation
professional status
Model
1
2
3
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: professional identitya. 
Selecting only cases for which Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) =  Selectedb. 
 
 
Excluded Variablesd
-.044a -.872 .384 -.044 1.000
-.059a -1.185 .237 -.060 .999
-.022a -.430 .667 -.022 .997
.138a 2.752 .006 .139 .981
-.083a -1.663 .097 -.084 .999
.043a .864 .388 .044 .998
-.015a -.302 .763 -.015 1.000
.155a 3.071 .002 .154 .964
-.055b -1.103 .271 -.056 .995
-.057b -1.140 .255 -.058 .999
-.027b -.548 .584 -.028 .995
.145b 2.924 .004 .147 .979
-.080b -1.615 .107 -.082 .999
.067b 1.332 .184 .068 .977
-.014b -.281 .779 -.014 1.000
-.004c -.068 .946 -.003 .867
-.065c -1.314 .190 -.067 .996
-.102c -1.909 .057 -.097 .832
-.081c -1.654 .099 -.084 .998
.051c 1.013 .312 .052 .964
-.007c -.151 .880 -.008 .998
SEX
age
education level
professional status
retirement status
duration of last job
duration of retirement
job deprivation
SEX
age
education level
professional status
retirement status
duration of last job
duration of retirement
SEX
age
education level
retirement status
duration of last job
duration of retirement
Model
1
2
3
Beta In t Sig.
Partial
Correlation Tolerance
Collinearity
Statistics
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), self-efficacy beliefa. 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), self-efficacy belief, job deprivationb. 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), self-efficacy belief, job deprivation, professional statusc. 
Dependent Variable: professional identityd. 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b
2.80 4.61 3.91 .281 390 2.88 4.70 3.91 .297 402
-3.25 1.67 .00 1.024 390 -3.52 1.86 .10 .992 402
-3.942 2.492 .000 1.000 390 -3.649 2.818 -.002 1.056 402
-3.158 1.626 .000 .996 390 -3.427 1.812 .098 .965 402
Predicted Value
Residual
Std. Predicted Value
Std. Residual
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.
Deviation N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.
Deviation N
Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) =  Selected
(Selected)
Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) ~= Selected
(Unselected)
Dependent Variable: professional identitya. 
Pooled Casesb. 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analyses for different aspects of subjective age
Communalities
1.000 .624
1.000 .648
1.000 .394
1.000 .595
general feeling
activities
interests
attractiveness
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Total Variance Explained
2.262 56.557 56.557 2.262 56.557 56.557
.736 18.412 74.969
.526 13.139 88.107
.476 11.893 100.000
Component
1
2
3
4
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Component Matrixa
.790
.805
.628
.772
general feeling
activities
interests
attractiveness
1
Compone
nt
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
Rotated Component Matrixa
Only one component was extracted.
The solution cannot be rotated.
a. 
Communalities
1.000 .577
1.000 .768
1.000 .620
1.000 .620
1.000 .591
1.000 .565
1.000 .543
1.000 .510
general feeling
fitness
activities
relations to others
interests
mental abilities
esteem by society
esteem by fam. +
friends
attractiveness
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Total Variance Explained
4.253 47.258 47.258 4.253 47.258
1.209 13.434 60.692 1.209 13.434
.802 8.916 69.608
.609 6.761 76.369
.505 5.613 81.982
.468 5.195 87.177
.427 4.739 91.916
.413 4.589 96.505
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Total
% of
Variance
Cumulative
% Total
% of
Variance
Cumulative
% Total
Initial Eigenvalues
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
Rotation
Sums of
Squared
Loadingsa
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total
variance.
a.
60.692 3.424
47.258 5.555
Component Matrix a
.726
.667 -.568
.715 -.331
.652 .441
.644 .420
.667 .347
.702
.696
general feeling
fitness
activities
relations to others
interests
mental abilities
esteem by society
esteem by fam. +
friends
attractiveness
1 2
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
2 components extracted.a.
Component Correlation Matrix
1.000 -.499
-.499 1.000
Component
1
2
1 2
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Pattern Matrix a
-.626
-.944
-.730
.827
.801
.743
.644
.579
general feeling
fitness
activities
relations to others
interests
mental abilities
esteem by society
esteem by fam. +
friends
attractiveness
1 2
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 6 iterations.a.
-.798
Component Plot in Rotated Space
Component 1
1.0.50.0-.5-1.0
Co
mp
on
en
t 2
1 .0
.5
0.0
-.5
-1.0
attractiveness
esteem by fam. + fr iesteem by socie ty
menta l abil ities
interestsrelations to others
activi ties
fi tness
general fee ling
Linear Regression with crossvalidation for the dependent variable subjective age 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b
satisfaction with
fitness .
Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050,
Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100).
satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness .
Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050,
Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100).
optimism . Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050,Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100).
"youth-preserving"
activities .
Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050,
Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100).
health state . Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050,Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100).
Model
1
2
3
4
5
Variables Entered
Variables
Removed Method
Dependent Variable: KASTENBAa. 
Models are based only on cases for which Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) =  Selectedb. 
 
 
 
Model Summaryf,g
.475a .225 .223 .47726
.526b .277 .273 .46176
.557c .310 .305 .45155
.576d .331 .324 .44518
.594e .545 .353 .344 .43857
Model
1
2
3
4
5
Approximately
50 % of cases
(SAMPLE) = 
Selected
(Selected)
Approximately
50 % of cases
(SAMPLE) ~=
Selected
(Unselected)
R
R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitnessa. 
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness, optimism
c. 
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness, optimism, "youth-preserving" activities
d. 
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness, optimism, "youth-preserving" activities, health state
e. 
Unless noted otherwise, statistics are based only on cases for which
Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) =  Selected.
f. 
Dependent Variable: KASTENBAg. 
 
ANOVAf,g
25.726 1 25.726 112.943 .000a
88.379 388 .228
114.105 389
31.586 2 15.793 74.068 .000b
82.519 387 .213
114.105 389
35.399 3 11.800 57.870 .000c
78.706 386 .204
114.105 389
37.803 4 9.451 47.686 .000d
76.302 385 .198
114.105 389
40.244 5 8.049 41.846 .000e
73.861 384 .192
114.105 389
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
2
3
4
5
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitnessa. 
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness, optimism
c. 
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness, optimism, "youth-preserving" activities
d. 
Predictors: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness, optimism, "youth-preserving" activities, health state
e. 
Dependent Variable: KASTENBAf. 
Selecting only cases for which Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) =  Selectedg. 
 
Coefficientsa,b
4.223 .060 70.653 .000
-.277 .026 -.475 -10.627 .000
4.425 .069 63.751 .000
-.183 .031 -.313 -5.894 .000
-.179 .034 -.278 -5.242 .000
4.764 .104 45.928 .000
-.168 .030 -.289 -5.523 .000
-.166 .033 -.258 -4.945 .000
-.184 .042 -.187 -4.324 .000
4.553 .119 38.314 .000
-.156 .030 -.267 -5.157 .000
-.154 .033 -.239 -4.627 .000
-.168 .042 -.171 -3.978 .000
4.837E-02 .014 .151 3.482 .001
4.647 .120 38.726 .000
-.106 .033 -.181 -3.203 .001
-.142 .033 -.222 -4.336 .000
-.152 .042 -.155 -3.644 .000
4.946E-02 .014 .155 3.614 .000
-.128 .036 -.178 -3.563 .000
(Constant)
satisfaction with fitness
(Constant)
satisfaction with fitness
satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness
(Constant)
satisfaction with fitness
satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness
optimism
(Constant)
satisfaction with fitness
satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness
optimism
"youth-preserving"
activities
(Constant)
satisfaction with fitness
satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness
optimism
"youth-preserving"
activities
health state
Model
1
2
3
4
5
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: KASTENBAa. 
Selecting only cases for which Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) =  Selectedb. 
 
 
Excluded Variables f
-.220a -4.190 .000 -.208 .692
-.278
a
-5.242 .000 -.258 .662
-.135a -2.913 .004 -.146 .910
-.207a -4.655 .000 -.230 .962
-.233a -3.912 .000 -.195 .542
.194
a
4.325 .000 .215 .946
-.195b -3.788 .000 -.189 .685
-.098b -2.131 .034 -.108 .884
-.187b -4.324 .000 -.215 .954
-.100b -1.463 .144 -.074 .396
.170
b
3.868 .000 .193 .934
-.174c -3.429 .001 -.172 .677
-.014c -.280 .780 -.014 .710
.004c .051 .959 .003 .345
.151
c
3.482 .001 .175 .923
-.178d -3.563 .000 -.179 .677
-.009d -.178 .859 -.009 .710
.034d .472 .637 .024 .341
.000e -.005 .996 .000 .708
.037e .528 .598 .027 .340
health state
satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness
self-efficacy belief
optimism
satisfaction
"youth-preserving"
activities
health state
self-efficacy belief
optimism
satisfaction
"youth-preserving"
activities
health state
self-efficacy belief
satisfaction
"youth-preserving"
activities
health state
self-efficacy belief
satisfaction
self-efficacy belief
satisfaction
Model
1
2
3
4
5
Beta In t Sig.
Partial
Correlation Tolerance
Collinearity
Statistics
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), satisfaction with fitnessa. 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness
b. 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness, optimism
c. 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness, optimism, "youth-preserving" activities
d. 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), satisfaction with fitness, satisfaction with
phys.attractiveness, optimism, "youth-preserving" activities, health state
e. 
Dependent Variable: KASTENBAf.  
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa,b
2.4577 4.3660 3.6424 .32165 390 2.4304 4.3965 3.5902 .31823 402
-1.4744 1.4226 .0000 .43574 390 -1.2562 1.4798 .0072 .44685 402
-3.683 2.250 .000 1.000 390 -3.768 2.345 -.162 .989 402
-3.362 3.244 .000 .994 390 -2.864 3.374 .016 1.019 402
Predicted Value
Residual
Std. Predicted Valu
Std. Residual
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.
Deviat N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.
Deviatio N
Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) = Approximately 50 % of cases (SAMPLE) ~= Selected
Dependent Variable: KASTENBAa. 
Pooled Casesb. 
 
Structural Equation Models
---------------------------
Measurement Model of Subjective Age
Sample size:   390
Computation of degrees of freedom:
                      Number of distinct sample moments:   14
          Number of distinct parameters to be estimated:   12
                                     -------------------------
                                     Degrees of freedom:    2
Minimum was achieved.
Chi-square = 1.141
Degrees of freedom = 2
Probability level = 0.565
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
----------------------------
Regression Weights:                      Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label
-------------------                      --------   -------   -------   -------
 sa_int <------------ subjective_age       1.000
 sa_gen <------------ subjective_age       1.568     0.213     7.346
 sa_act <------------ subjective_age       1.871     0.257     7.289
 sa_attr <----------- subjective_age       1.894     0.264     7.184
Standardized Regression Weights:         Estimate
--------------------------------         --------
 sa_int <------------ subjective_age       0.431
 sa_gen <------------ subjective_age       0.772
 sa_act <------------ subjective_age       0.741
 sa_attr <----------- subjective_age       0.700
Summary of models
-----------------
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   ---------
       Default model    12       1.141     2       0.565       0.570
     Saturated model    14       0.000     0
  Independence model     4    5413.824    10       0.000     541.382
                          DELTA1     RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2
               Model         NFI      RFI         IFI         TLI       CFI
    ----------------     -------  -------  ----------  ----------  --------
       Default model       1.000    0.999       1.000       1.001     1.000
     Saturated model       1.000                1.000                 1.000
  Independence model       0.000    0.000       0.000       0.000     0.000
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
       Default model       0.000       0.000       0.085       0.791
  Independence model       1.179       1.152       1.205       0.000
Measurement Model of Subjective Age: Cross-Validation
Sample size: 402 (sample split by a random filter variable)
Chi-square = 2.255
Degrees of freedom = 2
Probability level = 0.324
Summary of models
-----------------
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   ---------
       Default model    12       2.255     2       0.324       1.128
     Saturated model    14       0.000     0
  Independence model     4    5500.868    10       0.000     550.087
                          DELTA1      RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2
               Model         NFI       RFI         IFI         TLI       CFI
    ----------------  ----------  --------  ----------  ----------  --------
       Default model       1.000     0.998       1.000       1.000     1.000
     Saturated model       1.000                 1.000                 1.000
  Independence model       0.000       0.000     0.000       0.000     0.000
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
       Default model       0.018       0.000       0.102       0.616
  Independence model       1.170       1.144       1.196       0.000
******************************************************************************
Predictive Model of Subjective Age
Sample size:   390
Computation of degrees of freedom:
                      Number of distinct sample moments:  230
          Number of distinct parameters to be estimated:   70
                                     -------------------------
                                     Degrees of freedom:  160
Minimum was achieved.
Chi-square = 561.724
Degrees of freedom = 160
Probability level = 0.000
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
----------------------------
Regression Weights:                      Estimate     S.E.      C.R.
-------------------                      --------   -------   -------
 subjective age <------- personality       0.296     0.168     1.763
 subjective age <-------------- body       1.000
 subjective age <---------- behavior      -0.568     0.265    -2.145
 subjective age <------- satsfaction      -0.726     0.221    -3.284
 m_seef <--------------- personality       1.000
 m_opt <---------------- personality       0.742     0.077     9.592
 healthst <-------------------- body       0.812     0.069    11.842
 sat_attr <-------------------- body       1.000
 sickleav <-------------------- body       0.750     0.092     8.191
 sat_fitn <-------------------- body       1.241     0.089    13.935
 edv <--------------------- behavior       1.000
 phone <------------------- behavior      -0.271     0.126    -2.151
 sat_act <-------------- satsfaction       1.452     0.171     8.491
 sat_fin <-------------- satsfaction       1.000
 msatsoc <-------------- satsfaction       1.012     0.119     8.474
 msatcogn <------------- satsfaction       1.009     0.123     8.191
 sat_life <------------- satsfaction       1.002     0.123     8.175
 actyouth <---------------- behavior       2.427     0.841     2.884
 learnt <------------------ behavior       1.500     0.517     2.899
 m_judg <--------------- personality       0.706     0.104     6.810
 sa_attr <----------- subjective age      -0.888     0.136    -6.545
 sa_int <------------ subjective age      -0.409     0.079    -5.178
 sa_gen <------------ subjective age      -0.633     0.098    -6.471
 sa_act <------------ subjective age      -0.803     0.124    -6.486
Standardized Regression Weights:         Estimate
--------------------------------         --------
 subjective age <------- personality       0.203
 subjective age <-------------- body       0.904
 subjective age <---------- behavior      -0.291
 subjective age <------- satsfaction      -0.475
 m_seef <--------------- personality       0.784
 m_opt <---------------- personality       0.626
 healthst <-------------------- body       0.668
 sat_attr <-------------------- body       0.720
 sickleav <-------------------- body       0.457
 sat_fitn <-------------------- body       0.813
 edv <--------------------- behavior       0.215
 phone <------------------- behavior      -0.198
 sat_act <-------------- satsfaction       0.745
 sat_fin <-------------- satsfaction       0.467
 msatsoc <-------------- satsfaction       0.740
 msatcogn <------------- satsfaction       0.681
 sat_life <------------- satsfaction       0.678
 actyouth <---------------- behavior       0.501
 learnt <------------------ behavior       0.580
 m_judg <--------------- personality       0.415
 sa_attr <----------- subjective age      -0.760
 sa_int <------------ subjective age      -0.408
 sa_gen <------------ subjective age      -0.722
 sa_act <------------ subjective age      -0.736
Covariances:                             Estimate     S.E.      C.R.
------------                             --------   -------   -------
 personality <------------> behavior      -0.077     0.029    -2.709
 personality <----------------> body       0.142     0.023     6.271
 satsfaction <----------------> body       0.210     0.031     6.682
 satsfaction <---------> personality       0.153     0.023     6.635
 body <-------------------> behavior      -0.069     0.029    -2.424
 satsfaction <------------> behavior      -0.075     0.028    -2.671
Correlations:                            Estimate
-------------                            --------
 personality <------------> behavior      -0.471
 personality <----------------> body       0.488
 satsfaction <----------------> body       0.761
 satsfaction <---------> personality       0.731
 body <-------------------> behavior      -0.319
 satsfaction <------------> behavior      -0.477
Summary of models
-----------------
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   ---------
       Default model    70     561.724   160       0.000       3.511
     Saturated model   230       0.000     0
  Independence model    20   19297.436   210       0.000      91.893
                          DELTA1      RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2
               Model         NFI       RFI         IFI         TLI         CFI
    ----------------  ----------  --------  ----------  ----------  ----------
       Default model       0.971     0.962       0.979       0.972       0.979
     Saturated model       1.000                 1.000                   1.000
  Independence model       0.000     0.000       0.000       0.000       0.000
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
       Default model       0.080       0.073       0.088       0.000
  Independence model       0.483       0.478       0.489       0.000
Predictive Model of Subjective Age: Cross-Validation
Sample size: 402 (sample split by a random filter variable)
Minimum was achieved.
Chi-square = 622.009
Degrees of freedom = 160
Probability level = 0.000
Summary of models
-----------------
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   ---------
       Default model    70     622.009   160       0.000       3.888
     Saturated model   230       0.000     0
  Independence model    20   20061.023   210       0.000      95.529
                          DELTA1       RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2
               Model         NFI        RFI         IFI         TLI        CFI
    ----------------  ----------  ---------  ----------  ----------  ---------
       Default model       0.969      0.959       0.977       0.969      0.977
     Saturated model       1.000                  1.000                  1.000
  Independence model       0.000      0.000       0.000       0.000      0.000
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
       Default model       0.085       0.078       0.092       0.000
  Independence model       0.486       0.480       0.491       0.000
